

Hamilton County, Ohio
Corrections Review Task Force: Cost/Facility Sub-committee Report
July 27, 2006

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The Cost/Facility sub-committee was created to provide focused analysis and recommendations to the Corrections Review Task Force concerning cost and facility issues for several options to address the current and long-term jail space needs. This effort was conducted in collaboration with the Treatment Services sub-committee.

NOTE: This sub-committee was not charged with assessing financing options as these options are largely driven by revenue policies established by the Board of County Commissioners.

Summary Recommendations:

1. The county's jail facilities are a part of the entire criminal justice system and the ultimate size and number of jail facilities will be determined by the interaction and collaboration of all components of the criminal justice system (law enforcement, prosecution, the judiciary, etc.). The Cost/Facility sub-committee supports the recommendations of the Treatment Services sub-committee concerning the need for better coordination and interaction of these various justice system components to improve outcomes at all levels.

Until the results of better coordination are demonstrated and realized, the Cost/Facility sub-committee recommends that Hamilton County build an 1,800-bed facility to address immediate public safety needs.

2. The recommended 1,800-bed facility should be a stand alone facility that consolidates the Queensgate, Reading Road, and Turning Point facilities because it is the most cost effective approach based on operating and capital costs.
3. The county should establish a Jail Facility Working Group to help guide the county in the development of facility specifications and general design to minimize capital costs of the project. This group will include functional experts to ensure program and treatment areas (i.e., mental health services) are designed in a fashion to ensure maximum success in reducing recidivism.
4. The new facility should include specialty beds and housing to address the increasing special needs inmate population identified in both the Voorhis Associates and the Vera Institute reports.
5. The facility design should allow for future cost effective expansion to meet the jail space needs beyond the year 2020.

I. Background

The starting point of the sub-committee's efforts was a review and understanding of the Hamilton County Corrections Master Plan and supporting documents. The county engaged the services of Voorhis Associates Inc. to provide an assessment of the current corrections system and to provide a program plan with corresponding facility recommendations to address current system deficiencies and future bed space needs.

While the estimated project cost in the Master Plan totals \$225 million for a 627,000 square foot facility it was important for the sub-committee to understand how these numbers were derived. Voorhis examined current facilities, alternatives to incarceration, treatment programs, inmate profiles, and population projections. These efforts are described in detail within the Master Plan report. Attachment A provides the breakdown of the recommended beds based on inmate projections through the year 2020, 15-years from when the assessment was begun in mid-2005.

Once the number and types of inmate beds were determined, space for support functions (food service, laundry, etc.) and programming (medical, mental health, other treatment programs) was determined. Attachment B provides the estimated square foot requirement by functional area.

After the type and size of the facility was determined, a firm that specializes in cost estimates for correctional institutions (Construction Cost Systems Inc.) was engaged to provide a construction estimate. This construction estimate combined with other project costs (land acquisition, professional service fees, etc.) results in the \$225 million figure in the Master Plan document. This figure is not only aligned to the number and types of inmate beds determined in the planning efforts it also includes a facility core (kitchen, laundry, physical plant, etc.) for a inmate population projection through the year 2030. This provides the county the opportunity to cost effectively expand the facility for bed space alone in future years.

The sub-committee agrees with the space requirement and cost estimation approach of Voorhis Associates; however, the actual cost of the project will be determined once a site is selected, a detailed design is developed, and the space requirements for each area are assessed in the context of the detailed design under the oversight of the proposed Jail Facility Working Group.

While the general approach to the planning exercise is important to understanding the Master Plan recommendations, the more relevant information for the sub-committee was the facility assessment conducted as part of the Master Plan effort (Attachment C) as well as a 2002 independent facility assessment of the Queensgate facility. Please see section III for a description of the current facilities.

II. Approach

Once the sub-committee understood the Master Plan approach, the committee identified the factors that would allow for the development of alternatives to the recommendations in the Master Plan. These factors include, but are not limited to; the condition and ownership of existing facilities, construction type for a new facility (vertical v. horizontal), site location, the

number of facilities to operate and manage, total operating and capital costs, public versus private sector ownership and/or operations, need for and feasibility of expansion, providing treatment programs on-site versus off-site, and other risk factors.

This general framework helped the sub-committee develop the following options for evaluation:

- a) Develop a new 1,800-bed facility and consolidate three of the four existing facilities into the new structure. [This is referred to as the Master Plan recommendation.]
- b) Renovate the Queensgate facility to a higher security level, vacate the Reading Road and Turning Point facilities, and expand the existing Justice Center with a 1,000-bed addition. [This is referred to as the Queensgate Renovation / Justice Center Expansion alternative.]
- c) Renovate the Queensgate facility to a higher security level, vacate the Reading Road and Turning Point facilities, and add a 1,000-bed addition to the Queensgate facility. The entire Queensgate jail facility would be owned and operated by a private contractor. [This is referred to as the Queensgate Renovation & Expansion alternative.]

The sub-committee assumed that existing treatment programs at Reading Road and Turning Point would be provided in a centralized facility to maximize efficiency and effectiveness.¹

III. Current Facilities

As described in the Facility Assessment section of the Master Plan and summarized in the table that follows, the county uses four correctional facilities. Additionally, beginning in April 2006, the county also uses 200 contract beds at the Butler County jail.

Table I – Current Correctional Facilities

Facility	Ownership	Age (years)	Inmate Beds	Primary Use
Justice Center	County	21	1,240 (rated initially for 848)	Maximum security, inmate medical, central in-take
Queensgate	Corrections Corporation of America	100	822	All males, 50% minimum security, 40% medium security, 10% maximum security
Reading Road	Talbert House	76	150	100 women and 50 men – substance abuse treatment programs
Turning Point	Talbert House	76	60	DWI treatment program – men
Total			2,272	

¹ Please see the Corrections Review Task Force report for a discussion of the need to centralize and coordinate treatment programs.

The county leases the Queensgate facility for approximately \$2 million per year. The county also pays the property taxes at approximately \$100,000 annually and all utility costs. Talbert House owns and operates the Reading Road and Turning Point facilities with the county providing security, food service, medical, and transportation. The facility costs associated with the Talbert House facilities are estimated at \$442,000 annually. The Queensgate and Talbert House facility costs were included in the cost-to-own model described in Section V.

IV. Key Decision Factors Concerning Jail Facility Projects

In developing and assessing alternative jail facilities the sub-committee developed several essential criteria beyond the number of beds. Each of the alternatives was evaluated against these criteria. The criteria include:

- Does the alternative maximize operating efficiency, especially inmate transportation costs?
- Does the alternative minimize operating risks concerning the safety of staff, inmates, and visitors?
- Does the alternative limit the number and severity of construction risks associated with capital projects involving the concurrent operation of a secure facility that operates 24-hours per day, 7-days a week?
- Does the alternative provide a long-term option to address the county's jail bed space requirements by having the potential for cost-effective expansion or contraction of bed space?
- Does the alternative provide for appropriate program and treatment space to expand and integrate services to all inmates, regardless of security classification and to provide services to inmate populations that are not served now due to limited program space (i.e., mental health services)?
- Does the alternative comply with the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections, Bureau of Adult Detention (BAD) local jail facility and operating guidelines and standards? Additionally, does the alternative meet the Ohio Basic Building Code requirements?
- Does the alternative maximize the county's long-term program and facility flexibility? For example, does the alternative provide the county the maximum flexibility to modify facilities and inmate services to meet the changing needs of inmate populations?

Operating Efficiencies: This criteria concerns the efficiency in the number of staff and facility costs to operate the entire correctional system. The Master Plan recommendation would require the addition of 170 correctional officers and the county would realize facility operating savings by vacating the Queensgate, Reading Road, and Turning Point facilities. Please see attachment D for the Operational Analysis of Options document concerning staffing requirements.

The Queensgate Renovation / Justice Center Expansion alternative would require 211 correctional officers. The difference in the staffing requirements from the Master Plan recommendation is a factor of the design of the facilities. A horizontal correctional facility (a 3-4 story jail) recommended in the Master Plan is more efficient to staff and operate than a vertical correctional facility (5 stories and higher) proposed in the Justice Center expansion alternative. The movement of prisoners, their support staff, and logistics (food and laundry) requires additional elevators, smaller inmate groups, and thus more staff in taller facilities. The Queensgate Renovation & Expansion alternative does not require additional staff because this option would be owned and operated by a private contractor and would result in the elimination of approximately 169 county correctional officers at the Queensgate, Reading Road, and Turning Point facilities. Please see section V for a discussion of costs for these alternatives.

Operating Risks: The safety of the inmates, staff, and visitors to any of the county's correctional facilities is a high priority. Movement of inmates — within the facility, to treatment programs, to the courts, and between correctional institutions — is a key risk area for operations. The Master Plan recommendation minimizes this risk through the consolidation of three facilities and the co-location of medical services and programming. For example, in the current environment, if an inmate becomes sick at Queensgate, Reading Road, or Turning Point a transportation detail is called to transport the inmate back to the Justice Center where the medical treatment facilities are located. All three alternatives address this type of risk. The primary operating risk difference between the alternatives is that the Master Plan recommendation calls for a consolidated facility design to integrate all areas of inmate movement where as the Queensgate Renovation included the other two alternatives still relies on the daily movement of 800 male inmates in and around a facility that was not designed as a correctional facility.

Construction Risks: There are a number of risks associated with the construction of the three alternatives. The Jail Facility Working Group will provide value-added experience and perspective to identifying and assessing these unknowns. For the Master Plan recommendation, a specific site has not been identified; it is assumed some type of environmental remediation would be required. The Queensgate Renovation / Justice Center Expansion alternative has a number of risks because the site adjacent to the Justice Center is over major underground utilities and building vertical is inherently more risky than a more horizontal approach. This option also has the risk, planned or unplanned, of disrupting existing operations at the Justice Center during construction. The Queensgate Renovation & Expansion alternative is the most risky from a construction perspective because the property adjacent to Queensgate facility may not be available or cost effective. This property is the old Hudepohl site and it will inevitably include some environmental remediation. Furthermore, there is the potential that the entire area around Queensgate will be heavily impacted by the Brent Spence Bridge replacement project in future years.

Expansion Capability: The Master Plan identifies bed space requirements through the year 2030, but it only recommends bed space to address inmate projections through 2020. With this recommendation it is important to consider the feasibility of expansion after 2020. The Master Plan recommendation includes property assumptions and core facility functions to expand at a

later date. The Queensgate Renovation / Justice Center Expansion and Queensgate Renovation & Expansion alternatives do not allow for planned expansion in the future.

Program and Treatment Integration: Based on the discussions of the Corrections Review Task Force, it was clear that the coordination of various programs to assist inmates in developing positive behaviors, address substance abuse, and other services (medical and mental health) was an important part of a facility recommendation. All three alternatives would centrally locate programming in one facility. For the Master Plan recommendation the facility would be at a site to be determined. For the Queensgate Renovation / Justice Center Expansion alternative the programming would be at the Justice Center expansion site, and for the Queensgate Renovation & Expansion alternative programming would be in the Queensgate expansion. The Master Plan recommendation would have the programming functional areas align with housing and support areas to minimize inmate movement and to collocate similar services. The Queensgate Renovation / Justice Center Expansion alternative would require transporting Queensgate prisoners to the Justice Center for medical treatment and inmate programs. The Queensgate Renovation & Expansion alternative would have the programming all in one place as part of expanded Queensgate facility, but the movement of inmates would not be as efficient because the existing Queensgate facility was not designed as a correctional facility.

Ability to meet BAD Standards and the Ohio Basic Building Code: The County will have to work the Bureau of Adult Detention (BAD) to have building plans approved for adherence to operating and facility standards and guidelines. BAD has been known to provide waivers in certain conditions. For example, the county received BAD waivers in 1992 to use the Queensgate facility as a jail facility. The building owners (Corrections Corporation of America – CCA) are uncertain if the Queensgate facility would meet the current BAD standards when upgrading the security at Queensgate to the current inmate profile at the facility. The Master Plan recommendation calls for a new facility in which BAD would be involved beginning with the design phase.

Concerning the Ohio Basic Building Code, the expansion and/or renovation of the Justice Center and the Queensgate facilities introduces elements of risk and unknown costs concerning the potential of having these facilities brought up to the current building code requirements.

Long-term Flexibility: This criteria involves the county's ability to enhance, modify, and control the facility and programming needs of the corrections system. The Master Plan recommendation results in two county-owned facilities where as the other alternatives include some form of private ownership of the facility and operations. To the extent that these owners have financial difficulties or a change in business focus, the county may be exposed to an immediate need for detention facilities and/or inmate services. In the case of the Queensgate Renovation & Expansion alternative (operated by a private contractor) the immediate need may not only be an 1,800-bed facility, but hundreds of staff to operate the facility.

V. Cost-to-Own Model and Comparison of Alternatives

In addition to facility attributes, the sub-committee also determined the estimated total operating and capital costs of the alternatives developed. The methodology to develop the cost model included the following assumptions:

- A 30-year period;
- Municipal tax exempt financing rates via Bloomberg.com with a contingency;
- 2005 actual operating costs, personnel and non-personnel, for the entire Hamilton County correctional system;
- Capital costs from the Correctional Master Plan, the URS Corporation, and the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA);
- Per-diem rates from CCA; and
- Annual inflation of 3%.

It is important to recognize the construction cost is heavily dependent on the relative size of the core functions (food service, medical, programming) and the types of inmate beds (i.e., single cells, medical beds, dormitory beds, etc.). In developing alternatives, the sub-committee ensured the number and types of beds were consistent across all alternatives. The alternatives needed to be consistent to the program plan in the Master Plan document. It would be less expensive to just build “bulk storage” dorms for 1,800 beds, but the special needs of the county’s inmate population would not be addressed (i.e., medical and mental health services, and treatment programs for substance abuse for inmates in all security classifications).

The sub-committee worked directly with CCA to determine the operating costs of the Queensgate renovation and expansion alternatives. As summarized in Table II, the committee estimated that the county would spend between \$2.7 billion and \$3.5 billion over a 30-year period for the entire corrections system. As a point of reference, the Hamilton County spent approximately \$42.9 million in 2005 for corrections. The detailed cost model is provided in Attachment E.

Table II – Total Cost-to-Own Comparison

Alternative	30-Year Operating	Capital (Includes Debt Service)	Total Cost to Own	County Facility Residual Value
Master Plan Recommendation	\$ 2,418,166,926	\$ 317,963,283	\$ 2,736,130,209	\$ 44,104,047
Queensgate Renovation / Justice Center Expansion	\$ 2,644,938,880	\$ 200,636,820	\$ 2,845,575,699	\$ 27,829,930
Queensgate Renovation & Expansion	\$ 3,472,195,612	\$ 9,174,000	\$ 3,481,369,612	n/a

Note: Each alternative includes an annual 3% inflationary increase for operating costs.

As detailed in the previous table, operating costs are the biggest factor in providing correctional services. Over a 30-year period, the most cost effective option is to build an 1,800-bed facility consistent with the Master Plan Recommendation that is financed and operated by the county. This less costly approach is primarily a factor of the efficiencies gained by consolidating three older facilities not originally designed as correctional facilities. The total cost is also less because the county's financing costs are lower than the private sector. The difference in the Master Plan Recommendation and the Queensgate Renovation / Justice Center Expansion is approximately \$109 million, or 4%.

Though not included in the total cost-to-own calculation, the County will still have the residual (depreciated) value of \$44.1 million for the facility in the Master Plan Recommendation after 30 years. In the Queensgate Renovation / Justice Center Expansion alternative there is an estimated residual value of \$27.8 million for the County-owned Justice Center expansion after 30 years.

VI. Temporary Structures

The Jail Task Force requested the Cost/Facility sub-committee to assess the possibility of incorporating the temporary structures proposed by the City of Cincinnati into the permanent solution for the County's detention needs. Because this is a somewhat novel approach to an urban county jail environment, there are not many examples of these structures to compare.

