

## Section 8. Facility Evaluation

This section of the master plan provides a detailed analysis of the Queensgate Correctional Facility as well as a summary analysis of the Hamilton County Justice Center, the Reading Road Facility, and Turning Point.

### Queensgate Correctional Facility Assessment

#### General Information

##### *Location and Property Description*

**Figure 8.1** Queensgate Location



The Queensgate Correctional facility is located at 516-528 Linn Street in Cincinnati on approximately 1.5 acres of land, bounded by Fifth Street, Sixth Street, and Linn Street. This area is within an enterprise zone. The lot is irregularly shaped and is physically contiguous to a number of adjacent buildings, which were formerly part of the Hudepohl Brewery. There are four parcels as shown in Figure 8.1, and there are three other unimproved parcels (516 Linn Street) which are now part of the exterior recreation area. According to Hamilton County Auditor's records, the property includes 145,950 square feet of improved space and is valued at \$156,000 for the land and \$3,690,100 for the improvements.

Adjacent properties appear to be in the process of redevelopment as sections of the former Brewery are torn down. Adjacent properties are valued at \$320,400, \$195,400 and \$767,000. These have been recently purchased, most likely with an eye to redevelopment of the area.

This area is industrial in nature. The former Hudepohl Brewery is located to the east; this facility is currently being razed. A viaduct lies to the north, with the Expressway just beyond it. To the west is a railroad line, which is consistently used. To the south are several food distribution warehouses. This area appears currently to have no residential components and appears not to have much traffic during non-business hours. A neighborhood redevelopment and remediation project is occurring at Baymiller and 3<sup>rd</sup> Street, about a block away. The proposed uses for the renovated structures will be offices.

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Financial Information

Queensgate was converted to correctional use from 1990-1992, when it was occupied by the County. US Corrections Corp completed the renovation and was subsequently acquired by Corrections Corporation of America (CCA). CCA leases the facility to the County through its Prison Realty Trust division. CCA receives a property tax reimbursement; Hamilton County operates the facility. The County is also responsible for paying property taxes and maintaining fire and extended liability coverage. CCA is responsible for maintenance of the structure, which is defined in the lease as roof, boilers, electrical systems, plumbing systems, structural components, drywall and tile, water heaters, elevators, emergency generator, inmate visiting phones and exterior painting *unless the damage is caused by inmate or staff abuse*. The County is responsible for maintaining the parking lot, fencing, razor wire and gates, routine maintenance of locking mechanisms and security systems, routine cleaning of smoke/heat detection devices, kitchen equipment, interior painting, security screens, and washers and dryers. CCA is essentially responsible for system failures, while the County is responsible for any damage related to inmate or staff abuse. In the opinion of the consultant, since most damage in correctional facilities can be traced - either directly or indirectly - to inmate or staff abuse, the County is likely to be responsible for most maintenance in the facility.

Table 8.1 Lease History

Year	Lease Amount
1992	\$2,044,000
1993	\$2,044,000
1994	\$2,044,000
1995	\$2,044,000
1996	\$2,044,000
1997	\$2,044,000
1998	\$2,044,000
1999	\$1,737,400
2000	\$1,772,148
2001	\$1,807,591
2002	\$1,843,743
2003	\$1,880,618
2004	\$1,918,230
2005	\$1,956,595
	\$27,224,325

Figure 8.2 Queensgate Correctional Facility



Hamilton County has had three leases during the thirteen years that Queensgate has been operational. The first two leases were for a period of five years each; the current lease provides a three year term, with three one-year renewals. This lease includes a 2% payment in addition to the base rent. The County is in the second annual lease of the current period, which implies that this lease will be up in 2006.

Facility Description

The facility is a former Kruse Hardware warehouse, which was constructed in 1900 according to Auditor records, and has a total of 135,050 gross square feet. The Queensgate Facility is an eight story structure; inmate housing is located on seven floors. There is a significant slope on this site which results in several floor levels. Vertical circulation occurs using two, twelve passenger elevators, as well as two stair towers. Each housing floor has approximately 12,000 gross square feet. Inmate services are located in the basement as well as the first and second

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floors of the facility. This structure was expanded to provide a more adequate public entry and waiting area and appears to have been modified to provide for correctional functions.

First Floor

This floor includes mechanical and storage space. Although a portion of this floor is shown on the blueprints as inmate recreation, that does not appear to be its current use.

Second Floor

This floor includes:

- Inmate recreation,
- Commissary,
- Inmate dining,
- Staff dining and vending,
- Inmate health care (a waiting area, a nurse-station, medication storage, two exam rooms, and associated storage),
- Kitchen, which is primarily a serving kitchen and tray wash,
- Holding and processing area, which includes three small holding cells with access to an exterior, fenced vehicle sallyport.

Public access to this facility occurs on Floor 2a. This appears to be a newer structure and may have been modified significantly when the facility was renovated. This floor includes:

- Visitor waiting, which occurs in an addition,
- Non-contact visiting,
- Professional visiting (one room),
- Central Control and Visitor Registration,
- Male and female staff lockers,
- Staff services, which includes briefing and physical training areas, and
- Administrative space (conference room and several staff offices).