We did contact the Bureau of Adult Detention (BAD) within the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections for their position concerning temporary structures. BAD is responsible for approving all local jail plans within the state as well as the periodic inspection of local jails. BAD also sets minimum facility and operating standards for local jails. BAD routinely gets requests from manufacturers and Ohio counties to use temporary structures to ease jail overcrowding. This would include bubble tents, manufactured housing, and the conversion of buildings not originally constructed for jail operations (i.e., Queensgate). According to BAD, they have not formed a set policy on temporary structures because each jurisdiction's jail space needs are different and there are some limited instances where these structures would be approved. These limited instances only apply to temporary needs (2-3 years) for a very narrow inmate classification.

Based on BAD's understanding of the Hamilton County Jail system's prisoner risk profile, especially in light of BAD's understanding that the current "Queensgate" facility may not be housing prisoners at the agreed upon 'minimum risk only' prisoner classification, they question whether there are sufficient 'sentenced / minimum risk' prisoner counts available to justify a Minimum Security Jail project of the size being proposed (800 beds). In addition to this very limited range of eligible prisoners, BAD is not certain how well the structural components of this temporary style facility will match up with the required 'construction criteria' that must also be approved by BAD; and, there is some question as to how any proposed 'temporary approval' would be viewed, in light of the fact that the earlier agreed upon use of the current "Queensgate" facility has now continued to operate approximately 10 years beyond its originally approved use.

Introducing these structures in an urban environment will increase land acquisition costs because of the additional space requirements for these single-level facilities. These structures also increase operating costs (i.e., utilities) and require additional costs for perimeter fencing and associated security staffing. Finally, zoning restrictions and community opposition may pose obstacles to this approach.

VII. Recommendations

- 1.** The county's jail facilities are a part of the entire criminal justice system and the ultimate size and number of jail facilities will be determined by the interaction and collaboration of all components of the criminal justice system (law enforcement, prosecution, the judiciary, etc.). The Cost/Facility sub-committee supports the recommendations of the Treatment Services sub-committee concerning the need for better coordination and interaction of these various justice system components to improve outcomes at all levels.

The sub-committee believes that increased collaboration among the components of the criminal justice system will generate ideas and an enabling environment to assess and implement these ideas. The continual assessment and adaptation of the entire justice system to will ultimately improve outcomes for persons entering the system as well as fostering an environment that helps persons avoid the criminal justice all together...resulting in less of a need for jail space in the future.

Until the results of better coordination are demonstrated and realized, the sub-committee recommends that Hamilton County build an 1,800-bed facility to address immediate public safety needs and to realize operating savings and improved treatment program effectiveness by consolidating the existing outdated facilities. The 1,800-bed facility supports the inmate projections through the year 2020 and results in a total corrections system of 3,044 beds.

- 2.** The recommended 1800-bed facility should be a stand alone facility that consolidates the Queensgate, Reading Road, and Turning Point facilities because it is the most cost effective approach based on operating and capital costs.
- 3.** The county should establish a Jail Facility Working Group to help guide the county in the development of facility specifications and general design for the preparation of procurement documents. Included in this effort will be experts to ensure functional areas (i.e., mental health services) are designed in a fashion to ensure that the space allocated to these services is conducive to maximizing the success of these services in reducing recidivism.
- 4.** The new facility should include the specialty beds and housing to address the increasing special needs inmate population (female inmates, mental health and special medical conditions, and substance abuse) identified in the Voorhis Associates report and the Vera Institute reports.
- 5.** The facility design should allow for future cost effective expansion to meet the jail space needs beyond the year 2020.

VIII. Conclusion

We wish to thank the County Commissioners for creating the Corrections Review Task Force to study this important issue facing Hamilton County. We would also like to formally express our appreciation to the Vera Institute for their insight to the coordination of inmate services and the entire criminal justice system, to Voorhis Associates for helping the sub-committee get through the various reports that support the Master Plan, and Corrections Corporation of American and Talbert House in assisting in our cost analyses.

Attachments:

- A. Hamilton County Correctional Master Plan: Bed Space Distribution
- B. Hamilton County Correctional Master Plan: Facility by Functional Area
- C. Hamilton County Correctional Master Plan: Facility Assessment
- D. Hamilton County Correctional Master Plan: Operational Analysis of Options
- E. Cost-to-Own Comparison of Alternatives

Hamilton County, Ohio Jail Bed Breakdown

Attachment A

Proposed Corrections Facilities

TOTAL CAPACITY	3,044
Justice Center	1,240
Proposed New Facility	1,804

Current Corrections Facilities

TOTAL CAPACITY	2,272
Justice Center	1,240
Queensgate	822
Reading Road	150
Turning Point	60

Women's Housing

Medical	32
16 single cell, 8 double cell	
Medical/Mental Health Transition	32
16 single cell, 8 double	
Program Housing	120
120 dorm beds	
Mental Health	32
16 single cell, 4 four-person	
Intake/Special Management	32
32 single cells	
Orientation/Assessment	60
30 double cells	
Pre-release	60
60 dorm beds	
General Population (programming enabled)	120
120 dorm beds	
TOTAL WOMEN'S HOUSING	488

Medical-Infirmary (Justice Center)	7
Short-Term Treatment, Intake Overflow (Reading Road)	50
Treatment Housing (Reading Road)	50
All Other Housing (Justice Center)	208
- Intake/Special Management/Orientation	
- Medical/Mental Health	
- General Population	
TOTAL WOMEN'S HOUSING	315

Men's Housing

Mental Health	152
120 single cell, 16 double cell	
Medical Housing/Infirmary	88
24 single cell, 32 double cell	
Medical Transition	56
28 double cell	
Intake	120
120 single cells	
Orientation/Assessment (Admitting)	120
120 single cells	
Treatment Program Housing	120
120 dorm beds	
In-Facility Workers	120
120 dorm beds	
Pre-Release/Outside Details	180
180 dorm beds	
General Population (programming enabled)	360
360 dorms beds	
Justice Center Med/Max Security	1,240
Single and double cells	
TOTAL MEN'S HOUSING	2,556

Mental Health (Justice Center)	46
Medical-Infirmary (Justice Center)	37
Intake - Pre-arraignment (Justice Center)	48
Admitting - Post-arraignment/Workers (Justice Center)	72
Treatment Housing (Turning Point)	60
Treatment Housing (Reading Road)	50
General Population/Workers (Queensgate)	822
Justice Center Med/Max Security	822
TOTAL MEN'S HOUSING	1,957

Section 1. General Issues

Tobacco-Free Facility

Any facility developed will be a tobacco-free facility. An area outside of the facility, out of public view, will be necessary for staff who smoke on break.

Summary of Spaces

Component #	Component	Subcomponent	Net SF	Circulation Factor	Gross SF
1	Intake	Sallyport	11,150	1.2	13,380
		All Other	8,940	1.54	13,770
2	Admissions & Classification	Admissions	6,540	1.54	10,070
		Property	4,305	1.54	6,630
3	Transportation & Release	Release Processing	1,565	1.54	2,410
		Transport Staging	2,725	1.54	4,200
		Court Holding	2,585	1.54	3,980
4	Security and Control	Central Control	3,900	1.54	6,010
5	Housing	Cell Housing	91,005	1.75	159,260
		Dormitory Housing	100,375	1.6	160,600
		Shared Housing Spaces	45,870	1.5	68,810
6	Health Care	Medical Clinic	6,420	1.54	9,890
		Medical Staff Access Zone	4,045	1.54	6,230
		Mental Health Clinic	1,580	1.54	2,430
		Mental Health Staff Access Zone	2,340	1.54	3,600
7	Programs	Inmate Access Zone	10,190	1.3	13,250
		Programs/Vocational Office Zone	1,165	1.54	1,790
8	Visitation	Jail Public Areas/Video Visit Center	5,045	1.4	7,060
		Special Visiting Suite	2,280	1.54	3,510
9	Support Services	Food Service	20,390	1.4	28,550
		Laundry	1,885	1.4	2,640
		Janitorial	7,065	1.4	9,890
		Commissary	2,520	1.4	3,530
		Vehicle Maintenance	3,265	1.4	4,570
		Maintenance Shop Area	3,345	1.4	4,680
		Maintenance Office Suite	1,370	1.54	2,110

Section 1. General Issues

Component #	Component	Subcomponent	Net SF	Circulation Factor	Gross SF
10	Administration	Corrections Administration	3,840	1.54	5,910
11	Staff Support		12,530	1.4	17,540
12	Courts	Video Court	2,905	1.54	4,470
	Total Programmed		371,140		580,770
	Mechanical (8%)				46,460
	Total				627,230

This program assumes that a new facility is developed at a separate location from HCJC to provide for a total of 1,804 beds, 1,032 of which are replacement beds and 772 are new beds. This space program provides a total of 371,140 net square feet and will result in a total of 627,230 gross square feet.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

This section of the master plan provides a detailed analysis of the Queensgate Correctional Facility as well as a summary analysis of the Hamilton County Justice Center, the Reading Road Facility, and Turning Point.

Queensgate Correctional Facility Assessment

General Information

Location and Property Description

Figure 8.1 Queensgate Location



The Queensgate Correctional facility is located at 516-528 Linn Street in Cincinnati on approximately 1.5 acres of land, bounded by Fifth Street, Sixth Street, and Linn Street. This area is within an enterprise zone. The lot is irregularly shaped and is physically contiguous to a number of adjacent buildings, which were formerly part of the Hudepohl Brewery. There are four parcels as shown in Figure 8.1, and there are three other unimproved parcels (516 Linn Street) which are now part of the exterior recreation area. According to Hamilton County Auditor's records, the property includes 145,950 square feet of improved space and is valued at \$156,000 for the land and \$3,690,100 for the improvements.

Adjacent properties appear to be in the process of redevelopment as sections of the former Brewery are torn down. Adjacent properties are valued at \$320,400, \$195,400 and \$767,000. These have been recently purchased, most likely with an eye to redevelopment of the area.

This area is industrial in nature. The former Hudepohl Brewery is located to the east; this facility is currently being razed. A viaduct lies to the north, with the Expressway just beyond it. To the west is a railroad line, which is consistently used. To the south are several food distribution warehouses. This area appears currently to have no residential components and appears not to have much traffic during non-business hours. A neighborhood redevelopment and remediation project is occurring at Baymiller and 3rd Street, about a block away. The proposed uses for the renovated structures will be offices.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

Financial Information

Queensgate was converted to correctional use from 1990-1992, when it was occupied by the County. US Corrections Corp completed the renovation and was subsequently acquired by Corrections Corporation of America (CCA). CCA leases the facility to the County through its Prison Realty Trust division. CCA receives a property tax reimbursement; Hamilton County operates the facility. The County is also responsible for paying property taxes and maintaining fire and extended liability coverage. CCA is responsible for maintenance of the structure, which is defined in the lease as roof, boilers, electrical systems, plumbing systems, structural components, drywall and tile, water heaters, elevators, emergency generator, inmate visiting phones and exterior painting *unless the damage is caused by inmate or staff abuse*. The County is responsible for maintaining the parking lot, fencing, razor wire and gates, routine maintenance of locking mechanisms and security systems, routine cleaning of smoke/heat detection devices, kitchen equipment, interior painting, security screens, and washers and dryers. CCA is essentially responsible for system failures, while the County is responsible for any damage related to inmate or staff abuse. In the opinion of the consultant, since most damage in correctional facilities can be traced - either directly or indirectly - to inmate or staff abuse, the County is likely to be responsible for most maintenance in the facility.

Table 8.1 Lease History

Year	Lease Amount
1992	\$2,044,000
1993	\$2,044,000
1994	\$2,044,000
1995	\$2,044,000
1996	\$2,044,000
1997	\$2,044,000
1998	\$2,044,000
1999	\$1,737,400
2000	\$1,772,148
2001	\$1,807,591
2002	\$1,843,743
2003	\$1,880,618
2004	\$1,918,230
2005	\$1,956,595
	\$27,224,325

Figure 8.2 Queensgate Correctional Facility



Hamilton County has had three leases during the thirteen years that Queensgate has been operational. The first two leases were for a period of five years each; the current lease provides a three year term, with three one-year renewals. This lease includes a 2% payment in addition to the base rent. The County is in the second annual lease of the current period, which implies that this lease will be up in 2006.

Facility Description

The facility is a former Kruse Hardware warehouse, which was constructed in 1900 according to Auditor records, and has a total of 135,050 gross square feet. The Queensgate Facility is an eight story structure; inmate housing is located on seven floors. There is a significant slope on this site which results in several floor levels. Vertical circulation occurs using two, twelve passenger elevators, as well as two stair towers. Each housing floor has approximately 12,000 gross square feet. Inmate services are located in the basement as well as the first and second

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

floors of the facility. This structure was expanded to provide a more adequate public entry and waiting area and appears to have been modified to provide for correctional functions.

First Floor

This floor includes mechanical and storage space. Although a portion of this floor is shown on the blueprints as inmate recreation, that does not appear to be its current use.

Second Floor

This floor includes:

- Inmate recreation,
- Commissary,
- Inmate dining,
- Staff dining and vending,
- Inmate health care (a waiting area, a nurse-station, medication storage, two exam rooms, and associated storage),
- Kitchen, which is primarily a serving kitchen and tray wash,
- Holding and processing area, which includes three small holding cells with access to an exterior, fenced vehicle sallyport.

Public access to this facility occurs on Floor 2a. This appears to be a newer structure and may have been modified significantly when the facility was renovated. This floor includes:

- Visitor waiting, which occurs in an addition,
- Non-contact visiting,
- Professional visiting (one room),
- Central Control and Visitor Registration,
- Male and female staff lockers,
- Staff services, which includes briefing and physical training areas, and
- Administrative space (conference room and several staff offices).

Third Floor

Because there are some additional functions on this floor, this is the smallest of the housing floors. This floor also includes:

- Two classrooms (one of which is used as a library and meeting room for program staff and inmates in programs),
- Computer lab/classroom, and
- Administrative offices (6).

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

Housing Functions

According to the original plan, all housing floors were designed to accommodate 112 inmates which would result in an operating capacity of 784 inmates. As constructed, each floor accommodates a slightly different number of inmates, resulting in a total facility capacity of 822. The second and third floors accommodate 116 inmates, the fourth floor accommodates 114 inmates and the remaining floors accommodate 119 inmates. Each floor includes:

- Two dormitories, each of which have access to inmate telephones and the automated Jail Help system, which provides inmates information about pertinent information, such as their account balances, bond amounts, and court dates,
- One recreation room (with television),
- One dayroom (on the side which does not have television),
- Two group shower rooms, each with ten shower heads, which meets the current Ohio Standard for Full Service Jails for up to 120 inmates,
- Two toilet rooms, each with five toilets, four urinals, and eight sinks, which meets the current Ohio Standard for Full Service Jails for up to 108 inmates (for toilets and urinals, assuming that urinals can be substituted for up to half of the toilets) and for up to 96 inmates (for sinks),¹
- One laundry room with two residential washers and two residential dryers,
- One janitor's closet,
- One staff restroom,
- One small storage area, and
- Two open staff workstations, one in each dormitory.

Inspection Reports

The Ohio Bureau of Adult Detention (BAD) is responsible for inspection of jail facilities in the State. Inspections occur annually and typically focus on a selected group of standards which change annually. This section provides a summary of findings of BAD inspections.

1. 2005 Inspection
 - a. BAD - The facility was in compliance with all 63 standards which were reviewed this year.
 - b. Environmental Sanitation Report for Institutions - although information was provided for the Justice Center and Reading Road, no report was provided for Queensgate.
 - c. City of Cincinnati, Division of Fire Inspection Report - noted no violations.
2. 2004 Inspection
 - a. BAD - the facility was in compliance with the 27 standards selected for inspection this year.

¹ Because Ohio Standards have been modified over time, it is likely that the number of sinks and toilets met the required number for the anticipated number of inmates on the floor at the time that the project was developed.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

- b. No environmental or fire inspections were available for this year.
3. 2003 Inspection
 - a. BAD - the facility was in compliance with the 29 standards selected for inspection this year.
 - b. Environmental Sanitation Report recommended the following:
 - i. Replacement of stained ceiling tiles in the cafeteria
 - ii. Repair of sinks in the housing areas, including addressing issues with low water pressure
 - iii. Repair of several toilets and urinals that were out of order
 - iv. Replacement or cleaning of light shields
 - v. Repair of flooring in showers
 - c. The Food Service Operation Inspection report by the Ohio Department of Health found no violations.
 - d. The City of Cincinnati Fire Inspection found no violations.