Third Floor

Because there are some additional functions on this floor, this is the smallest of the housing floors. This floor also includes:

- Two classrooms (one of which is used as a library and meeting room for program staff and inmates in programs),
- Computer lab/classroom, and
- Administrative offices (6).

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Housing Functions

According to the original plan, all housing floors were designed to accommodate 112 inmates which would result in an operating capacity of 784 inmates. As constructed, each floor accommodates a slightly different number of inmates, resulting in a total facility capacity of 822. The second and third floors accommodate 116 inmates, the fourth floor accommodates 114 inmates and the remaining floors accommodate 119 inmates. Each floor includes:

- Two dormitories, each of which have access to inmate telephones and the automated Jail Help system, which provides inmates information about pertinent information, such as their account balances, bond amounts, and court dates,
- One recreation room (with television),
- One dayroom (on the side which does not have television),
- Two group shower rooms, each with ten shower heads, which meets the current Ohio Standard for Full Service Jails for up to 120 inmates,
- Two toilet rooms, each with five toilets, four urinals, and eight sinks, which meets the current Ohio Standard for Full Service Jails for up to 108 inmates (for toilets and urinals, assuming that urinals can be substituted for up to half of the toilets) and for up to 96 inmates (for sinks),<sup>1</sup>
- One laundry room with two residential washers and two residential dryers,
- One janitor's closet,
- One staff restroom,
- One small storage area, and
- Two open staff workstations, one in each dormitory.

**Inspection Reports**

The Ohio Bureau of Adult Detention (BAD) is responsible for inspection of jail facilities in the State. Inspections occur annually and typically focus on a selected group of standards which change annually. This section provides a summary of findings of BAD inspections.

1. 2005 Inspection
  - a. BAD - The facility was in compliance with all 63 standards which were reviewed this year.
  - b. Environmental Sanitation Report for Institutions - although information was provided for the Justice Center and Reading Road, no report was provided for Queensgate.
  - c. City of Cincinnati, Division of Fire Inspection Report - noted no violations.
2. 2004 Inspection
  - a. BAD - the facility was in compliance with the 27 standards selected for inspection this year.

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<sup>1</sup> Because Ohio Standards have been modified over time, it is likely that the number of sinks and toilets met the required number for the anticipated number of inmates on the floor at the time that the project was developed.

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- b. No environmental or fire inspections were available for this year.
3. 2003 Inspection
  - a. BAD - the facility was in compliance with the 29 standards selected for inspection this year.
  - b. Environmental Sanitation Report recommended the following:
    - i. Replacement of stained ceiling tiles in the cafeteria
    - ii. Repair of sinks in the housing areas, including addressing issues with low water pressure
    - iii. Repair of several toilets and urinals that were out of order
    - iv. Replacement or cleaning of light shields
    - v. Repair of flooring in showers
  - c. The Food Service Operation Inspection report by the Ohio Department of Health found no violations.
  - d. The City of Cincinnati Fire Inspection found no violations.

The degree to which this facility has received good inspection reports is a credit to the staff who work at this facility. It is clean and orderly, which is a remarkable achievement for a facility of this age and use. However, there are clear operational and maintenance issues in this facility. The next sections of this report focus on the issues that characterize operations observed and discussed during an initial review of the facility.

It is evident that this facility is somewhat atypical for minimum security facilities found in the State of Ohio. The Bureau of Adult Detention provides some of the most stringent construction and renovation criteria for correctional facilities in the US. Staff at the Sheriff's Office who were involved in the development of the facility found that US Corrections Corp was not familiar with Ohio requirements and developed the facility with a number of characteristics that would not normally have been approved by the Bureau of Adult Detention. It was necessary to obtain a number of variances to allow the facility to open.

The areas in which variances appear to have been necessary include:

- dormitory size,
- the number of showers, toilets and sinks (as noted above),
- the need for direct voice contact with a continuously staffed post or central control and direct voice contact with adjacent corridor, and some of the building elements or dimensions such as the type of glazing and dimensions of the windows, type of fasteners, type and location of view panels, method of anchoring items, such as windows, the method of anchoring ducting systems and other HVAC materials, the type of locking system selected in conjunction with the inability to use electronic locking devices to restrict movement across zones within the facility, and accessibility to handicapped prisoners.

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**Functional Analysis**

On June 2, 2005, the consultants conducted a three-hour walk through of Queensgate with staff of the Hamilton County Sheriff's Office and Hamilton County Budget Office. This section of this document identifies issues that were noted during that walk-through and are the consultants' observations.

**1. In-facility Service Delivery Strategy, Circulation and Movement**

- a. All inmate services are centralized in this facility, which means that inmates must move off their housing floors for any activity. This occurs at least three times per day for meals, and every time an inmate participates in exercise, visiting or program activities.
- b. Because there is very limited elevator capacity, movement to these activities takes a considerable amount of time.
  - i. Elevator capacity consists of two elevators, each of which can accommodate 12 passengers, while more than 100 inmates live on each floor. Staff report that these elevators are often "unreliable" resulting in periods when one of the elevators is not operational. Over time, because of their age and use, it is likely that this problem will grow while the facility remains in use.
  - ii. Because of restricted elevator capacities, inmates will use the stairs. The typical process is down by stairs and up by elevator if the inmates are housed on the sixth - eighth floors. Otherwise, upward movement is by stairs as well. For mass movement, one officer leads the group of inmates and the second officer from the floor brings up the rear. Not only does this degree of movement using stairs present a "trip and fall" risk, but, because of the construction of these stairs, it also places inmates out of staff view for extended periods, resulting in potential security and safety issues for both staff and other inmates.
- c. Movement off the floor will be escorted (for mass movements) and unescorted (for individual movement).
- d. Unlike the wide, straight corridors, with no indentations, designed to accommodate inmate movement, Queensgate has narrow corridors, with many perpendicular connections. There are also a number of areas in which indentations (such as entries to office or storage areas) on a major corridor provide places where an inmate may move out of view of escorting staff. The implication of this type of corridor system is that video surveillance of these areas would be prohibitively expensive if full coverage of corridors were desired.
- e. The implication of this type of movement, in conjunction with the relative lack of security technology, suggests that this facility would be appropriate for minimum security inmates at best - and only those who are not particularly vulnerable. This facility would also be difficult for inmates with physical disabilities which make movement (particularly movement up and down stairs) difficult. In fact, the facility can not accommodate insulin dependent diabetics or inmates with heart, mobility or respiratory problems.

**2. Inter-facility Movement**

- a. In addition to centralizing services within the facility, the Hamilton County Sheriff's Offices has centralized support services (food and laundry). Meals are prepared and laundry is done at a single location at HCJC. This is clearly the most efficient

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strategy to perform the work, but with a remote facility leads to the need to move food and laundry from HCJC to remote locations. Each of these issues will be discussed in the section of this report which deals with that function.

- b. There is a significant movement of inmates on a daily basis between Queensgate and HCJC.
  - i. Inmate workers typically come from minimum classifications and because Queensgate is the primary location for minimum custody inmates, most workers will live at Queensgate, even though their work assignment may be elsewhere.
    - (1) Kitchen crews are approximately 30 inmates, who work two shifts.
    - (2) Laundry crews are approximately eight inmates who work two shifts.
    - (3) Commissary crews are approximately five inmates who work one shift.
  - ii. Inmates in Queensgate may be either pre-trial or sentenced. Inmates frequently have court appearances and it is not uncommon to have 100 inmates from Queensgate going to court on a single day.
  - iii. Inmates in Queensgate who need dental services or specialty appointments also have to be transported to HCJC.
- c. Transportation begins as early as four AM and continues throughout the day. This is perhaps the most inefficient consequence of separation of facilities. What would simply be walking down a corridor in a single facility now involves multiple vehicles from 40+ passenger busses, vans and cars, with transportation staff driving inmates and food from the central location.

**3. Security and Control**

- a. Queensgate is a decidedly "low tech" facility. There are less than ten cameras in use in the facility, which is remarkable considering the number of floors; while some cameras appear to have been replaced, because the quality of the image is quite good, there are a number which provide very poor recognition capacity.
- b. Central Control is located at the public entry to the facility and performs the typical duties of security system monitoring, door control, emergency response, and communication. In addition to telephone, staff radios provide the only means of communication within the facility. The intercom system is no longer functional.
- c. Montgomery Technology, based in Greenville, Alabama, made the door control system. Unlike most facilities which use either electric or pneumatic locking devices, this system appears to rely on doors with magnetic locking devices, which were reinforced by adding additional magnetic locks after the first set of locks were found to be inadequate. The doors initially installed were also easily bendable, resulting in a minimal security perimeter. Remote locking devices focus on the perimeter and first floor. The consultant has never seen this type of locking system in any correctional facility and has not been able to find another correctional setting which has used this type of system. It is worth noting that this facility had to be developed quickly, in an existing structure. As a result, this locking system may have been selected because of time constraints or because it is easy to install with minimal re-wiring.
- d. All movement beyond the security perimeter within the facility appears to be key operated. The control panel is deteriorating, and the Sheriff's Office reports a number of control system failures. Key operated facilities are vulnerable to at least three specific types of problems.