The degree to which this facility has received good inspection reports is a credit to the staff who work at this facility. It is clean and orderly, which is a remarkable achievement for a facility of this age and use. However, there are clear operational and maintenance issues in this facility. The next sections of this report focus on the issues that characterize operations observed and discussed during an initial review of the facility.

It is evident that this facility is somewhat atypical for minimum security facilities found in the State of Ohio. The Bureau of Adult Detention provides some of the most stringent construction and renovation criteria for correctional facilities in the US. Staff at the Sheriff's Office who were involved in the development of the facility found that US Corrections Corp was not familiar with Ohio requirements and developed the facility with a number of characteristics that would not normally have been approved by the Bureau of Adult Detention. It was necessary to obtain a number of variances to allow the facility to open.

The areas in which variances appear to have been necessary include:

- dormitory size,
- the number of showers, toilets and sinks (as noted above),
- the need for direct voice contact with a continuously staffed post or central control and direct voice contact with adjacent corridor, and some of the building elements or dimensions such as the type of glazing and dimensions of the windows, type of fasteners, type and location of view panels, method of anchoring items, such as windows, the method of anchoring ducting systems and other HVAC materials, the type of locking system selected in conjunction with the inability to use electronic locking devices to restrict movement across zones within the facility, and accessibility to handicapped prisoners.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

Functional Analysis

On June 2, 2005, the consultants conducted a three-hour walk through of Queensgate with staff of the Hamilton County Sheriff's Office and Hamilton County Budget Office. This section of this document identifies issues that were noted during that walk-through and are the consultants' observations.

1. In-facility Service Delivery Strategy, Circulation and Movement

- a. All inmate services are centralized in this facility, which means that inmates must move off their housing floors for any activity. This occurs at least three times per day for meals, and every time an inmate participates in exercise, visiting or program activities.
- b. Because there is very limited elevator capacity, movement to these activities takes a considerable amount of time.
 - i. Elevator capacity consists of two elevators, each of which can accommodate 12 passengers, while more than 100 inmates live on each floor. Staff report that these elevators are often "unreliable" resulting in periods when one of the elevators is not operational. Over time, because of their age and use, it is likely that this problem will grow while the facility remains in use.
 - ii. Because of restricted elevator capacities, inmates will use the stairs. The typical process is down by stairs and up by elevator if the inmates are housed on the sixth - eighth floors. Otherwise, upward movement is by stairs as well. For mass movement, one officer leads the group of inmates and the second officer from the floor brings up the rear. Not only does this degree of movement using stairs present a "trip and fall" risk, but, because of the construction of these stairs, it also places inmates out of staff view for extended periods, resulting in potential security and safety issues for both staff and other inmates.
- c. Movement off the floor will be escorted (for mass movements) and unescorted (for individual movement).
- d. Unlike the wide, straight corridors, with no indentations, designed to accommodate inmate movement, Queensgate has narrow corridors, with many perpendicular connections. There are also a number of areas in which indentations (such as entries to office or storage areas) on a major corridor provide places where an inmate may move out of view of escorting staff. The implication of this type of corridor system is that video surveillance of these areas would be prohibitively expensive if full coverage of corridors were desired.
- e. The implication of this type of movement, in conjunction with the relative lack of security technology, suggests that this facility would be appropriate for minimum security inmates at best - and only those who are not particularly vulnerable. This facility would also be difficult for inmates with physical disabilities which make movement (particularly movement up and down stairs) difficult. In fact, the facility can not accommodate insulin dependent diabetics or inmates with heart, mobility or respiratory problems.

2. Inter-facility Movement

- a. In addition to centralizing services within the facility, the Hamilton County Sheriff's Offices has centralized support services (food and laundry). Meals are prepared and laundry is done at a single location at HCJC. This is clearly the most efficient

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

strategy to perform the work, but with a remote facility leads to the need to move food and laundry from HCJC to remote locations. Each of these issues will be discussed in the section of this report which deals with that function.

- b. There is a significant movement of inmates on a daily basis between Queensgate and HCJC.
 - i. Inmate workers typically come from minimum classifications and because Queensgate is the primarily location for minimum custody inmates, most workers will live at Queensgate, even though their work assignment may be elsewhere.
 - (1) Kitchen crews are approximately 30 inmates, who work two shifts.
 - (2) Laundry crews are approximately eight inmates who work two shifts.
 - (3) Commissary crews are approximately five inmates who work one shift.
 - ii. Inmates in Queensgate may be either pre-trial or sentenced. Inmates frequently have court appearances and it is not uncommon to have 100 inmates from Queensgate going to court on a single day.
 - iii. Inmates in Queensgate who need dental services or specialty appointments also have to be transported to HCJC.
- c. Transportation begins as early as four AM and continues throughout the day. This is perhaps the most inefficient consequence of separation of facilities. What would simply be walking down a corridor in a single facility now involves multiple vehicles from 40+ passenger busses, vans and cars, with transportation staff driving inmates and food from the central location.

3. Security and Control

- a. Queensgate is a decidedly "low tech" facility. There are less than ten cameras in use in the facility, which is remarkable considering the number of floors; while some cameras appear to have been replaced, because the quality of the image is quite good, there are a number which provide very poor recognition capacity.
- b. Central Control is located at the public entry to the facility and performs the typical duties of security system monitoring, door control, emergency response, and communication. In addition to telephone, staff radios provide the only means of communication within the facility. The intercom system is no longer functional.
- c. Montgomery Technology, based in Greenville, Alabama, made the door control system. Unlike most facilities which use either electric or pneumatic locking devices, this system appears to rely on doors with magnetic locking devices, which were reinforced by adding additional magnetic locks after the first set of locks were found to be inadequate. The doors initially installed were also easily bendable, resulting in a minimal security perimeter. Remote locking devices focus on the perimeter and first floor. The consultant has never seen this type of locking system in any correctional facility and has not been able to find another correctional setting which has used this type of system. It is worth noting that this facility had to be developed quickly, in an existing structure. As a result, this locking system may have been selected because of time constraints or because it is easy to install with minimal re-wiring.
- d. All movement beyond the security perimeter within the facility appears to be key operated. The control panel is deteriorating, and the Sheriff's Office reports a number of control system failures. Key operated facilities are vulnerable to at least three specific types of problems.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

- i. In an emergency, if a key is dropped or lost, it may become impossible to leave the floor unless central control is able to open the door remotely or the fire system automatically opens all doors opening. Central control does not have the ability to open doors to the inmate stairs and staff carry keys to allow inmates into the stair towers.
 - ii. If an inmate plans to leave the facility, then staff who have keys to the stairwells may become vulnerable.
 - iii. If a disturbance breaks out on one floor, it would take almost no time for the disturbance to spread to other floors.
4. Intake and Release - All inmates are booked and released from HCJC. Property remains at the HCJC. As a result, inmates who are being released are moved from this facility to HCJC.
5. Health Care
 - a. Inmates can be seen in the clinic which is located adjacent to the inmate dining area.
 - b. To facilitate picking up medications, the clinic has a window which opens to the inmate dining area. However, the area in the health clinic from which medications are distributed is also the medication storage area. This process is efficient, but restricts the kinds of medications that are distributed from this location and as a result the type of inmate who can be housed at Queensgate.
 - c. The level of health care available at this facility is limited to nursing care, using LPNs; a doctor comes to this location five days a week. As a result, if an inmate needs to see the dentist or another specialist, he is transported to HCJC.
 - d. As a result, this facility should be considered appropriate housing for relatively healthy, younger inmates.
6. Inmate Programs
 - a. All programs delivered to this population are done away from housing areas. These programs are delivered on the third floor of the facility, with inmate access through the housing unit on this floor. This is problematic because it provides an opportunity for floors to interact (which is not desirable) and it is also disruptive to this unit of workers (whose work assignment begins at approximately 3:30 AM). As a result, use of this area during evenings for programming is disruptive.
 - b. This area is difficult to supervise, since it is not visible from a staffed location and incidental supervision by staff passing the area in a corridor is not viable either, since this area is isolated from areas in which staff routinely move.
 - c. Programs include:
 - i. School, particularly GED,
 - ii. Library and law library,
 - iii. Religious services and Bible studies,
 - iv. Self-help groups (AA/NA), and
 - v. Special events or special interest programs, provided by a variety of volunteers.
 - d. Classroom space is limited to two classrooms, accommodating 20 and 12 inmates respectively. The implication for this minimum security population is significant. Minimum inmates are non-violent pre-sentenced misdemeanants, sentenced misdemeanants, and sentenced non-violent felons. Of all populations in the jail, this may be one of the largest groups to which programming should be targeted. The facility sets a significant limit on the number of inmates who can participate in programming because the areas in which it can occur are extremely limited. The implication is that the population who could most likely benefit from intensive correctional programming focusing on reducing recidivism has limited opportunities for participation.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

7. Exercise

- a. Ohio standards require that inmates are offered one hour of exercise five days per week.
- b. The facility has both an indoor and outdoor exercise area to which inmates must be moved.
 - i. The indoor area is large enough to allow between 30 and 60 inmates to exercise by square footage requirements, but functionally would be more appropriate for a smaller population. There are no security cameras in the gym. Because multiple housing units used the same area, there is always the potential for contraband and information to be passed from unit to unit.
 - ii. The outdoor area is larger, but is only used during warm weather months. When used, three officers are located inside and a fourth (armed) officer is available outside. The outdoor area is particularly vulnerable to the potential intrusion of contraband since it abuts a public street. The fencing is 12' chain link with razor wire at the top; because inmates in the exercise area are completely visible to the street, they are also vulnerable when in the area. Staff report at least one incidence of drive by shootings while inmates are in the exercise area.

8. Visiting

- a. Queensgate uses a centralized, non-contact form of visitation. Family visitors enter a lobby and waiting area, which are not adequately sized for the number of visitors this facility routinely has, and move into the visitor's side of the visiting area after registration. Telephones allow visitors and inmates to communicate.
- b. There are approximately 40 booths and one contact, professional visiting room. The layout of these booths occurred to maximize the number of booths that could be provided in the limited space. Unfortunately the strategy selected failed to consider the need to observe visiting to prevent illicit or inappropriate communication. As a result, this area is difficult to supervise effectively. Both of these areas are very noisy when they are full.
- c. In contemporary facilities, the general visiting strategy in facilities of this size is to either provide decentralized non-contact visiting at the housing areas or to use video-visiting technology. While the first might have been feasible at the time of renovation, neither seems viable - from either a construction or financial perspective - at this time. As a result, the facility has a movement-intensive form of visiting, which is difficult to supervise.

9. Food Service

- a. Food service is provided from the central kitchen at HCJC. Food is transported three times a day, in bulk, in insulated containers. Food is portioned onto trays at a cafeteria serving line by inmate workers. There are at least two problems which occur as a result of this strategy:
 - i. The need for timely delivery of food impacts operations at both the Hamilton County Justice Center (HCJC) and Queensgate. Timeliness is essential to ensure that food is maintained at the appropriate temperatures.
 - ii. The distance between HCJC and Queensgate results in a longer time to resolve problems which can occur in the amount of food provided. This typically is noticed the second time that the food is portioned onto the tray at Queensgate. If not enough food is sent in the bulk containers from HCJC, it presents problems at Queensgate. Since food is one of the things that is most important to inmates, this has the potential to create a major problem in the dining area for those inmates who eat last.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

- b. The serving kitchen has large heaters and coolers to keep food at the appropriate temperature, but there have been consistent complaints regarding the quality and temperature of food at this facility.
 - c. The kitchen has extremely limited capacity and prep activities are limited to sandwiches and salads. As a result, in an emergency, such as a weather emergency, this kitchen would not be able to prepare meals.
 - d. There are two major implications of this strategy for food service delivery:
 - i. It is very labor intensive to move food three times a day from HCJC. Unlike a connected facility, in which inmate workers can push food carts to the appropriate location, this method requires staff drivers and vans to move food.
 - ii. Most institutions have moved away from central dining, since this is one area in which large groups of inmates gather. In the past, dining areas have been the spots in which inmate disturbances broke out. In this facility, more than 100 inmates move together to central dining, which is supervised by more than five officers. In spite of the commitment of staff resources, this is an area which is vulnerable to disturbances.
 - e. The degree to which movement occurs between the two facilities also creates inefficient operations. While a centralized kitchen is clearly an efficient way in which to prepare food, moving it three times daily is not. There are similar problems with movement of laundry. Even more problematic is the movement of inmate workers between the facilities, since this provides potential security risks to the community.
10. Laundry
- a. All uniforms, bedding and towels are laundered at HCJC.
 - b. This is a second function which requires the movement of large volumes of material from Queensgate to HCJC and vice versa. This also requires the staff drivers and vans to move laundry.
11. Work Details
- a. Correctional facilities typically used minimum inmates as food service, laundry, and janitorial workers. The implication of this practice for Hamilton County is that inmate workers typically live at Queensgate but must be transported to and from HCJC at least twice a day to their work location.
 - b. This results in a significant amount of transportation of inmates between the two facilities. Not only is this labor intensive, but it also creates a number of security risks whenever inmates are moved outside of the perimeter of an institution.
 - i. Inmates are often impulsive, and depending on what is happening in their lives, they may feel or act differently from the behavior classification personnel would normally anticipate.
 - ii. The number of inmates who are moved is significant. Kitchen crews alone are groups of 30 inmates, and there are at least two kitchen crews transported per day.
 - iii. Work crews that work outside the facility also live at this location. When inmates work outside the facility, even though they are supervised, there is an increased possibility of the introduction of contraband.
12. Maintenance - the facility provides for the typical maintenance functions. These functions will be discussed more fully later in this section.
13. Staff and Administrative Functions - the facility provides locker, break and briefing areas for staff.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

The very nature of the Queensgate Facility limits who should be housed there. Because of the high degree of inmate movement, coupled with the relative lack of security technology to extend staff's ability to observe inmates and monitor areas of the facility, this is a facility in which only minimum custody inmates should be housed. However, review of average daily population at this facility (see Section 4) suggests that Hamilton County does not have the ability to keep this facility as "full" as HCJC. In fact, although the Sheriff's Office clearly does not want to house inmates who do not meet minimum classification requirements at Queensgate, the pressure of population at HCJC has resulted in times when inmates, other than minimum security, including new intakes, were held in this location. By policy, medium inmates include:

- pre-sentenced felony charges, which are non-violent,
- current misdemeanor charges (pre-sentenced or sentenced) for assault.
- inmates who have a history of two assault convictions in the last five years.
- inmates who have a holder from Common Pleas probation or other County or State Parole.

Maximum security inmates include:


- pre-sentenced felony charge of violence,
- sentenced to state penitentiary.
- fugitives from out of state,
- inmates who have a history of conviction for violence in last five years, and
- inmates who have a history of conviction of escape in the last five years.

Table 8.2 Trend in Classification of Inmates Held at Queensgate

	1999	%	2000	%	2001	%	2002	%	2003	%	2004	%
None	6	0.0%	3	0.0%	6	0.1%	32	0.3%	21	0.2%	4	0.0%
Minimum	7,946	64.8%	7,404	63.3%	6,303	60.5%	6,536	57.9%	6,916	54.8%	7,441	50.1%
Medium	3,811	31.1%	3,821	32.7%	3,694	35.4%	4,182	37.1%	4,817	38.2%	5,993	40.4%
Maximum	500	4.1%	462	4.0%	423	4.1%	536	4.7%	871	6.9%	1,407	9.5%
Total	12,263	100.0%	11,690	100.0%	10,426	100.0%	11,286	100.0%	12,625	100.0%	14,845	100.0%

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

Figure 8.3 Trend in Classification of Inmates Held at Queensgate



Data in Table 8.2 and Figure 8.3 was provided by the Regional Crime Information Center. All inmates who were housed at Queensgate each year from 1999 were identified. Four classifications of inmates were found:

- None,
- Minimum,
- Medium, and
- Maximum.

Figure 8.3 clearly shows the increase in the number of medium and maximum security inmates held at Queensgate. Both of these classifications are increasing. Medium security inmates were just under one-third of inmates in 1999, but are now 40% of inmates, and maximum security inmates were less than 5% in 1999, but just under 10% in 2004. Given the nature of this facility, it is somewhat surprising to see maximum security inmates housed here. This may relate to the degree to which HCJC is dealing with significant capacity issues.