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- i. In an emergency, if a key is dropped or lost, it may become impossible to leave the floor unless central control is able to open the door remotely or the fire system automatically opens all doors opening. Central control does not have the ability to open doors to the inmate stairs and staff carry keys to allow inmates into the stair towers.
  - ii. If an inmate plans to leave the facility, then staff who have keys to the stairwells may become vulnerable.
  - iii. If a disturbance breaks out on one floor, it would take almost no time for the disturbance to spread to other floors.
4. Intake and Release - All inmates are booked and released from HCJC. Property remains at the HCJC. As a result, inmates who are being released are moved from this facility to HCJC.
5. Health Care
  - a. Inmates can be seen in the clinic which is located adjacent to the inmate dining area.
  - b. To facilitate picking up medications, the clinic has a window which opens to the inmate dining area. However, the area in the health clinic from which medications are distributed is also the medication storage area. This process is efficient, but restricts the kinds of medications that are distributed from this location and as a result the type of inmate who can be housed at Queensgate.
  - c. The level of health care available at this facility is limited to nursing care, using LPNs; a doctor comes to this location five days a week. As a result, if an inmate needs to see the dentist or another specialist, he is transported to HCJC.
  - d. As a result, this facility should be considered appropriate housing for relatively healthy, younger inmates.
6. Inmate Programs
  - a. All programs delivered to this population are done away from housing areas. These programs are delivered on the third floor of the facility, with inmate access through the housing unit on this floor. This is problematic because it provides an opportunity for floors to interact (which is not desirable) and it is also disruptive to this unit of workers (whose work assignment begins at approximately 3:30 AM). As a result, use of this area during evenings for programming is disruptive.
  - b. This area is difficult to supervise, since it is not visible from a staffed location and incidental supervision by staff passing the area in a corridor is not viable either, since this area is isolated from areas in which staff routinely move.
  - c. Programs include:
    - i. School, particularly GED,
    - ii. Library and law library,
    - iii. Religious services and Bible studies,
    - iv. Self-help groups (AA/NA), and
    - v. Special events or special interest programs, provided by a variety of volunteers.
  - d. Classroom space is limited to two classrooms, accommodating 20 and 12 inmates respectively. The implication for this minimum security population is significant. Minimum inmates are non-violent pre-sentenced misdemeanants, sentenced misdemeanants, and sentenced non-violent felons. Of all populations in the jail, this may be one of the largest groups to which programming should be targeted. The facility sets a significant limit on the number of inmates who can participate in programming because the areas in which it can occur are extremely limited. The implication is that the population who could most likely benefit from intensive correctional programming focusing on reducing recidivism has limited opportunities for participation.

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7. Exercise

- a. Ohio standards require that inmates are offered one hour of exercise five days per week.
- b. The facility has both an indoor and outdoor exercise area to which inmates must be moved.
  - i. The indoor area is large enough to allow between 30 and 60 inmates to exercise by square footage requirements, but functionally would be more appropriate for a smaller population. There are no security cameras in the gym. Because multiple housing units used the same area, there is always the potential for contraband and information to be passed from unit to unit.
  - ii. The outdoor area is larger, but is only used during warm weather months. When used, three officers are located inside and a fourth (armed) officer is available outside. The outdoor area is particularly vulnerable to the potential intrusion of contraband since it abuts a public street. The fencing is 12' chain link with razor wire at the top; because inmates in the exercise area are completely visible to the street, they are also vulnerable when in the area. Staff report at least one incidence of drive by shootings while inmates are in the exercise area.

8. Visiting

- a. Queensgate uses a centralized, non-contact form of visitation. Family visitors enter a lobby and waiting area, which are not adequately sized for the number of visitors this facility routinely has, and move into the visitor's side of the visiting area after registration. Telephones allow visitors and inmates to communicate.
- b. There are approximately 40 booths and one contact, professional visiting room. The layout of these booths occurred to maximize the number of booths that could be provided in the limited space. Unfortunately the strategy selected failed to consider the need to observe visiting to prevent illicit or inappropriate communication. As a result, this area is difficult to supervise effectively. Both of these areas are very noisy when they are full.
- c. In contemporary facilities, the general visiting strategy in facilities of this size is to either provide decentralized non-contact visiting at the housing areas or to use video-visiting technology. While the first might have been feasible at the time of renovation, neither seems viable - from either a construction or financial perspective - at this time. As a result, the facility has a movement-intensive form of visiting, which is difficult to supervise.

9. Food Service

- a. Food service is provided from the central kitchen at HCJC. Food is transported three times a day, in bulk, in insulated containers. Food is portioned onto trays at a cafeteria serving line by inmate workers. There are at least two problems which occur as a result of this strategy:
  - i. The need for timely delivery of food impacts operations at both the Hamilton County Justice Center (HCJC) and Queensgate. Timeliness is essential to ensure that food is maintained at the appropriate temperatures.
  - ii. The distance between HCJC and Queensgate results in a longer time to resolve problems which can occur in the amount of food provided. This typically is noticed the second time that the food is portioned onto the tray at Queensgate. If not enough food is sent in the bulk containers from HCJC, it presents problems at Queensgate. Since food is one of the things that is most important to inmates, this has the potential to create a major problem in the dining area for those inmates who eat last.