The Regional Computer Center (RCC) provided information about the incident reports which were made at Queensgate in 2004. There were 3,798 inmates involved in incidents at Queensgate in 2004. Because some inmates were involved in more than one incident and some incidents involved more than one

inmate, it is important to note both the number of discrete individuals (2,342, who were involved in an average of 1.62 incidents) and the number of discrete incidents (2,227).

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

Figure 8.4 Security Level of Queensgate Inmates Involved in Incidents





Figure 8.4 and Figure 8.5 provide information about the incidents at Queensgate. Just over 35% of incidents at Queensgate involved inmates who were classified as minimum security, while just over 45% involved inmates who were classified as medium security. Nearly 20% of incidents involved inmates who were classified as **maximum** security. When viewed in the context of overall classification, 50% of inmates who were

Figure 8.5 Seriousness of Incidents at Queensgate



medium or maximum security accounted for 65% of incidents, and 10% of inmates classified as maximum security accounted for 20% of incidents.

Just over 35% of incidents were classified as minor (the least serious), but just over 45% were considered major and just over 10% were considered serious. About 85% of these incidents were disciplinary violations. About 8% of these were reports taken for information only, but 5% involved inmate fights or disturbance. According to Department policy, serious incidents are violations of law. Major and minor incidents are categorized according to disciplinary policy and procedure which define rule violations as major or minor depending on the sanction that can be imposed.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

Physical Building Analysis*Structural Load Characteristics*

The multi-story facility is reported to have been constructed approximately 100 years ago. For many years, the building was utilized as a warehouse. From observations of the facility and pictures of unearthed site structures, it is likely that the facility may have been part of the neighboring brewery at one time. It is also reported the underground structures were part of the City sewerage systems at one time. Drawings were provided that indicate an addition and interior renovations were constructed in 1991 for the purpose of converting the warehouse to a correctional facility.

The facility structure is predominantly cast-in-place concrete columns and beams with a cast-in-place floor slab. The floor slab appears to have been poured integrally with the supporting concrete beams. The structure was most likely designed to withstand vertical loading only. Other than cosmetic issues, no distress was observed on the interior reinforced concrete support systems. Some deterioration was observed on portions of the reinforced concrete structural system where it is exposed to the elements on the exterior of the building. Due to its location, this is believed to be cosmetic in nature.

The exterior of the facility is comprised of multi-wythe masonry construction. This exterior shell of masonry may or may not be tied to the cast-in-place concrete support structure and very likely provides the primary lateral support for the building. Sections of the facade have been removed and replaced due to reported bowing of the wall. Both of these structural systems appear to be servicing the present load requirements adequately.

If modifications are made to this facility, it will be necessary to evaluate current code requirements. Since the structure is known to fall within the influence of the New Madrid fault, the present structure will need to be evaluated for resistance to seismic design criteria. This criteria was not considered in the original design, and evaluation will most likely demonstrate the structure's inability to resist such applied loads without extensive structural retrofit of the lateral bracing systems.

Facade Thermal Characteristics

This type of construction was common around the turn of the century and, unlike today's designs, was not concerned with building thermal efficiency. Most likely, insulation is non-existent in the exterior walls of the original facility. Uninsulated exterior walls develop moisture related issues that require extensive maintenance. This is discussed in the section of this report describing moisture characteristics.

The exterior windows were replaced when the facility was converted for its present use as a correctional facility. These windows occupy a large portion of the exterior building envelope. The windows were installed with insulated glazing, however, this insulating value is quite low when compared to a fully insulated wall system. Partially in-filling the openings with insulated wall systems and smaller detention grade windows will enhance both the thermal and detention performance of the exterior walls.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

When combining the thermal inefficiency of both the windows and building exterior brick walls, both heat gain and heat loss associated with the cooling and heating seasons, respectively, are expected to be quite high for this facility.

Exterior insulated finish systems could be applied to the exterior of the building. These systems offer a two-fold benefit. They insulate the facility as well as enhance the exterior appearance. New generation insulated finish systems also offer insulation that is design to drain condensate away from the building. In adding insulation to the exterior of the building, the present multi-wythe brick wall will no longer be exposed to the stresses of seasonal fluctuations of temperature and moisture that presently result in costly removal and replacement of portions of the walls.

Facade Moisture Characteristics

Masonry construction is porous in nature and requires periodic sealing to mitigate moisture migration into the building facade and the interior of the building. Periodic replacement of portions of the exterior masonry wall included replacement of steel lintels and headers that were reported to be rusted extensively.

The impact of moisture in this facility is enhanced due to its uninsulated nature. As the warmer interior temperatures meet with the exterior cooler temperatures, condensation is formed. Without insulation, condensation forms within the wall and provides the moist environment needed to deteriorate steel headers and lintels that are embedded within the wall. Masonry ties that may have been used to secure the brick to the building would also be subject to this attack. Sealers will not eliminate this condition and will only serve to mitigate the amount of moisture that penetrates the wall from the exterior.

The addition of insulation to the building exterior and proper flashing would control the point at which condensation is formed and provide a means of removing the moisture to enhance the service life of the building exterior. Removal of condensate is accomplished as described in the previous section.

Mechanical System Study

A Mechanical Systems study of three Hamilton County Facilities in Cincinnati, Ohio was performed in June of 2005. The three facilities are:

- Queensgate Correctional Facility
- Reading Road Correctional Center
- Turning Point

All existing equipment was documented and evaluated with respect to each building's needs. Queensgate is the largest facility representing approximately 80,000 square feet of useable space and is the focus of the mechanical portion of this study.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

Existing Conditions

Air-conditioning for the building is provided utilizing thirty (30) split systems totaling slightly over 300 tons. Fan coil units provide air distribution to the thirty HVAC zones throughout the building. HVAC for each of the housing floors (two through eight) features two zones; one for the southern half and one for the northern half. This is an effective approach offering good temperature control at minimal installed cost. The fan coil units are not equipped with economizers; therefore, the condensing units typically run continuously; even during winter months.

Outdoor air for occupant ventilation is pre-heated during winter months using electric duct heaters upstream of each fan coil unit. Perimeter heating is provided by a 15-psig, one-pipe steam system with steam radiators located at each floor. There are two (2), 125 horse-power, fire-tube, steam boilers located in the basement of the facility.

Potable water is provided to the facility from the city source with an incoming pressure of 55-psig. There are no isolation valves in the piping network; hence, any repairs to the system require a complete shutdown and draining of the system. The top floors have pressure problems with a residual pressure of approximately 24 psig and 19 psig on the seventh and eighth floors respectively. Flush valves typically require 25 psig as a minimum to operate effectively.

The water heater is approximately 13 years old and is performing adequately. Three-way mixing valves provide tempered water to lavatories and showers, but often malfunction and require frequent maintenance. Plumbing fixtures are made of porcelain with exposed flush valves and water piping. This plumbing design is typically used in commercial applications and is not suitable for detention facilities.

HVAC

The heating system is old and is functioning beyond its service life. Heating is provided by two steam boilers. In terms of gas consumption per Btu of heat produced, these units are not as efficient as boilers utilized in heating systems designed today. Steam is then delivered to radiators on the floors. This type of heat is difficult to control, leading to the subsequent installation of air handling units to temper the interior climate. The two systems are in essence competing with each other to temper the space, and this results in increased operational expenses. The air handling units are mounted beneath the ceiling of each floor. The condensers for these units are mounted on the roof of the facility.

Existing systems that are presently exposed should be enclosed within chases or soffits that are design for a correctional application. Piping, ductwork, and control systems would then be removed from potential tampering. Concealed construction will assist in providing a safer environment for the inmates and most importantly, the staff.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

Plumbing Systems

The plumbing systems are observed to be standard grade porcelain with non-detention grade hardware. Piping is routed in the open space and not concealed. Showers and restrooms have been upgraded with ceramic floors and walls. Shower units are not detention grade fixtures.

Plumbing should be completely replaced. Reconstruction should also include chase walls and cabinets that are designed for a correctional application. Plumbing could then be concealed with only operating parts such as push buttons exposed for use in operating lavatories, toilets, and showers. The installation of concealed construction will result in a minor reduction of available floor space. Chases will need to be constructed in a manner that facilitates maintenance.

Fire Protection Sprinkler System

The fire protection system, like many other systems, is constructed and routed throughout the facility in an open, unprotected manner. The riser piping and associated tamper switches are accessible to inmates. The distribution piping is routed overhead without detention grade sprinkler heads.

The fire protection system should be upgraded by removing non-detention grade sprinkler heads and replacing them with detention grade sprinkler heads. Exposed overhead branch piping will likely need to remain exposed. Fire protection piping that is presently mounted too low should be raised to prevent it from being reached easily. Exposed riser piping and valves should be enclosed within chases consistent in construction required for a correctional facility while providing ease of access to control valves and tamper switches.

Electrical Systems

The electrical service appears to be adequate for the facility. Unprotected outlets are observed in inmate spaces and are exposed. Sub-panels and breaker boxes are located within inmate spaces. Conduit is surface mounted and not tight to the walls and ceilings. Light fixtures are non-security grade fixtures. Chain hung light fixtures with wire covers to protect the lamps are observed throughout the facility. Lamps for the lights are also an older style and less efficient than today designs.

The electrical installation should be upgraded to include improvements consistent with a corrections application. Overhead conduit should be mounted as high as possible and securely fastened to the structure with tamper resistant hardware. Exposed electrical panels and disconnect switches should be enclosed to prevent tampering. Enclosing electrical panels will need to also satisfy the National Electrical Code for access and clearances. This could result in a reduction of available floor space and create potential blind spots on the floors. Additional controls should also be installed on the electrical service to facilitate controlling power and lighting remotely. Light fixtures should be replaced with detention grade fixtures that are installed with security hardware.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

Security Systems

As noted earlier in this section, control throughout the facility is accomplished mostly by keyed access. A minimal number of cameras are used for observation of movement through the facility. Some of the cameras are not operating. For a facility that is operated with the amount of inmate movement observed and reported, the security system is inadequate.

The following is a list of observations as they pertain to security concerns for a correctional facility. All of the building systems were adapted for use as a correctional facility and each system presents concerns as follows.

1. HVAC
 - a. Ductwork is routed within reach of inmates and is accessible for hiding contraband.
 - b. Intake grilles are mounted on plywood sheets in the windows and make the building envelope vulnerable.
 - c. Radiators are enveloped by guards that protect against burns without properly limiting accessibility for hiding contraband.
 - d. Radiator enclosures could be used to harm other inmates or staff.
2. Plumbing
 - a. Piping is routed in open spaces and vulnerable to being tampered with.
 - b. Fixtures are not of a detention grade and are vulnerable to attack.
 - c. Observation of inmate movement by floor stations is limited.
3. Electrical
 - a. Light fixtures are not of a detention grade with tamper resistant lenses.
 - b. Light fixtures are hung in a manner conducive to hiding contraband.
 - c. Electrical outlets are readily accessible for tampering.
 - d. Electrical subpanels and breaker boxes are mounted in the open and within inmate areas.
 - e. Conduit is mounted in a manner that is susceptible to tampering.
4. Fire Protection
 - a. Fire protection risers are installed in inmate areas without protection from tampering.
 - b. Fire protection sprinkler heads are non-detention grade and susceptible to tampering.
5. Door Locks
 - a. Magnetic locks were retrofitted for the facility without door position switches to alert staff to potential perimeter security breaches.
 - b. The wide use of keys provides opportunity for inmates to gain use of keys that could lead to a breach of the security perimeter.
6. Recreation
 - a. Outdoor recreation is located next to city sidewalks and streets that provide opportunity for the flow of contraband and substances to and from the facility.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

- b. Fence systems were installed in a manner that make the interior corners available for climbing and breaching perimeter security.
- 7. Building Envelope
 - a. The security grating mounted over the windows could easily be removed or torn down, thus making the building perimeter easy to breach.
 - b. The security grating is mounted with non-detention grade hardware and could be easily removed with make-shift tools.

The security system is inadequate for the level of inmate detained at this location. The use of direct supervision has succeeded in operating the facility with minimal incident, however, many blind spots exist that provide opportunity for incidents. Magnetic door locks should be replaced with standard jamb locks consistent with the level of inmate located on each floor. When replacing doors and frames, door position switches should be installed to provide a means of monitoring door position and record its use. Consideration should be given to the installation of cameras throughout the facility. Cameras should be installed as needed to eliminate blind spots. New control panels should be installed to integrate all controls for better means of indirect supervision. Real time recording capabilities should be included to record incidents in the facility. Critical locations should also include audio as well as visual recording. Access points should be provided with an intercom system that is interconnected with a camera when activated in order to provide automated visual observation of individual and group movement throughout the facility. Upgrading the control system will necessitate a larger control room in order to house the expanded system.

Mechanical System Evaluation

The 300+ tons of mechanical cooling exceed the actual building load of 220 tons. While having excess capacity can be a benefit during extreme weather conditions, during the majority of the year, the refrigeration circuits are forced to cycle on and off resulting in premature failure of the compressors. Additionally, the long vertical pipe runs from the roof to the fifth floor pose a problem for refrigerant systems. The entrained oil necessary for compressor lubrication can have difficulty circulating through the piping network and typically will collect at the bottom (fifth floor) of the circuit. The insufficient oil flow also contributes to premature compressor failure. A building this size can justify a central chilled water system in lieu of the multiple split system approach currently employed. A central chilled water system will provide superior energy efficiency, lower maintenance costs, better performance at partial loading and longer equipment life.

In the late 1990's, the State of Ohio adopted the ASHRAE Standard 62 requiring a significant increase in the amount of outdoor air required for buildings. The existing fan coils do not meet the current (2005) Ohio Mechanical Code for outdoor air flow-rates. Also, utilizing electric resistance duct heaters is extremely inefficient. The lack of an economizer mode on the fan coil units forces the air-cooled condensing units to run 24 hours per day and 365 days per year. This unusual situation results in higher annual electricity charges and reduced life of the condensers.

The two steam boilers are 37 years old and nearing the end of their expected lives. They were decommissioned during our visit, but a visual inspection of the tubes revealed well-maintained equipment with potentially ten additional years of service remaining. The steam

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

capacity of 250 horse-power represents just under four times the building load of 70 horse-power. Fortunately, steam boilers operate at partial loading quite efficiently. In addition, the partial loading extends the life of the equipment, which is probably why the boilers look so good after 37 years of service.

The one-pipe steam distribution system represents 1920's technology. There are inherent problems with this heating approach; namely, poor temperature control and pipe corrosion. The typical symptoms include badly corroded piping with frequent leaks and poor heating distribution leaving one end of the building too hot while the opposite end is too cold. Both of these symptoms are present in this facility. There are very few of these systems still in operation in the United States having been upgraded with two-pipe steam systems or two-pipe hot water systems.

Municipal potable water distribution systems commonly operate between 50 and 65 psig. Since potable water piping networks are "open" systems, the pressure has to overcome the static head of the pipe risers. In high-rise buildings (above 5 floors), the static head of the pipe risers can be too high for the municipal water pressure to overcome. Because of the limited pressure, high-rise buildings usually employ potable water booster pumps. There are two design approaches to the use of these pumps:

- Booster pump(s) sized for the entire building load with pressure regulators to reduce the pressure provided to the lower floors.
- Booster pump(s) sized for the upper floors only with the lower floors connected directly to the municipal feed upstream of the booster pump(s).

Given the fact that this is an existing building, option 2 above is probably the most cost effective approach.

Conclusion


The sole value in this facility is that it provides housing for a significant portion of the County's inmate population, and its saving grace is that the Sheriff's Office operates it using a direct supervision strategy to manage inmate behavior. The manner in which routine operations have to occur results in both inefficiencies and potential hazards - particularly when considered in the light of higher security inmates being housed in this facility. The design of the facility makes it difficult to deliver even a minimal level of services to the population and challenging for staff to supervise inmates.