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- b. The serving kitchen has large heaters and coolers to keep food at the appropriate temperature, but there have been consistent complaints regarding the quality and temperature of food at this facility.
  - c. The kitchen has extremely limited capacity and prep activities are limited to sandwiches and salads. As a result, in an emergency, such as a weather emergency, this kitchen would not be able to prepare meals.
  - d. There are two major implications of this strategy for food service delivery:
    - i. It is very labor intensive to move food three times a day from HCJC. Unlike a connected facility, in which inmate workers can push food carts to the appropriate location, this method requires staff drivers and vans to move food.
    - ii. Most institutions have moved away from central dining, since this is one area in which large groups of inmates gather. In the past, dining areas have been the spots in which inmate disturbances broke out. In this facility, more than 100 inmates move together to central dining, which is supervised by more than five officers. In spite of the commitment of staff resources, this is an area which is vulnerable to disturbances.
  - e. The degree to which movement occurs between the two facilities also creates inefficient operations. While a centralized kitchen is clearly an efficient way in which to prepare food, moving it three times daily is not. There are similar problems with movement of laundry. Even more problematic is the movement of inmate workers between the facilities, since this provides potential security risks to the community.
10. Laundry
- a. All uniforms, bedding and towels are laundered at HCJC.
  - b. This is a second function which requires the movement of large volumes of material from Queensgate to HCJC and vice versa. This also requires the staff drivers and vans to move laundry.
11. Work Details
- a. Correctional facilities typically used minimum inmates as food service, laundry, and janitorial workers. The implication of this practice for Hamilton County is that inmate workers typically live at Queensgate but must be transported to and from HCJC at least twice a day to their work location.
  - b. This results in a significant amount of transportation of inmates between the two facilities. Not only is this labor intensive, but it also creates a number of security risks whenever inmates are moved outside of the perimeter of an institution.
    - i. Inmates are often impulsive, and depending on what is happening in their lives, they may feel or act differently from the behavior classification personnel would normally anticipate.
    - ii. The number of inmates who are moved is significant. Kitchen crews alone are groups of 30 inmates, and there are at least two kitchen crews transported per day.
    - iii. Work crews that work outside the facility also live at this location. When inmates work outside the facility, even though they are supervised, there is an increased possibility of the introduction of contraband.
12. Maintenance - the facility provides for the typical maintenance functions. These functions will be discussed more fully later in this section.
13. Staff and Administrative Functions - the facility provides locker, break and briefing areas for staff.

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The very nature of the Queensgate Facility limits who should be housed there. Because of the high degree of inmate movement, coupled with the relative lack of security technology to extend staff's ability to observe inmates and monitor areas of the facility, this is a facility in which only minimum custody inmates should be housed. However, review of average daily population at this facility (see Section 4) suggests that Hamilton County does not have the ability to keep this facility as "full" as HCJC. In fact, although the Sheriff's Office clearly does not want to house inmates who do not meet minimum classification requirements at Queensgate, the pressure of population at HCJC has resulted in times when inmates, other than minimum security, including new intakes, were held in this location. By policy, medium inmates include:

- pre-sentenced felony charges, which are non-violent,
- current misdemeanor charges (pre-sentenced or sentenced) for assault.
- inmates who have a history of two assault convictions in the last five years.
- inmates who have a holder from Common Pleas probation or other County or State Parole.

Maximum security inmates include:


- pre-sentenced felony charge of violence,
- sentenced to state penitentiary.
- fugitives from out of state,
- inmates who have a history of conviction for violence in last five years, and
- inmates who have a history of conviction of escape in the last five years.

**Table 8.2** Trend in Classification of Inmates Held at Queensgate

	<b>1999</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>%</b>
None	6	0.0%	3	0.0%	6	0.1%	32	0.3%	21	0.2%	4	0.0%
Minimum	7,946	64.8%	7,404	63.3%	6,303	60.5%	6,536	57.9%	6,916	54.8%	7,441	50.1%
Medium	3,811	31.1%	3,821	32.7%	3,694	35.4%	4,182	37.1%	4,817	38.2%	5,993	40.4%
Maximum	500	4.1%	462	4.0%	423	4.1%	536	4.7%	871	6.9%	1,407	9.5%
Total	12,263	100.0%	11,690	100.0%	10,426	100.0%	11,286	100.0%	12,625	100.0%	14,845	100.0%

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**Figure 8.3** Trend in Classification of Inmates Held at Queensgate



Data in Table 8.2 and Figure 8.3 was provided by the Regional Crime Information Center. All inmates who were housed at Queensgate each year from 1999 were identified. Four classifications of inmates were found:

- None,
- Minimum,
- Medium, and
- Maximum.

Figure 8.3 clearly shows the increase in the number of medium and maximum security inmates held at Queensgate. Both of these classifications are increasing. Medium security inmates were just under one-third of inmates in 1999, but are now 40% of inmates, and maximum security inmates were less than 5% in 1999, but just under 10% in 2004. Given the nature of this facility, it is somewhat surprising to see maximum security inmates housed here. This may relate to the degree to which HCJC is dealing with significant capacity issues.

The Regional Computer Center (RCC) provided information about the incident reports which were made at Queensgate in 2004. There were 3,798 inmates involved in incidents at Queensgate in 2004. Because some inmates were involved in more than one incident and some incidents involved more than one

inmate, it is important to note both the number of discrete individuals (2,342, who were involved in an average of 1.62 incidents) and the number of discrete incidents (2,227).

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**Figure 8.4** Security Level of Queensgate Inmates Involved in Incidents





Figure 8.4 and Figure 8.5 provide information about the incidents at Queensgate. Just over 35% of incidents at Queensgate involved inmates who were classified as minimum security, while just over 45% involved inmates who were classified as medium security. Nearly 20% of incidents involved inmates who were classified as **maximum** security. When viewed in the context of overall classification, 50% of inmates who were

**Figure 8.5** Seriousness of Incidents at Queensgate



medium or maximum security accounted for 65% of incidents, and 10% of inmates classified as maximum security accounted for 20% of incidents.

Just over 35% of incidents were classified as minor (the least serious), but just over 45% were considered major and just over 10% were considered serious. About 85% of these incidents were disciplinary violations. About 8% of these were reports taken for information only, but 5% involved inmate fights or disturbance. According to Department policy, serious incidents are violations of law. Major and minor incidents are categorized according to disciplinary policy and procedure which define rule violations as major or minor depending on the sanction that can be imposed.

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**Physical Building Analysis***Structural Load Characteristics*

The multi-story facility is reported to have been constructed approximately 100 years ago. For many years, the building was utilized as a warehouse. From observations of the facility and pictures of unearthed site structures, it is likely that the facility may have been part of the neighboring brewery at one time. It is also reported the underground structures were part of the City sewerage systems at one time. Drawings were provided that indicate an addition and interior renovations were constructed in 1991 for the purpose of converting the warehouse to a correctional facility.

The facility structure is predominantly cast-in-place concrete columns and beams with a cast-in-place floor slab. The floor slab appears to have been poured integrally with the supporting concrete beams. The structure was most likely designed to withstand vertical loading only. Other than cosmetic issues, no distress was observed on the interior reinforced concrete support systems. Some deterioration was observed on portions of the reinforced concrete structural system where it is exposed to the elements on the exterior of the building. Due to its location, this is believed to be cosmetic in nature.

The exterior of the facility is comprised of multi-wyth masonry construction. This exterior shell of masonry may or may not be tied to the cast-in-place concrete support structure and very likely provides the primary lateral support for the building. Sections of the facade have been removed and replaced due to reported bowing of the wall. Both of these structural systems appear to be servicing the present load requirements adequately.

If modifications are made to this facility, it will be necessary to evaluate current code requirements. Since the structure is known to fall within the influence of the New Madrid fault, the present structure will need to be evaluated for resistance to seismic design criteria. This criteria was not considered in the original design, and evaluation will most likely demonstrate the structure's inability to resist such applied loads without extensive structural retrofit of the lateral bracing systems.

*Facade Thermal Characteristics*

This type of construction was common around the turn of the century and, unlike today's designs, was not concerned with building thermal efficiency. Most likely, insulation is non-existent in the exterior walls of the original facility. Uninsulated exterior walls develop moisture related issues that require extensive maintenance. This is discussed in the section of this report describing moisture characteristics.

The exterior windows were replaced when the facility was converted for its present use as a correctional facility. These windows occupy a large portion of the exterior building envelope. The windows were installed with insulated glazing, however, this insulating value is quite low when compared to a fully insulated wall system. Partially in-filling the openings with insulated wall systems and smaller detention grade windows will enhance both the thermal and detention performance of the exterior walls.

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When combining the thermal inefficiency of both the windows and building exterior brick walls, both heat gain and heat loss associated with the cooling and heating seasons, respectively, are expected to be quite high for this facility.

Exterior insulated finish systems could be applied to the exterior of the building. These systems offer a two-fold benefit. They insulate the facility as well as enhance the exterior appearance. New generation insulated finish systems also offer insulation that is design to drain condensate away from the building. In adding insulation to the exterior of the building, the present multi-wythe brick wall will no longer be exposed to the stresses of seasonal fluctuations of temperature and moisture that presently result in costly removal and replacement of portions of the walls.

*Facade Moisture Characteristics*

Masonry construction is porous in nature and requires periodic sealing to mitigate moisture migration into the building facade and the interior of the building. Periodic replacement of portions of the exterior masonry wall included replacement of steel lintels and headers that were reported to be rusted extensively.

The impact of moisture in this facility is enhanced due to its uninsulated nature. As the warmer interior temperatures meet with the exterior cooler temperatures, condensation is formed. Without insulation, condensation forms within the wall and provides the moist environment needed to deteriorate steel headers and lintels that are embedded within the wall. Masonry ties that may have been used to secure the brick to the building would also be subject to this attack. Sealers will not eliminate this condition and will only serve to mitigate the amount of moisture that penetrates the wall from the exterior.

The addition of insulation to the building exterior and proper flashing would control the point at which condensation is formed and provide a means of removing the moisture to enhance the service life of the building exterior. Removal of condensate is accomplished as described in the previous section.

**Mechanical System Study**

A Mechanical Systems study of three Hamilton County Facilities in Cincinnati, Ohio was performed in June of 2005. The three facilities are:

- Queensgate Correctional Facility
- Reading Road Correctional Center
- Turning Point

All existing equipment was documented and evaluated with respect to each building's needs. Queensgate is the largest facility representing approximately 80,000 square feet of useable space and is the focus of the mechanical portion of this study.

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*Existing Conditions*

Air-conditioning for the building is provided utilizing thirty (30) split systems totaling slightly over 300 tons. Fan coil units provide air distribution to the thirty HVAC zones throughout the building. HVAC for each of the housing floors (two through eight) features two zones; one for the southern half and one for the northern half. This is an effective approach offering good temperature control at minimal installed cost. The fan coil units are not equipped with economizers; therefore, the condensing units typically run continuously; even during winter months.