Over the last thirteen years, the County has paid a significant amount of money to lease and to operate a facility that was designed to be a two or three year solution to a correctional crisis. Between 1992 and 2005, the County has paid more than \$27 million dollars to lease this aging facility and much more to operate it. This situation can only become more pressing as alternatives to incarceration continue to be used for minimum inmates, resulting in an "in custody" population that presents higher levels of risk.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

Hamilton County Justice Center (HCJC)

General Information

*Location and Property Description***Figure 8.6** Hamilton County Justice Center Location

The Hamilton County Justice Center is located in the center of downtown Cincinnati at 1000 Sycamore. It occupies the irregularly shaped block bounded by Sycamore, East Central Parkway, Eggleston Avenue, and East Ninth Street. The site is 3.513 acres and provides 166,951 finished square feet. According to the Hamilton County Auditor, the market value of the land is estimated at \$9,183,900 and the improvements at \$61,023,200, resulting in a total market value of \$70,207,100. Most likely the improved value is the cost of project construction. The facility is located directly across from the Hamilton County Courthouse and is directly linked to the Court through the old Hamilton County Jail.

Facility Description

HCJC was occupied in 1985 with an initial capacity of 848 inmates. The facility is essentially comprised of two multistory structures (the north and south buildings) which are

linked by a pedestrian bridge. As noted earlier in this document, this facility was at capacity very soon after occupancy and double celling occurred in two stages. Because of crowding within this facility, the Sheriff's Office sought and obtained a cap established by the Federal District Court which set capacity limits at 1,240 where it has remained since 1994.

The facility provides podular housing units which essentially mirror each other in the north and south buildings. Each floor of inmate housing is divided into two housing groups. Units A-D comprise one unit, resulting in a capacity of 112

Figure 8.7 HCJC South Building

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

inmates (with double ceiling). Units E-H comprise a second unit, resulting in a capacity of up to 112 inmates (with double ceiling). Cells are grouped into units of 8, 8, 16, and 24 with separate dayrooms. Each group of units shares a common control room. This facility is similar to most first generation podular remote designs. In this approach to facility design and inmate management, staff are located in a series of control rooms which have the ability to observe inmates in one or more housing units. The primary philosophy of operations in this facility is a mixed strategy for delivery of services, which will be discussed in greater detail in each of the relevant areas. This also was typical of facilities constructed at this time.

Inspection Reports

The Ohio Bureau of Adult Detention (BAD) is responsible for inspection of jail facilities in the State. Inspections occur annually and typically focus on a selected group of standards which change annually. This section provides a summary of findings of BAD inspections.

1. 2005 Inspection
 - a. BAD - The facility was in compliance with 61 of the 63 standards which were reviewed this year.
 - i. The facility was non-compliant with 1-8-04 A(2a) and 1-8-04 (4)(a). Both of these standards relate to capacity.
 - ii. BAD indicated that *“action must be taken to limit the prisoner capacities in this jail to within the Bureau’s recommended housing capacity (848). The areas in the jail that are double bunked do not meet the minimum 100 square feet double bunk requirement. These cells should have one of the bunks removed and at that time these cells will be in compliance with single cells standard.”*
 - iii. BAD indicated that *“action must be taken to limit the prisoner population in the jail within the Bureau’s recommended housing capacity to allow the appropriate amount of square footage per prisoner in the dayroom space.”*
 - b. Environmental Sanitation Report for Institutions - Report noted one minor food handling violation, but no violations of temperature control. Further inspections noted the need to replace/repair tile in showers in various housing units.
 - c. City of Cincinnati, Division of Fire Inspection Report - noted no violations.
2. 2004 Inspection
 - a. BAD - the facility was in compliance with the 27 standards selected for inspection this year.
 - b. No environmental or fire inspections were available for this year at the time of BAD’s inspection, was duly noted by BAD. A subsequent fire inspection revealed no violations.

Figure 8.8 North Building with Court Connector



Section 8. Facility Evaluation

3. 2003 Inspection
 - a. Bureau of Adult Detention - the facility was in compliance with the 29 standards selected for inspection this year.
 - b. Environmental Sanitation Report recommended the following:
 - i. Cleaning and sanitizing of showers which were reported to be moldy
 - c. The City of Cincinnati Fire Inspection found no violations.

Functional Analysis

On June 16, 2005, the consultant conducted a detailed walk-through of HCJC. This section of this document identifies issues that were noted during that walk-through and are the consultant's observations.

1. In-facility Service Delivery Strategy, Circulation and Movement
 - a. This facility uses a mixed approach to the delivery of services.
 - b. As the primary booking and court holding facility, there is a significant amount of movement within the facility from booking to arraignment courts (which are also provided within the building) as well as to the adjacent courthouse.
 - c. Movement for inmates other than inmate workers is escorted, and large groups of inmates move from intake housing to booking.
 - d. This facility does provide wide primary circulation corridors which are designed to facilitate inmate movement and which are also relatively easy to observe on closed circuit television (CCTV). Within housing and program components areas, corridors are somewhat narrower and there are more corners.
 - e. One of this facility's greatest strengths is its secure connection to the Courts. Holding areas of the old Jail are currently used for post-arraignment court holding. However, the capacity of this area is inadequate for the number of inmates who routinely have to go to court.
2. Inter-facility Movement
 - a. HCJC serves as a transportation hub for inmates who are moving to and from Queensgate, Reading Road and Turning Point.
 - b. HCJC is the primary location of support services (food service and laundry), resulting in a significant amount of movement of materials between facilities.
3. Security and Control
 - a. The security and control systems in the facility are contemporary and were upgraded in 2003.
 - i. Security cameras appear to be of good quality with a mixture of color and black and white. There are more than 80 cameras in the facility.
 - ii. The control system relies on programmable logic controllers and appears to be relatively rapid in its response.
 - iii. It is possible to record (video only) from any camera.
 - b. Some systems which support these security devices are less robust.
 - i. Duress alarms are non-functional.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

- ii. The watchtour system reportedly never functioned as intended.
 - c. There are two central controls, one in each building. Neither appears to have a security vestibule and it appears that door position switches are either non-functional or being over-ridden on a regular basis.
 - d. In addition to these controls, each housing group has a separate control; this would result in sixteen additional control rooms (2 per floor in each tower). In addition, there are two visiting control rooms, one intake control room, and one kitchen control room, resulting in a total of twenty-two control rooms. The prevalence of controls has become somewhat questionable in contemporary correctional design because of the relative inflexibility of these posts. Unless it is possible to close a control room down and return operations to central control, then these are posts which must always be staffed.
- 4. Intake and Release - This is one of the areas which seems most problematic at HCJC.
 - a. The vehicle sallyport appears to have been designed for a much smaller number of in-coming arrests and much less inter-facility transportation. In addition to being uncovered with rather low walls, resulting in a number of escape vulnerabilities, given its shape, the vehicle sallyport is very narrow and was not designed to accommodate busses which are routinely used to move prisoners. 9-10 small vehicles can park in the sallyport. Buses block vehicles routinely.
 - b. This is one area which has been modified significantly to accommodate the increased numbers of in-coming prisoners and the increased role of the Department of Pretrial Services in screening for the Courts; the original booking area was designed for forty-five prisoners. While the renovation was successful in adding space, it has further complicated an ineffective and circuitous circulation pattern within booking and is still inadequately sized for the volume of prisoners who must pass through this area for intake, transportation, and release.
 - i. In booking, there is a need to separate circulation paths for in-coming inmates, inmates going to and from courts, inmates being released to the community and inmates being transported to other locations. This is critical - particularly when handling large groups of inmates - to avoid the potential of releasing the wrong inmate. Although the Sheriff's Office takes all reasonable precautions to appropriately identify inmates within this area, these groups of inmates share the same spaces and could potentially be mixed.
 - ii. Booking is a very sequential process in which movement should be linear with no retracing of steps to complete the process. Booking in this facility frequently involves doubling back to complete the process and is very inefficient.
 - c. The same holding areas are used for different functions during the day and evening hours. While this is efficient from a space perspective, it sets in motion a number of staffing dilemmas in booking associated with managing inmates in this area.
 - d. One of the strongest components of this facility is the extensive intake process which includes evaluation by pre-trial release personnel at the time of booking. This is an excellent approach which addresses specific needs of both the courts and the jail. Classification and health screening occur immediately following intake processing before inmates are placed in housing.
- 5. Courts -
 - a. The inclusion of arraignment courts is a significant asset since movement to court can occur without vehicle transportation. However, there are a number of issues associated with access to the arraignment courtroom from the holding areas, since

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

inmates essentially move across the jail perimeter for this hearing and back pending release. A stronger control of this perimeter would be desirable, and video-arraignment might be worth considering in the future.

- b. The court connector between this facility and the former Jail in the Courthouse also provides a secure, if somewhat circuitous, connection between HCJC and the courts. However, the holding space available at the Courthouse is limited. There are five single holding cells and several group holding cells. Typical movement to the court on a daily basis is more than 200 inmates. Inmates are moved to court holding based on morning or afternoon court appearances.
- c. A small room is available on the second floor for video-arraignment of a limited number of inmates.

6. Housing

Table 8.3 HCJC Housing Capacity

- a. As noted earlier, this facility is podular in design and the predominant inmate management style is remote supervision through a series of control rooms. Although housing areas are supervised by controls, staff actively supervise inmates by moving throughout the units.

North Tower						South Tower					
Unit	Capacity	Cells	Unit	Capacity	Cells	Unit	Capacity	Cells	Unit	Capacity	Cells
N51	112	56	N52	88	56	S51	104	56	S52	104	56
N41	112	56	N42	112	56	S41	112	56	S42	112	56
N31	112	56	N32	96	56	S31	112	56	S32	112	56
N21	46	46	N22	44	18	S21	88	56	S22	48	48
Subtotal	382	214		340	186		416	224		376	216
North Totals						South Totals					
Bed Capacity						722					
Cells						400					
HCJC Totals											
Bed Capacity											1,514
Court Ordered Capacity											1,240
Cells											840
Design Capacity											848
Female Bed Capacity											215
Female Cell Capacity											119
Original capacity included multiple occupancy for 8 additional people in medical											

- b. Table 8.3 provides an overview of capacity, which clearly shows the extent of double celling which has occurred in this facility. BAD's recommended capacity would return the facility to single occupancy.

- c. It is worth noting that the American Corrections Association (ACA) Standards for Adult Local Detention Facilities requires that one-third of housing be designed for single occupancy; it is clear that Hamilton County can not meet this standard. This same standard also requires that inmates who present a high degree of risk be housed in single occupancy. HCJC's problem lies in the fact that it does not have adequate housing for its medical and mental health population. When current national research suggests that in excess of 15% of inmates have a significant mental health disorder, and there is less than 10% of all capacity is in special housing, it tends to support the belief that there are significant deficiencies in specialized housing in HCJC.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

- i. In fact, the unit in which mental health inmates (suicide watch) are held is no different from other housing units in door type and organization. Typically this unit would provide a much higher degree of observation than others. In fact, cell fronts have no additional glazing and door vision panels are classroom sized.
 - ii. The complexity of medical housing needs have increased. Not only are negative pressure rooms required, but many of those with specialty medical needs now need access to special devices, such as sleep apnea machines.
 - d. HCJC is a primary housing location for female inmates; the other location in which women are held is at Reading Road. System-wide, 315 beds (14%) are available to women and nearly half of these (99 beds at Reading Road and 7 beds in medical) are specialized beds. General population capacity for women then is considerable less (about 7% of system capacity). At the time that HCJC was constructed, 10% of beds for women would have been a typical "rule of thumb." Unfortunately, a variety of factors have led to significant increases in the female offender population throughout the US. Today, it is not unusual to see a female population between 15% and 20% of ADP. In addition, because this is a smaller number than the male population, there is greater statistical variability, resulting much more variable counts for females. As a result, there are frequent capacity issues for this population.
- 7. Health Care - HCJC is the location in which inmates who have the most significant medical and mental health needs are held. As a result, there are a number of issues associated with this function. There is a great deal of inmate movement to this area, both from inside HCJC and from the remote facilities.
 - a. It is reasonable to assume that facility planners could not reasonably anticipate the types of medical challenges that health care staff in this institution face. The emergence of MRSA, HIV, Hepatitis C and more virulent forms of TB have challenged all health care providers in institutions. As a result, this facility is experiencing the issues previously noted under housing comments.
 - b. The approach to delivery of services is mixed. While medications are distributed to each unit, sick call occurs in the clinic area. There are two small holding areas adjacent to the clinic, which are not adequate to hold the number of inmates who need to be seen in clinic.
 - c. There are four exam rooms in the clinic area. Since this clinic also services inmates from the remote facilities, these rooms will be in high demand.
- 8. Inmate Programs
 - a. The primary strategy for delivery of inmate services is centralized. Inmates move to classrooms and other multi-use areas in which services and programs can be delivered. This results in a significant amount of inmate movement.
 - b. The facility includes two computer classrooms with approximately 20-25 stations each. This is consistent with contemporary approaches to inmate programs and services, providing access to computer based programming.
 - c. There is a chapel available for religious services.
 - d. Today, the most significant difference in this area is likely to be the degree to which these types of programs and activities are decentralized and delivered to inmates in or immediately adjacent to their housing areas. There are two significant advantages to this approach: the degree to which inmate movement (which is labor intensive) is minimized and the greater potential for access to these services.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

9. Exercise

- a. Ohio Standards require that inmates are offered opportunities for exercise for a minimum of one hour, five days a week. In reality, more is often better, since it provides an opportunity for inmates to release energy in a positive way.
- b. HCJC provides for centralized exercise areas. An indoor gym is available on the fourth floor and outdoor exercise is available on the roof. All inmates must move to this area. Because this function is centralized, it is likely that larger groups go to exercise together. The larger the group in the area, the higher the staffing requirement and the greater potential for an incident. This approach to exercise has not worked well for correctional facilities; contemporary designs have found alternative approaches to providing this function which are much less labor intensive.
- c. In contemporary design, most facilities try to decentralize these areas so that they are immediately adjacent to housing areas. This results in a higher degree of access and less inmate movement.

10. Visiting

- a. The facility provides for decentralized non-contact visiting. Visitors move through a separate circulation system to their side of the visiting cubicle. The security perimeter essentially runs through the glazing in each visiting booth and communication occurs via telephone. Inmates can move to their side of the visiting booth from the second level of their housing units.
- b. This approach minimizes movement and reduces the potential for the introduction of contraband.

11. Food Service - This is the primary food service location for all facilities.

- a. There are two methods of preparation: pre-plated trays, which are distributed throughout HCJC and which are transported to Turning Point and Reading Road, and bulk preparation for Queensgate. Most food service operations would prefer to do only one method of preparation.
- b. The kitchen has been able to meet the challenges of preparing and staging this number of meals, which strongly suggests that it was designed for something more than the 848 initial capacity. However, if the population continues to grow, additional staging and storage space may be required. The kitchen has a relatively small dry storage area for the population fed; the fact that food service has contracted with a correctional food service vendor with access to off-site facilities and bulk purchasing contracts has been an advantage.
- c. The layout of the kitchen presents a number of inmate supervision challenges, due to its shape and the inability to easily observe the working areas.
- d. The loading dock has become an issue for several reasons.
 - i. Although it is an enclosed dock, there are only two slots, one of which is large enough to easily accommodate a tractor trailer. However, this is the location through which inmate work crews move into the facility and through which food is transported to other locations. As a result, there are times when there is a greater demand for dock space.
 - ii. The receiving area is relatively small which results in the need to move deliveries quickly to the location where they will be stored.


12. Laundry - This is the primary laundry facility for the system.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

- a. Laundry equipment is commercial grade and appears to be in relatively good condition. There are three washers and three dryers.
- b. Laundry operates on two shifts and requires 8 detail workers.
- c. Laundry's stock is located across the hall, which requires inmate workers who stock to leave the laundry.
- 13. Maintenance - It was not possible to observe maintenance areas. However, it appears that there is a very active maintenance program in this facility. Equipment appears to be of good quality and in working order, which is remarkable given the number of inmates services in this facility.
- 14. Staff and Administrative Functions
 - a. This facility does provide some amenities for staff, primarily locker rooms and a staff dining area.
 - b. However, it is clear that there are more staff working in the facility than it was designed to accommodate. This is true not only for correctional staff, but for civilian staff, including medical, classification, and pretrial release.

Reading Road Correctional Facility

Figure 8.9 Reading Road Facility



General Information

Location and Property Description

The Reading Road Facility is located at 1613-1617 Reading Road about a mile from HCJC. The facility was constructed in 1930 as a commercial building and was an automobile dealership or garage at one time. The ramps which were used for that purpose are still in the facility. The building has been owned by Talbert House, a non-profit corporation, since 1994 and has been removed

Figure 8.10 Reading Road Facility



Section 8. Facility Evaluation

from the tax rolls. This three story structure sits on .87 acres of land and includes a small parking area, able to accommodate less than 15 vehicles. Land is currently valued at \$107,200 and improvements at \$1,307,400 for a total property value of \$1,414,600. This is an area which was clearly once commercial in nature and today should probably be considered transitional. The site slopes steeply up behind this facility, and it appears that the area across Hamilton Avenue, behind the facility is residential in nature.

This is a masonry structure with few evidences of correctional grade equipment and construction. It must be considered a minimum security facility. The Reading Road facility accommodates up to 150 inmates on three floors, 100 of whom are female offenders. BAD recommends a capacity of 150, which is consistent with current use. The primary focus of this facility is extended drug and alcohol treatment. The first floor of this facility houses up to 49 females who are being assessed for substance abuse treatment needs. The primary focus for this floor is educational in nature. However, because of crowding in the female offender areas of HCJC, the Sheriff's Office frequently moves female intakes to this area where they are held over night until a bed becomes available for them at HCJC. Talbert House, the Sheriff's Office and a consortium of other groups who are specifically interested in the needs of female offenders have develop a model for an "off the streets" program, similar to the SAGE program in San Francisco which targets women who have been involved in prostitution. The second floor accommodates 50 female inmates in extended treatment, and the third floor accommodates up to 50 male inmates in extended treatment. Inmates in the extended drug treatment program may be charged with offenses other than substance abuse offenses. At the completion of treatment, most inmates have their sentence mitigated.


Each of the floors in this facility are identical, with the exception of an area which has been modified on the first floor to provide for office and security functions. Each floor is operated independently of the others, which provides gender specific program opportunities at this location. What is remarkable about this facility is not the structure at all, but its program, which will be described in more detail later in this section.

Inspection Reports

This section provides a summary of findings of BAD inspections.

1. 2005 Inspection

Figure 8.11 Reading Road Floor Plan



Section 8. Facility Evaluation

- a. BAD - The facility was in compliance with all 63 standards which were reviewed this year.
- b. Environmental Sanitation Report for Institutions - This inspection noted the need to replace a variety of pillows and mattresses
- c. City of Cincinnati, Division of Fire noted no violations.
2. 2004 Inspection
 - a. BAD - the facility was in compliance with the 27 standards selected for inspection this year.
 - b. No environmental or fire inspections were available for this year.
3. 2003 Inspection
 - a. BAD - the facility was in compliance with the 29 standards selected for inspection this year.
 - b. Environmental Sanitation Report found no violations
 - c. The City of Cincinnati Fire Inspection found no violations.

Functional Analysis

1. In-facility Service Delivery Strategy, Circulation and Movement - All programming and activity occurs on the floor, and inmates have relatively high freedom of movement on the floor. Correctional staff are assigned to each floor who supervise inmates along with treatment counselors. All services, except for recreation, are decentralized to the floor.
2. Inter-facility Movement - As noted earlier in this section, this facility is close to HCJC. However, all transportation will occur in a vehicle. The parking area for this facility is small enough that the transportation vans routinely used can easily block vehicle access. In addition, Reading Road is a heavily traveled thoroughfare; entering and exiting the facility can be difficult.
3. Security and Control
 - a. Security control technology and space were added when the facility was renovated for treatment uses.
 - b. Control technology provides for the ability to monitor specific areas of the facility, door controls (perimeter doors only), and intercoms.
 - c. Movement on and off the floor is controlled by staff in key operated elevators.
4. Intake and Release - All intake and release functions occur at HCJC.
5. Housing - All housing is dormitory style.
 - a. Each floor has two units, able to accommodate 26 and 24 inmates. Each unit is further subdivided into smaller sleeping rooms.
 - b. All inmates on a floor share common day and activity spaces.
 - c. Toilets and showers are provided for each floor. Each shower room provides 5 shower, 5 toilets, and 2 sinks.
6. Health Care - This is a satellite health care facility. Health care staff come to this location from HCJC in the morning for triage and to deliver medications. Most health care treatment requires transportation to HCJC.
7. Inmate Programs - Talbert House is a progressive, multi-service community non-profit corporation, which developed from a single halfway house program. Talbert House serves a broad population and develops and delivers quality mental health, community corrections, welfare-to-work and substance abuse services in both correctional and non-correctional settings.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

- a. Talbert House provides two different programs at this facility. Females who are housed on the first floor participate in an assessment and educational program. As noted earlier, this floor may shift in purpose to house a dual diagnosis program that targets women who have been involved in prostitution.
 - b. Women who are housed on the second floor and men who are housed on the third floor participate in a longer term treatment program (90 - 120 days). This program is cognitive-behavioral in nature. Inmates participate in a variety of group and individual treatment activities during the day; evenings provide for visiting and mandatory participation in daily 12 step groups.
 - c. Because Talbert House provides a variety of services outside of the facility, there are strong linkages to aftercare.
 - d. Inmates at this facility are sentenced misdemeanants; felons receive comparable services at River City (a community corrections facility). There are relatively few program restrictions, however, inmates who are fire setters, escape risks or assaultive are not placed here.
 - e. As this program is involved in a continuous process of quality improvement, there has been a clear interest in developing and integrating more gender specific programming.
8. Exercise - Each floor has an activity area which includes cardio-vascular fitness equipment. An outdoor exercise area is available behind the facility.
 9. Visiting - Six non-contact booths are available on the first floor. Visiting times are designated by floors and inmates move to the visiting area. There is relatively little space in which visitors can wait.
 10. Food Service - Meals are pre-plated and delivered on insulated trays. Inmates eat in their day areas.
 11. Laundry - Inmates are responsible for some of their own laundry, but HCJC is responsible for bedding and blankets.
 12. Maintenance - Maintenance areas were not observed.
 13. Staff and Administrative Functions - Counseling staff have offices on each of the floors in which they provide individual treatment. Administrative and support staff have office space assigned on the first floor.

Physical Building Analysis*Structural Load Characteristics*

As stated previously, this multi-story concrete/masonry building was constructed around 1930. For many years, the building was reportedly utilized as a parking garage and car dealership. The structure is situated in front of sloping terrain and as such, the rear wall of the building functions as a retaining wall. The soils are retained to a height just below the roof level.

The facility structure is predominantly cast-in-place concrete columns and beams with a cast-in-place floor slab. The floor slab appears to have been poured integrally with the supporting concrete beams. Other than cosmetic issues, no distress was observed on the interior structural support systems.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

The exterior of the facility is comprised of multi-wythe masonry construction. This exterior shell of masonry may or may not be tied to the cast-in-place concrete support structure. The masonry exterior system appears to be servicing the facility adequately. As with previous discussion on other County facilities, sealing of the masonry should be part of a maintenance program.

If modifications are made to this facility, it will be necessary to evaluate current code requirements. Since the structure is known to fall within the influence of the New Madrid fault, the present structure will need to be evaluated for resistance to seismic design criteria. This criteria was not considered in the original design, and evaluation will most likely demonstrate the structure's inability to resist such applied loads without extensive structural retrofit of the lateral bracing systems.

Facade Thermal Characteristics

Although constructed of masonry and most likely uninsulated originally, it appears the facility has been renovated to include interior build-out that has enhanced the thermal performance of the building. Additional thermal enhancements could be made throughout the facility with the installation of insulated windows.

Facade Moisture Characteristics

Unlike the Queensgate facility, moisture related damage to the facade appears to be minimal.

Plumbing Systems

The plumbing systems are observed to be standard grade porcelain with non-detention grade hardware. Piping is routed in the open space and not concealed. Showers and restrooms have been upgraded. Shower units are not detention grade fixtures.

Plumbing should be completely replaced. Reconstruction should also include chase walls and cabinets that are designed for a correctional application. Plumbing could then be concealed with only operating parts such as push buttons exposed for use in operating lavatories, toilets, and showers. The installation of concealed construction will result in a minor reduction of available floor space. Chases will need to be constructed in a manner that facilitates maintenance.

Fire Protection Sprinkler System

The fire protection system, like many other systems, is constructed and routed throughout the facility in an open, unprotected manner. The distribution piping is routed overhead without detention grade sprinkler heads.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

The fire protection system should be upgraded by removing non-detention grade sprinkler heads and replacing them with detention grade sprinkler heads. Exposed overhead branch piping will likely need to remain exposed. Fire protection piping that is presently mounted too low should be raised to prevent it from being reached easily.

Electrical Systems

The electrical service appears to be adequate for the facility. Unprotected outlets are observed in inmate spaces and are exposed. Conduit is surface mounted and not tight to the walls and ceilings. Light fixtures are non-security grade fixtures. Chain hung light fixtures with wire covers to protect the lamps are observed throughout the facility. Lamps for the lights are also an older style and less efficient than today's designs.

The electrical installation should be upgraded to include improvements consistent with a corrections application. Overhead conduit should be mounted as high as possible and securely fastened to the structure with tamper resistant hardware. Light fixtures should be replaced with detention grade fixtures that are installed with security hardware.

Security Systems

The following is a list of observations as they pertain to security concerns for a correctional facility. All of the building systems were adapted for use as a correctional facility and each system presents concerns as follows.

1. HVAC
 - a. Ductwork is routed within reach of inmates and is accessible for hiding contraband.
 - b. Intake grilles are mounted on plywood sheets in the windows and make the building envelope vulnerable.
 - c. Radiators are enveloped by guards that protect against burns without properly limiting accessibility for hiding contraband.
2. Plumbing
 - a. Piping is routed in open spaces and vulnerable to being tampered with.
 - b. Fixtures are not of a detention grade and are vulnerable to attack.
3. Electrical
 - a. Light fixtures are not of a detention grade with tamper resistant lenses.
 - b. Light fixtures are hung in a manner conducive to hiding contraband.
 - c. Electrical outlets are readily accessible for tampering.
 - d. Conduit is mounted in a manner that is susceptible to tampering.
4. Fire Protection

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

- a. Fire protection sprinkler heads are non-detention grade and susceptible to tampering.
5. Building Envelope
- a. The building construction could be breached rather easily and consideration should be given to perimeter upgrades that enhance security.
 - b. An inmate could gain access to the roof. Doors leading to the roof are not monitored and provide no warning that the perimeter is potentially being breached. Once on the roof, an inmate could easily leave by jumping onto the slope retained by the back of the building.

The security system is inadequate at this location. The use of direct supervision has succeeded in operating the facility with minimal incident, however, many blind spots exist that provide opportunity for incidents. Doors and frames should be replaced with detention grade construction that automates access and provides a means of checking the status of the doors. When replacing doors and frames, door position switches should be installed to provide a means of monitoring door position and record its use. Consideration should be given to the installation of cameras throughout the facility. Cameras should be installed as needed to eliminate blind spots. New control panels should be installed to integrate all controls for better means of indirect supervision. Real time recording capabilities should be included to record incidents in the facility. Critical locations should also include audio as well as visual recording. Access points should be provided with an intercom system that is interconnected with a camera when activated in order to provide automated visual observation of individual and group movement throughout the facility. Upgrading the control system will necessitate a larger control room in order to house the expanded system.

Mechanical System Evaluation

The HVAC system appears to be adequate for this facility. The facility is serviced by roof top units that appear to be in good operating condition. Other than security concerns expressed previously, no comment is offered with the regard to mechanical system improvements.


Section 8. Facility Evaluation

Turning Point

General Information

Location and Property Description

Figure 8.12 Turning Point Location



Turning Point is located at 2605 Woodburn Avenue in a residential area of Cincinnati. The area includes both multiple and single occupancy residences. The original part of this house was constructed in 1930 and was used by the Marist Brothers for an extended period of time. The facility appears to have been expanded on at least two occasions.

Figure 8.13 Turning Point Facility



The house sits on a well-landscaped 1.308 acre lot bounded by Woodburn Avenue, Burdette Avenue and Taft Road. The Assessor places a \$206,900 value on the land and a \$344,300 value on the improvements for a total property value of \$551,200. The facility is owned by Talbert House, which operates the multiple DUI and 10 and 20 day DUI programs here. Turning Point

has a capacity of 52 inmates, as recommended by BAD.

At the time when this facility was developed, DUI was a major issue in the criminal justice system. Penalties had just been modified, and social perceptions regarding driving while intoxicated were just beginning to change. Today, utilization of this facility and program are reduced. There are a variety of potential reasons for this, which may interact.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

1. Other priorities have overtaken law enforcement and there may be less of an emphasis on DUI.
2. Driving while intoxicated is less socially acceptable in 2005 than it was in 1985.
3. The fact that this is a very low security facility, with minimal correctional supervision, may limit who can be housed here.

Turning Point is a pleasing brick structure with four levels. Inmates are housed on the first through third floors in small dormitory style rooms. Program space includes a variety of group rooms and a large multi-use room which are located throughout the facility. This facility has three separate furnaces (one for each expansion) and is likely to have many of the energy efficiency issues typical in buildings of this age. There is a volleyball area outside that serves as an exercise area. There is a privacy fence separating the grounds from the adjacent houses, but this is essentially a non-secure facility.

Inspection Reports


This section provides a summary of findings of BAD inspections.

1. 2005 Inspection
 - a. BAD - The facility was in compliance with all 63 standards which were reviewed this year.
 - b. Environmental Sanitation Report for Institutions -
 - c. City of Cincinnati, Division of Fire noted no violations, but commented that fire extinguishers were to be recharged the month of the inspection.
2. 2004 Inspection
 - a. BAD - the facility was in compliance with the 27 standards selected for inspection this year.
 - b. No environmental or fire inspections were available for this year.
3. 2003 Inspection
 - a. BAD - the facility was in compliance with the 29 standards selected for inspection this year.
 - b. Environmental Sanitation Report recommended the following:
 - i. Repair of broken plaster
 - c. The City of Cincinnati Fire Inspection found no violations.

Functional Analysis

1. In-facility Service Delivery Strategy, Circulation and Movement - Inmates in this facility are unescorted. A single corrections officer is assigned to supervise the facility.

Figure 8.14 Turning Point Floor Plan



Section 8. Facility Evaluation

2. Inter-facility Movement - Because this is a short-term facility, inmates are not likely to leave this facility. Services and supplies are delivered to Turning Point.
3. Security and Control - There were no security or control systems noted, other than good practice regarding manually locked doors.
4. Intake and Release - All inmates are booked at HCJC and brought to this facility.
5. Housing
 - a. All housing is dormitory style in small rooms of 2-4 occupants.
 - b. Equipment is residential in nature.
6. Health Care - A nurse comes to Turning Point twice daily from HCJC to deliver medications and provide triage services. If additional care is needed, the inmate would be transported to HCJC.
7. Inmate Programs
 - a. Like Reading Road, this facility's programs are operated by Talbert House. The focus in this facility is various types of driving intervention programs, with the duration dependent on the number of driving violations.
 - b. This facility also has a strong program day in which daily activities provide individual and group activities from approximately 9 AM until 4 PM. Evenings include both opportunities for visiting and self-help groups such as AA.
8. Exercise - In addition to exercise equipment in the facility, an outdoor volleyball court provides for active exercise. Because this population is relatively short-term, this approach to exercise seems appropriate.
9. Visiting - Visiting in this facility allows contact. Visiting occurs in the central dining area. Again, given the nature of this population, contact visiting is an acceptable option.
10. Food Service - Food is trayed and delivered to this location from HCJC. Meals are eaten in a central dining area, which is also used for larger group activities. This is another facility which uses HCJC resources.
11. Laundry - Residential grade washers and dryers are available in the basement of the facility.
12. Maintenance - Like the others noted, this facility is clean and well-maintained. However, this is clearly an older facility and shows all of the symptoms of what was essentially a residence being used for congregate living.
13. Staff and Administrative Functions - There are small offices provided for staff.