Outdoor air for occupant ventilation is pre-heated during winter months using electric duct heaters upstream of each fan coil unit. Perimeter heating is provided by a 15-psig, one-pipe steam system with steam radiators located at each floor. There are two (2), 125 horse-power, fire-tube, steam boilers located in the basement of the facility.

Potable water is provided to the facility from the city source with an incoming pressure of 55-psig. There are no isolation valves in the piping network; hence, any repairs to the system require a complete shutdown and draining of the system. The top floors have pressure problems with a residual pressure of approximately 24 psig and 19 psig on the seventh and eighth floors respectively. Flush valves typically require 25 psig as a minimum to operate effectively.

The water heater is approximately 13 years old and is performing adequately. Three-way mixing valves provide tempered water to lavatories and showers, but often malfunction and require frequent maintenance. Plumbing fixtures are made of porcelain with exposed flush valves and water piping. This plumbing design is typically used in commercial applications and is not suitable for detention facilities.

HVAC

The heating system is old and is functioning beyond its service life. Heating is provided by two steam boilers. In terms of gas consumption per Btu of heat produced, these units are not as efficient as boilers utilized in heating systems designed today. Steam is then delivered to radiators on the floors. This type of heat is difficult to control, leading to the subsequent installation of air handling units to temper the interior climate. The two systems are in essence competing with each other to temper the space, and this results in increased operational expenses. The air handling units are mounted beneath the ceiling of each floor. The condensers for these units are mounted on the roof of the facility.

Existing systems that are presently exposed should be enclosed within chases or soffits that are design for a correctional application. Piping, ductwork, and control systems would then be removed from potential tampering. Concealed construction will assist in providing a safer environment for the inmates and most importantly, the staff.

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Plumbing Systems

The plumbing systems are observed to be standard grade porcelain with non-detention grade hardware. Piping is routed in the open space and not concealed. Showers and restrooms have been upgraded with ceramic floors and walls. Shower units are not detention grade fixtures.

Plumbing should be completely replaced. Reconstruction should also include chase walls and cabinets that are designed for a correctional application. Plumbing could then be concealed with only operating parts such as push buttons exposed for use in operating lavatories, toilets, and showers. The installation of concealed construction will result in a minor reduction of available floor space. Chases will need to be constructed in a manner that facilitates maintenance.

Fire Protection Sprinkler System

The fire protection system, like many other systems, is constructed and routed throughout the facility in an open, unprotected manner. The riser piping and associated tamper switches are accessible to inmates. The distribution piping is routed overhead without detention grade sprinkler heads.

The fire protection system should be upgraded by removing non-detention grade sprinkler heads and replacing them with detention grade sprinkler heads. Exposed overhead branch piping will likely need to remain exposed. Fire protection piping that is presently mounted too low should be raised to prevent it from being reached easily. Exposed riser piping and valves should be enclosed within chases consistent in construction required for a correctional facility while providing ease of access to control valves and tamper switches.

Electrical Systems

The electrical service appears to be adequate for the facility. Unprotected outlets are observed in inmate spaces and are exposed. Sub-panels and breaker boxes are located within inmate spaces. Conduit is surface mounted and not tight to the walls and ceilings. Light fixtures are non-security grade fixtures. Chain hung light fixtures with wire covers to protect the lamps are observed throughout the facility. Lamps for the lights are also an older style and less efficient than today designs.

The electrical installation should be upgraded to include improvements consistent with a corrections application. Overhead conduit should be mounted as high as possible and securely fastened to the structure with tamper resistant hardware. Exposed electrical panels and disconnect switches should be enclosed to prevent tampering. Enclosing electrical panels will need to also satisfy the National Electrical Code for access and clearances. This could result in a reduction of available floor space and create potential blind spots on the floors. Additional controls should also be installed on the electrical service to facilitate controlling power and lighting remotely. Light fixtures should be replaced with detention grade fixtures that are installed with security hardware.

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Security Systems

As noted earlier in this section, control throughout the facility is accomplished mostly by keyed access. A minimal number of cameras are used for observation of movement through the facility. Some of the cameras are not operating. For a facility that is operated with the amount of inmate movement observed and reported, the security system is inadequate.

The following is a list of observations as they pertain to security concerns for a correctional facility. All of the building systems were adapted for use as a correctional facility and each system presents concerns as follows.

1. HVAC
  - a. Ductwork is routed within reach of inmates and is accessible for hiding contraband.
  - b. Intake grilles are mounted on plywood sheets in the windows and make the building envelope vulnerable.
  - c. Radiators are enveloped by guards that protect against burns without properly limiting accessibility for hiding contraband.
  - d. Radiator enclosures could be used to harm other inmates or staff.
2. Plumbing
  - a. Piping is routed in open spaces and vulnerable to being tampered with.
  - b. Fixtures are not of a detention grade and are vulnerable to attack.
  - c. Observation of inmate movement by floor stations is limited.
3. Electrical
  - a. Light fixtures are not of a detention grade with tamper resistant lenses.
  - b. Light fixtures are hung in a manner conducive to hiding contraband.
  - c. Electrical outlets are readily accessible for tampering.
  - d. Electrical subpanels and breaker boxes are mounted in the open and within inmate areas.
  - e. Conduit is mounted in a manner that is susceptible to tampering.
4. Fire Protection
  - a. Fire protection risers are installed in inmate areas without protection from tampering.
  - b. Fire protection sprinkler heads are non-detention grade and susceptible to tampering.
5. Door Locks
  - a. Magnetic locks were retrofitted for the facility without door position switches to alert staff to potential perimeter security breaches.
  - b. The wide use of keys provides opportunity for inmates to gain use of keys that could lead to a breach of the security perimeter.
6. Recreation
  - a. Outdoor recreation is located next to city sidewalks and streets that provide opportunity for the flow of contraband and substances to and from the facility.