Physical Building Analysis*Structural Load Characteristics*

The facility was constructed in 1930 as a residence and construction reflects this. No distress was observed during our walk-through. Typical to older residential design, corridors are narrow, stairs are narrow and tend to be steeper than today's designs. Although not a structural issue, the existing floor plan does not function well in terms of the functional relationship of the spaces.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

Accessibility Characteristics

The existing floor plan, stairs (both interior and exterior), and narrow design present a considerable challenge in accommodating persons with a disability.

Facade Thermal and Moisture Characteristics

The building envelope appears to be functioning satisfactorily. As with all buildings constructed in this time frame, the extent of insulation in the walls would be expected to be minimal or non-existent.

Plumbing Systems

The plumbing systems are observed to be standard grade porcelain with non-detention grade hardware. Piping is routed in the open space and not concealed. Showers and restrooms have been upgraded. Shower units are not detention grade fixtures.

Although the level of security for this building is not the same as the previous buildings, consideration should be given to upgrades that enhance the installation to reflect detention concerns.

Fire Protection Sprinkler System

The fire protection system is constructed and routed throughout the facility in an open, unprotected manner and in many instances is located within corridors. This could potentially impede travel through the corridor during emergency egress scenarios and expose the County to liability. Consideration should be given to removing riser piping from the corridors. The distribution piping is routed overhead without detention grade sprinkler heads.

Electrical Systems

The electrical service appears to be adequate for the facility. Light fixtures are non-security grade fixtures. Chain hung light fixtures with wire covers to protect the lamps are observed throughout the facility. Lamps for the lights are also an older style and less efficient than today's designs.

The electrical installation should be upgraded to include improvements consistent with a corrections application. Overhead conduit should be mounted as high as possible and securely fastened to the structure with tamper resistant hardware. Light fixtures should be replaced with detention grade fixtures that are installed with security hardware.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

Security Systems

As mentioned previously, security is provided by the use locks that are manually operated by a single corrections officer located at this facility. At a minimum, consideration should be given to automating the exterior door access. This would provide the officer with a means of indirectly supervising more of the facility without being drawn away from internal activities. A limited controls system could be installed that would include an intercom, camera, and monitor.

Mechanical System Evaluation

The HVAC system appears to be adequate for this facility. The facility is serviced by residential units located in spaces retrofitted to serve as mechanical rooms. These systems appear to have been well maintained and are servicing the facility adequately.

Conclusions

1. With the notable exception of the Hamilton County Justice Center (HCJC), all of the facilities in use range in age from 70 - 100 years old. In addition, none of these facilities, with the exception of HCJC, were originally designed as correctional facilities. All have been retrofitted with varying success for their current purposes. Of the four facilities, Queensgate appears to the consultant to be the least successful - particularly when viewed in conjunction with the housing of medium security inmates in this location. With the exception of HCJC, none can be considered appropriate, based on the structure, layout, equipment and finishes, for correctional purposes beyond the lowest security levels. Given utilization rates in the various facilities, it appears that the jail population now has a lower proportion of minimum security inmates than it did in the past, resulting in the need for higher security beds than these facilities provide.
2. All of these facilities are relatively close to HCJC, and all rely strongly on the delivery of services from HCJC for daily operations. While this is clearly understandable from a financial and functional perspective, the movement of inmates, food, laundry and other materials clearly complicates daily operations at HCJC and provides ample opportunities for security violations. In the opinion of the consultant, Queensgate is particularly problematic because of its size. It is one thing to transport meals to Turning Point at up to 60 beds, and quite another to transport meals to Queensgate at up to 822.
3. With the exception of HCJC, these facilities are clearly at or beyond their useful life cycle. Examination of past practices suggests that both the County and the City have had a history of using facilities, such as the Workhouse and the old Jail, for very long periods of time. In the long-term, the extended use of facilities beyond their normal life-cycle was at least partially responsible for past litigation regarding conditions of confinement. Hamilton County has also, in the past, double and triple celled its primary correctional facility until ordered by the Federal District Court to reduce population. In the consultant's opinion, it is reasonable to assume that the County once again has increased vulnerability for confinement conditions, given the age of its facilities, and the degree to which the system has become reliant on multiple occupancy for medium and maximum security inmates.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

4. HCJC is clearly the best of these four facilities from a physical plant perspective. Yet, there are a number of significant issues here as well. There are areas within this facility that no longer meet the needs of the current population and are likely to become even more problematic in the future.
- a. Crowding in housing results in a significant number of inmates being placed in double occupancy. As the jail capacity was increased in the 1990's, the proportion of single cells decreased. When double celling occurred, even fewer single cells were available. However, the proportion of inmates who stay in custody on a long-term basis and are held at HCJC is a population in which more single occupancy is needed. BAD has been quite clear on its position that the capacity of this facility should be returned to the original 848, which provided much greater single occupancy.
 - b. The booking and intake areas have reached a point at which they no longer accommodate all of the functions which must occur here, given the number of inmates being processed.
 - c. The volume of inmates being booked, moving to arraignment court, being transported to other locations, and being released is large enough that it has become essential to separate the areas used by these populations and their circulation paths to avoid the potential for errors associated with release functions.
 - d. The consistent need to move inmates to exercise, health care, education and other program services is a staff-intensive approach to service delivery. Although this facility is likely to house most pretrial detainees whose service needs are not likely to extend to educational program, pretrial inmates will use all of the other services. Particularly problematic are approaches to meet the needs of inmates with medical and mental health needs.
 - e. There clearly is not enough space for female offenders. Females are the most likely inmates for early release, since they generally present a lower level of risk to the community, if not to themselves. Females have been early released since at least 1993, and it is clear that female ADP has become capacity driven.
 - f. It is also clear that a number of the support areas of the facility are operating at capacity. This is particularly true of food service and the loading dock. It will be essential to evaluate the ability of this area to support any additional inmate capacity.
 - g. Since the 1980's when this facility was planned, the activities required to provide mandated services in correctional facilities have expanded. This, in turn, has resulted in increases in personnel. The facility does not have adequate work areas for the number of staff currently employed.
 - h. The prevalence of secure control rooms in this facility raises the question of potential efficiencies that could be obtained if:
 - i. A single central control could be created to manage the perimeter and access across zones.
 - ii. The number of housing controls could be reduced with an alternative means of inmate behavior management and supervision used during at least during portions of the day.
 - i. An examination of the degree to which core functions of this facility, including mechanical and maintenance spaces, are adequate for increased population levels will be required in any expansion effort.
 - j. The value of this facility is its connection to the courts, which provides for a secure connection into the courthouse. If this connection were to be lost, the County would face significantly higher costs for transportation of inmates to and from courts.

Section 8. Facility Evaluation

5. Because of the large number of inmates held at the Queensgate facility, its continued use is particularly problematic.
 - a. The Queensgate facility was originally converted from a warehouse to correctional use from 1990 - 1992. The facility was renovated quickly because of jail population pressures in the County; it was renovated as economically as possible because its original intended lifespan was three years. The facility has now been operating continuously since 1992, and since that period the County has paid in excess of \$27 million dollars to lease the facility, in addition to the costs of operating it, paying property taxes, and maintaining any damage attributable to inmate or staff damage.
 - i. The materials selected were not correctional grade.
 - ii. Many design elements did not meet the correctional standards of the day, and the Bureau of Adult Detention granted variances because of the anticipated short life of the facility.
 - b. Queensgate was originally designed and approved for minimum security inmates; now 50% of its population are medium and maximum classifications.
 - i. The security system is inadequate for the level of inmates now held; the magnetic locking system used is not in current use in full-service jails and has severe limitations particularly in the event of a mass evacuation.
 - ii. Other security systems such as intercoms and cameras are almost totally lacking.
 - c. Maintenance considerations at this facility are significant and not without cost impacts:
 - i. The facility was not designed to withstand potential earthquakes.
 - ii. The uninsulated exterior walls have developed moisture problems which required extensive maintenance.
 - iii. The plumbing systems are not correctional grade, and water pressure on the upper two floors is inadequate.
 - iv. The heating system is at or near the end of its life-cycle.
 - v. HVAC, electrical, plumbing and fire protection systems are all within easy reach of inmates.
 - vi. The lack of insulation results in the continuous use of air conditioning to attempt to balance temperature levels.
 - d. The population held at Queensgate is among the most appropriate for program interventions. However, program space is so limited that basic services, such as recreation and education, which are required by standards are not available to the population. There are only two classrooms, which can accommodate a maximum of 32 inmates.
 - e. The facility has operated with minimal incidents to this point because of the successful management of direct supervision strategies. The Corrections Division has promoted an orderly style of operations in which staff are in control, and they have maintained the facility in a way that is remarkable for its age and current use. Nevertheless, there are indications that the number of incidents which have occurred here have increased as the minimum security proportion of the population decreased. As the facility continues to age and the security level of inmates housed there increases, the chances for successful outcomes diminishes very quickly.

Hamilton County, Ohio Correctional Master Plan

OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS

January 28, 2006



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Overview of the Options

Three conceptual options were identified:

- Option 1: Connected Campus assumes that new construction occurs immediately adjacent to HCJC and that the new construction, which may be on multiple sites, is connected to HCJC.
- Option 2: Nearby Site assumes that new construction at a location that is 5-10 minutes from HCJC.
- Option 3: Distant Site assumes that new construction occurs at a location that is more than 15 minutes from HCJC.

These options differ in the amount of space required, the type of construction (new construction vs. renovation), the complexity of the construction process, and operating costs. Site issues are discussed separately.

Space Planning Options

Each option is discussed in terms of the impact on new construction and the space currently used for that function (if it occurs at this location) in HCJC. Appendix A provides a detailed analysis of the new construction, the impact on HCJC and staffing implications for each functional component, in each option. The table on the following page summarizes changes to the space program based on each option. Detailed space programs for each option are available.

Analysis of Options

Component #	Component	Subcomponent	Net		Circulation Factor	Gross	
			Option 1	Option 2 & 3		Option 1	Option 2 & 3
1	Intake	Sallyport	11,150	11,150	1.2	13,380	13,380
		All Other	8,940	8,940	1.54	13,770	13,770
2	Admissions & Classification	Admissions	6,540	6,540	1.54	10,070	10,070
		Property	6,055	4,305	1.54	9,320	6,630
3	Transportation & Release	Release Processing	1,565	1,565	1.54	2,410	2,410
		Transport Staging		2,725	1.54		4,200
		Court Staging		0	1.54		0
		Court Holding	2,585	2,585	1.54	3,980	3,980
4	Security and Control	Central Control	4,860	3,900	1.54	7,480	6,0100
5	Housing	Cell Housing	91,900	91,005	1.75	160,830	159,260
		Dormitory Housing	104,185	100,375	1.6	166,700	160,600
		Shared Housing Spaces	51,880	45,870	1.5	77,820	68,810
6	Health Care	Medical Clinic	6,420	6,420	1.54	9,890	9,890
		Medical Staff Access Zone	4,045	4,045	1.54	6,230	6,230
		Mental Health Clinic	1,580	1,580	1.54	2,430	2,430
		Mental Health Staff Access Zone	2,340	2,340	1.54	3,600	3,600
7	Programs	Inmate Access Zone	10,190	10,190	1.3	13,250	13,250
		Programs/Vocational Office Zone	1,165	1,165	1.54	1,790	1,790
8	Visitation	Jail Public Areas/Video Visit Center	5,045	5,045	1.4	7,060	7,060
		Special Visiting Suite	2,280	2,280	1.54	3,510	3,510
9	Support Services	Food Service	33,115	20,390	1.4	46,360	28,550
		Laundry	6,610	1,885	1.4	9,250	2,640
		Janitorial	8,985	7,065	1.4	12,580	9,890
		Commissary	3,020	2,520	1.4	4,230	3,530
		Vehicle Maintenance	3,265	3,265	1.4	4,570	4,570
		Maintenance Shop Area	4,145	3,345	1.4	5,800	4,680
		Facilities Shop Area	3,670		1.4	5,140	
		Maintenance Office Suite	1,370	1,370	1.54	2,110	2,110
10	Administration	Corrections Administration	3,840	3,840	1.54	5,910	5,910
		Sheriff's Office Other	4,925	0	1.54	7,580	0
		Sheriff's Administration	3,090	0	1.54	4,760	0
11	Staff Support		18,220	12,530	1.4	25,510	17,540
12	Pretrial Services	Non-secure Sections	3,420	0	1.54	5,270	0

Analysis of Options

Component #	Component	Subcomponent	Net		Circulation Factor	Gross	
			Option 1	Option 2 & 3		Option 1	Option 2 & 3
13	Courts	Video Court	2,905	2,905	1.54	4,470	4,470
		Public Arraignment Courts	4,270	0	1.54	6,580	0
		Mayor Court Replacement	4,270	0	1.54	6,580	0
Total Programmed			431,845	371,140		670,220	580,770
Building Connectors			10,000			12,000	
					Mechanical (8%)	53,620	46,460
Total						735,840	627,230

Option 1 represents all of the space that would be required to provide for all of the space listed. It represents what the County would have to build if it were to replace everything. However, Option 1 will not be all new construction; renovation of areas vacated will be required. This raises the issue of potential need to bring the entire HCJC up to present code. It also suggests a longer and more complex construction process in which HCJC must continue operations. Option 2 and 3 will require less square footage, but it will all be new construction. This makes the basic assumption that HCJC is left “as is” and that court holding is expanded, in the courthouse. It also makes the following assumptions:

- The current intake area of HCJC serves as the court staging area and/or the area from which transports occur to the new facility. Transport staging shown in the Option 2 and 3 space program is located at the new facility to facilitate movement.
- Food service stays operational at HCJC; although some items, such as bakery items and some entrees which will be produced at the new facility can be moved to HCJC from the new facility, the two facilities are functionally self-sufficient with regard to meal preparation.
- Male laundry remains at HCJC; female laundry (and bulk bedding laundry) is provided at the new facility.
- Potentially commissary could remain in its present location at HCJC although space is planned at the new facility.
- The functions of the Sheriff’s Office which are currently inside the secure area of HCJC are relocated to space vacated by Corrections Administration, outside the secure area of the jail. No additional space is programmed.
- The Sheriff’s Office remains in its current location.
- The non-secure elements of pretrial services remain in their current location. No additional space is programmed.
- No connectors are required in this option, since transportation is by vehicle.
- If HCJC is retrofitted for video-visitation (as is suggested), space can be provided in the lobby of the north building for this function.

Staffing Implications of Options

Staffing Efficiency Measures

In 1999, the Bureau of Justice Statistics estimated that local jurisdictions spent \$15,096,000,000 to operate jails¹. Because jails are staff-intensive operations, most criminal justice planners estimate that between 70% and 80% of this cost is for staff salaries and benefits. Staffing costs are clearly the “big ticket” item in correctional planning. Over the thirty year life of a facility, most jurisdictions will spend in excess of 90% of all the money that is spent on the jail for staffing. As a result, local officials have become progressively more concerned about making good decisions about staffing.

The challenge for most jurisdictions is figuring out how much staff is “right” for a specific facility or facility design. There are many factors which influence facility staffing.

- Facility mission influences staffing because it identifies the primary purpose and the operational philosophy of the institution.
- Physical plant is a powerful influence on staffing through factors including configuration and size of housing units, supervision and control strategies, the location of program and support areas, and circulation patterns.
- The volume of activities carried out in the facility - and their timing - establishes workload, which influences staffing.
- The security level of the population in general and the size of the “special needs” population in particular influences staffing.
- Standards and case law also influence staffing levels by identifying what must be done, but they rarely establish actual staffing patterns or ratios.

It is obvious to correctional administrators and operations that not all jails are the same and that the differences should influence staffing levels. However, officials charged with funding jails may not “see” the differences so clearly as jail administrators, and most staffing methodologies begin with analyzing the influences of these factors in each facility. How then can funding officials evaluate the staffing plan? One approach is to consider what can be learned from staff to inmate ratios.

Staff to inmate ratios divide the total number of inmates that the institution is responsible for by the total number of staff, i.e., 150 inmates / 50 staff = 1:3 (1 staff for every three inmates). But like all statistics, staff to inmate ratios have to be used responsibly and accurately.

¹ Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Justice Expenditure and Employment in the United States, 1999.

Analysis of Options

1. **Not all staff are the same.** There are different types of staff who work in correctional facilities. There are officers, administrators, clerks, nurses, cooks and maintenance personnel. Most staff inmate ratios reflect all of these categories. It is important to know what the ratio of inmates to correctional officers is also.
2. **Staff to inmate ratios reflect total staff on the payroll, not who is in the building or in a housing unit at a given time.** There has been a great deal of discussion about a 1:48 or a 1:60 ratio for officers to inmates. These ratios refer to the number of inmates in one housing unit who are supervised by one officer at a time. They are not the same as a staff to inmate ratio.
3. **Staff to inmate ratios are statistics.** Like most other statistics, it is essential to have a large enough sample so that it is possible to generalize from the statistic to a situation. In addition, it is important to remember that your situation **may** be different from the "average." As statistics, good staff to inmate ratios are useful for establishing a **normal range** within which typical staffing levels will fall.

Staff to inmate ratios vary by region within the United States and by size of facility, since there clearly are economies of scale. The tables on the following page provide regional and size staff to inmate ratios from the Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletins.

Region	Inmates per Jail Employee			
	1983	1988	1993	1999
US Total				
Total Staff	3.5	3.4	2.8	2.9
CO	5.0	4.7	3.9	4.3
Northeast				
Total Staff	3.0	2.4	1.9	2.2
CO	4.1	3.2	2.5	2.9
Midwest				
Total Staff	2.9	2.9	2.4	2.5
CO	4.4	4.0	3.5	4.2
South				
Total Staff	3.4	3.8	3.2	3.3
CO	4.9	5	4.3	4.6
West				
Total Staff	4.6	4.5	3.4	3.3
CO	7.1	6.7	5.3	5.7

In the four years for which data is available, the Northeast, of which is Ohio is considered a part, has had the lowest inmate to staff ratios and could be considered the least efficient. In 1999, there were an average of 2.2 inmates for every staff person and 2.9 inmates for every correction officer. Nationally, in contrast, there were 2.9 inmates for every staff and 4.3 inmates for every corrections officer. In general, the west has traditionally had the most efficient operations. As the smaller table shows clearly, the larger the institution, the more efficient it can be.

Facility Size	Total Staff	Corrections Officers
Less than 50	1.5	2.4
50-249	2.7	3.9
250-499	2.8	4.1
500-999	3.1	4.4
More than 1,000	3.1	4.6

Current Staffing

The implications of the options should be viewed in the context of current staffing, which is remarkable in the context of the information about staff to inmate ratios available through BJS.

Analysis of Options

Facility/Job Classification	HCJC	HCJC Intake Detail	HCJC Intake Breakdown	Queensgate	Reading Road	Turning Point	Total	Total Non HCJC
CO	273			120	19	7	419	146
HCJC Housing Subtotal		187						
Intake Subtotal		87						
Intake/orientation Housing (1)			20					
transportation (2)			14					
Supervisors	28	subtotal (reassigned)	34	9	2	0	39	11
Support	123	subtotal (new intake)	53	18	1	0	142	19
Total	424			147	22	7	600	176
Capacity	1,240			822	150	60	2,272	1,032
Staff to inmate ratio	2.92			5.59	6.82	8.57	3.79	5.86
(1) Treat as part of HCJC Housing Staff								
(2) Transportation Staff								
Intake staffing (current) provides for courtrooms (which become video arraignment), JAX Staffing, hospital duty, court holding and admissions								
Revised HCJC Housing (includes old intake/orientation unit)		207						
Transportation		14						

Currently there are 424 staff assigned to HCJC (Housing and Intake) and 176 assigned to the other three facilities. HCJC as the current primary location for corrections absorbs most of the “administrative overhead” (personnel, finance, and management). HCJC has been divided into two groups (Housing and Intake), which parallel the way in which the Bureau of Adult Detention views these operations. There are currently 187 staff assigned to housing and 87 assigned to intake. The basic assumptions regarding staffing at HCJC are:

1. Intake and Orientation Housing functions will be moved to new construction; the areas vacated will be used for maximum inmates and will be staffed by the same 20 persons currently allocated to that function in the intake subtotal. Those 20 staff are shifted from the count for HCJC intake and moved to HCJC housing, resulting in a new HCJC housing staffing total of 207.
2. The 14 staff currently assigned for transportation are also removed from the intake total, since this number will vary based on the option selected.
3. All other intake and housing staffing remains the same.

Analysis of Options

Overall, the Hamilton County system has a **1 to 3.79** staff to inmate ratio, in notable contrast to northeast as a whole, which has a 1 to 2.2 staff to inmate ratio. Hamilton County’s staff to inmate ratio exceeds the more efficient averages seen in the south and the west. Even more telling is the comparison with comparably sized institutions (in excess of 1,000). Nationally large institutions had staff to inmate ratios of 1 to **3.1**; Hamilton County has a more efficient ratio of 1 to 3.79.

Methods for Estimating Future Staffing Needs

In seven day a week, 24 hour a day operations, estimation of staffing requirements, particularly for the essential staff, who work on various shifts, is sometimes difficult. The most straightforward approach is to determine the number of hours which have to be worked at each of the identified posts and divide that by the number of contracted work hours (2080) that the typical staff is available to work, typically somewhere between 1,575 and 1,675. This method accounts for regularly scheduled days off, sick and vacation time, and all other forms of leave. The derivation of net annual work hours is shown in the adjacent table. This method (and the net annual work hours shown in here) is used to provide an order of magnitude comparison of the options.

Step	Calculation
1. Total hours contracted per employee per year	2,086.00
2. Average number of vacation hours per employee per year	90.00
3. Average number of compensatory hours off per employee per year	30.00
4. Average number of sick leave hours off per employee per year	48.00
5. Average number of mandatory training hours off per employee per year	40.00
6. Average number of personal hours off per employee per year	8.00
7. Average number of other hours off per employee per year	4.00
8. Average number of break hours off per employee per year	130.00
9. Average number of holiday hours off per employee per year	60.00
10. Total hours off per employee per year	410.00
11. Net Annual work hours	1,676.00
No Relief	2,086.00
Weeks in year	52.14

This information will be applied to the staffing plans that are included as Appendix B, C, and D, and which are summarized below.

Summary of Staffing Implications of the Options

The following assumptions are made in the new staffing patterns:

1. All staff assigned to Queensgate, Reading Road, and Turning Point will be re-assigned to the new facility, since their programs will now be housed in the new facility.
2. Support staff will be relocated from HCJC to the new facility if their function(s) have moved.
3. The same strategies that have been used in the past and in HCJC to assign supervisors and support staff will continue into the new facility.

Analysis of Options

	CO	Supervisory	Support	Total
New Staffing Required at Full Occupancy	277	39	30	346
Current Staffing in Replacement Facilities	146	11	19	176
Added Staffing	131	28	11	170
HCJC Staffing	207	28	123	358
Subtotal Housing Staffing	484	67	153	704
Subtotal Intake Staffing (w/o transports)	53	included above		53
Subtotal CO (Housing + Intake)	537	67	153	757
Total System Capacity	3,036			
This staffing remains constant in the various options				
CO to Inmate Ratio	5.65			
Staff to Inmate Ratio	4.31			

This plan replaces 1,032 beds and adds an additional 772 new beds with a total of 170 **new** staff. The 176 staff currently working in the facilities which are attributed to the new staffing. If this staffing pattern is followed, the overall efficiency increases.

There are two staffing components which are influenced by the site options: transportation and court staging (the current intake area of HCJC which would be used to stage inmates to and from court).

	Option 1	Option 2	Option 3	
HCJC				
Housing	207	207	207	includes old intake and orientation housing staff previously attributed to intake
Old Intake/Court Staging	0	5	5	
Subtotal	207	212	212	
Supervisors	28	28	28	
Support	30	30	30	assumes relocation of most support staff
Subtotal HCJC	265	270	270	
Expansion Facility				
Intake	53	53	53	
Transportation	4	8	20	current transport staffing is 14; reduction anticipated in both Option 1 and Option 2 because of reduced movement, reduced number of facilities, increased delivery of medical service in-house, less movement of materials, and no movement to arraignment court. <i>If video arraignment does not occur, the number of transportation staff will increase in both Options 2 and 3.</i>
Housing	277	277	277	
Supervisors	39	39	39	
Relocated Support	93	93	93	
New Support	30	30	30	
Subtotal Expansion	496	500	512	
Total	761	770	782	

Analysis of Options

Shaded cells in the above table are those in which the options result in a difference. The most effective way to examine the differences between these staffing patterns is to compare them based on an order of magnitude basis.

	CO	Supervisors	Support	Total
New Housing Staffing	131	28	11	170
Annual CO Salary @\$30,000 + 33% benefits =				\$39,900
Annual Supervisor Salary @\$50,000 + 33% benefits =				\$66,500
Annual Support Salary @\$30,000 + 33% benefits =				\$39,900
	CO	Supervisor	Support	Total
New Housing Staffing	131	28	11	
Cost of New Housing Staffing	\$5,226,900	\$1,862,000	\$438,900	\$7,527,800
CO Options	Option 1	Option 2	Option 3	
Old Intake/Court Staging	0	5	5	
Transportation	4	8	20	
Annual Cost of Option	\$159,600	\$518,700	\$997,500	
Current Transport Staffing = 14 FTE * \$39,900				\$558,600
Variance of Option from Current Costs	(\$399,000)	(\$39,900)	\$438,900	

This table shows both the anticipated new cost for the additional 772 beds (\$7,527,800 annually), based on the assumptions shown in the above table regarding CO, supervisory and support staff benefit packages. There will be additional costs associated with operations (food and medical contracts, supplies, materials, etc.), which the County may wish to estimate. **Note: a typical estimation of personal services to other costs is a ratio of 80:20.** The costs associated with each option vary significantly since the number of transportation staff required for each option ranges from a low of 4 (estimated at \$159,600 annually) to 25 (estimated at an annual cost of \$997,500). Option 2 at the middle range is most consistent with current transport staffing levels (14 FTE currently versus 13 required in this option) at a cost of \$518,700. To some degree, then option 1 represents a savings over the status quo, Option 2 represents the status quo with minimal savings, and Option 3 represents an additional cost.

Conclusions

1. The Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office has a very efficient current operation, and the consultant sees no reason why that efficiency should not continue in the replacement and expanded facility.

Analysis of Options

2. Staffing, supervisory and support efficiency strategies in place in current facilities have been extended into the new facility, and additional efficiencies in housing have been developed through reduction in the number of fixed control points and the effective grouping of housing areas.
3. Management of staff assigned housing areas and the areas themselves have been balanced to reflect the degree of difficulty to be expected in that area.
4. Option 1 is the most staff-efficient, but presents significant operational issues during construction as the facility must remain in operation while areas within HCJC are renovated. Renovation of HCJC may trigger the need to bring all of HCJC up to present code.
5. Option 2 results in minimal operational inconvenience during construction, and is consistent in those areas in which additional staffing is required with the resources currently allocated to those functions. It also results in the less square footage to be constructed.
6. Option 3 presents significant operational problems. To a large degree it exacerbates the problems which this project is attempting to solve.

**Hamilton County, Ohio
Jail System: Total Cost-to-Own**

Alternative	30-Year Operating	Capital (Includes Debt Service)	Total Cost to Own	<i>County Facility Residual Value</i>
Master Plan Recommendation	\$ 2,418,166,926	\$ 317,963,283	\$ 2,736,130,209	\$ 44,104,047
Queensgate Renovation / Justice Center Expansion	\$ 2,644,938,880	\$ 200,636,820	\$ 2,845,575,699	\$ 27,829,930
Queensgate Renovation & Expansion	\$ 3,472,195,612	\$ 9,174,000	\$ 3,481,369,612	<i>n/a</i>

**Hamilton County, Ohio
Total Cost-to-Own: Operating**

2005 Total Operating Costs

2005 Total System Costs:	42,907,602
Per Day Per Inmate:	55.95

Yr 8 Current System Cost 52,772,060

Net 400 Increase Open (Years 1-7)

Master Plan Recommendation Incremental Costs:	Year 1	FTE	Years 1-7
Personnel	3,750,030	85	
Non-personnel	1,938,880		
Treatment Program Savings	(442,015)		
Queensgate Lease Savings	(2,100,000)		
Sub-total	3,146,895		
Year 1 Total System Costs:	46,054,497		352,890,842
Per Day Per Inmate:	50.45		

Net 800 Increase Open (Years 8-30)

Master Plan Recommendation Incremental Costs:	Year 8	FTE	Years 8-30	30-Year Total
Personnel	9,224,324	170		
Non-personnel	4,769,257			
Treatment Program Savings	(543,634)			
Queensgate Savings	(2,582,790)			
Sub-total	10,867,157			
Year 8 Total System Costs:	63,639,216		2,065,276,085	2,418,166,926
Per Day Per Inmate:	60.10			

Queensgate Renovation / Justice Center Expansion:

	FTE	Years 1-7
Personnel	4,656,253	106
Non-personnel	1,938,880	
Queensgate Lease Increase	1,000,000	
Treatment Program Savings	(442,015)	
Sub-total	7,153,118	
Year 1 Total System Costs:	50,060,720	383,588,376
Per Day Per Inmate:	54.84	

Queensgate Renovation / Justice Center Expansion:

	FTE	Years 8-30	30-Year Total
Personnel	11,453,452	211	
Non-personnel	4,769,257		
Queensgate Lease Increase	1,229,900		
Treatment Program Savings	(543,634)		
Sub-total	16,908,975		
Year 8 Total System Costs:	69,681,034	2,261,350,504	2,644,938,880
Per Day Per Inmate:	90.86		

Queensgate Renovation & Expansion:

	FTE	Years 1-7
CCA Per Diem Rate	69	
CCA Annual Cost	35,259,000	
Queensgate Lease Savings	(2,100,000)	
Treatment Program Savings	(442,015)	
Treatment Program County Staff Savings	(1,564,771)	-29
Treatment Program County Non-personnel Savings	(838,566)	
County Queensgate Savings...Personnel	(6,176,520)	-140
County Queensgate Savings...Non-personnel	(3,984,398)	
Sub-Total	20,152,730	
Year 1 Total System Costs:	63,060,332	483,197,409
Per Day Per Inmate:	69.08	

Queensgate Renovation & Expansion:

	FTE	Years 8-30	30-Year Total
CCA Per Diem Rate	88.14		
CCA Annual Cost	57,909,842		
Queensgate Lease Savings	(2,582,790)		
Treatment Program Savings	(543,634)		
Treatment Program County Staff Savings	(1,924,512)	-29	
Treatment Program County Non-personnel Savings	(1,031,352)		
County Savings...Personnel	(7,596,502)	-140	
County Savings...Non-personnel	(4,900,412)		
Sub-Total	39,330,640		
Year 8 Total System Costs:	92,102,700	2,988,998,203	3,472,195,612
Per Day Per Inmate:	120.10		

Notes:

- 37 Row 3 - Current per day costs includes all funding sources and does not include Justice Center debt service which ended in 2005.
- 38 Row 8 - Based on Talbert House estimate of \$7 per day per person for "occupancy" and using 2005 average daily population for Reading Road and Turning Point facilities.
- 39 Row 15 - The Queensgate Renovation / Justice Center Expansion does not realize staff efficiencies and uses the current 3.79 inmate/staff ratio (i.e. 800 / 3.79 = 211 staff).

Hamilton County, Ohio
Total Cost-to-Own: Capital

	Option	Construction Costs	Financing Costs	Total Capital
1	Master Plan Recommendation	192,699,279	125,264,004	317,963,283
2				
3	Queensgate Renovation / Justice Center Expansion	121,594,450	79,042,370	200,636,820
4				
5	Queensgate Renovation & Expansion	5,560,000	3,614,000	9,174,000

7 Notes:

8 Row 1 - The construction cost is reduced to \$192,699,279 to normalize inflation and contingency assumptions with the URS estimate for a Justice Center expansion.

9 Row 3 - The construction cost for a 800-bed expansion is based on the URS estimate for a 600-bed expansion adjusting for beds and leaving the core unchanged.

10 Row 5 - The cost proposal from Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) did not include land acquisition or site development costs. The estimate provided above are a prorated amount from the Master Plan recommendation.