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- b. Fence systems were installed in a manner that make the interior corners available for climbing and breaching perimeter security.
7. Building Envelope
- a. The security grating mounted over the windows could easily be removed or torn down, thus making the building perimeter easy to breach.
  - b. The security grating is mounted with non-detention grade hardware and could be easily removed with make-shift tools.

The security system is inadequate for the level of inmate detained at this location. The use of direct supervision has succeeded in operating the facility with minimal incident, however, many blind spots exists that provide opportunity for incidents. Magnetic door locks should be replaced with standard jamb locks consistent with the level of inmate located on each floor. When replacing doors and frames, door position switches should be installed to provide a means of monitoring door position and record its use. Consideration should be given to the installation of cameras throughout the facility. Cameras should be installed as needed to eliminate blind spots. New control panels should be installed to integrate all controls for better means of indirect supervision. Real time recording capabilities should be included to record incidents in the facility. Critical locations should also include audio as well as visual recording. Access points should be provided with an intercom system that is interconnected with a camera when activated in order to provide automated visual observation of individual and group movement throughout the facility. Upgrading the control system will necessitate a larger control room in order to house the expanded system.

*Mechanical System Evaluation*

The 300+ tons of mechanical cooling exceed the actual building load of 220 tons. While having excess capacity can be a benefit during extreme weather conditions, during the majority of the year, the refrigeration circuits are forced to cycle on and off resulting in premature failure of the compressors. Additionally, the long vertical pipe runs from the roof to the fifth floor pose a problem for refrigerant systems. The entrained oil necessary for compressor lubrication can have difficulty circulating through the piping network and typically will collect at the bottom (fifth floor) of the circuit. The insufficient oil flow also contributes to premature compressor failure. A building this size can justify a central chilled water system in lieu of the multiple split system approach currently employed. A central chilled water system will provide superior energy efficiency, lower maintenance costs, better performance at partial loading and longer equipment life.

In the late 1990's, the State of Ohio adopted the ASHRAE Standard 62 requiring a significant increase in the amount of outdoor air required for buildings. The existing fan coils do not meet the current (2005) Ohio Mechanical Code for outdoor air flow-rates. Also, utilizing electric resistance duct heaters is extremely inefficient. The lack of an economizer mode on the fan coil units forces the air-cooled condensing units to run 24 hours per day and 365 days per year. This unusual situation results in higher annual electricity charges and reduced life of the condensers.

The two steam boilers are 37 years old and nearing the end of their expected lives. They were decommissioned during our visit, but a visual inspection of the tubes revealed well-maintained equipment with potentially ten additional years of service remaining. The steam

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capacity of 250 horse-power represents just under four times the building load of 70 horse-power. Fortunately, steam boilers operate at partial loading quite efficiently. In addition, the partial loading extends the life of the equipment, which is probably why the boilers look so good after 37 years of service.

The one-pipe steam distribution system represents 1920's technology. There are inherent problems with this heating approach; namely, poor temperature control and pipe corrosion. The typical symptoms include badly corroded piping with frequent leaks and poor heating distribution leaving one end of the building too hot while the opposite end is too cold. Both of these symptoms are present in this facility. There are very few of these systems still in operation in the United States having been upgraded with two-pipe steam systems or two-pipe hot water systems.

Municipal potable water distribution systems commonly operate between 50 and 65 psig. Since potable water piping networks are "open" systems, the pressure has to overcome the static head of the pipe risers. In high-rise buildings (above 5 floors), the static head of the pipe risers can be too high for the municipal water pressure to overcome. Because of the limited pressure, high-rise buildings usually employ potable water booster pumps. There are two design approaches to the use of these pumps:

- Booster pump(s) sized for the entire building load with pressure regulators to reduce the pressure provided to the lower floors.
- Booster pump(s) sized for the upper floors only with the lower floors connected directly to the municipal feed upstream of the booster pump(s).

Given the fact that this is an existing building, option 2 above is probably the most cost effective approach.

**Conclusion**


The sole value in this facility is that it provides housing for a significant portion of the County's inmate population, and its saving grace is that the Sheriff's Office operates it using a direct supervision strategy to manage inmate behavior. The manner in which routine operations have to occur results in both inefficiencies and potential hazards - particularly when considered in the light of higher security inmates being housed in this facility. The design of the facility makes it difficult to deliver even a minimal level of services to the population and challenging for staff to supervise inmates.

Over the last thirteen years, the County has paid a significant amount of money to lease and to operate a facility that was designed to be a two or three year solution to a correctional crisis. Between 1992 and 2005, the County has paid more than \$27 million dollars to lease this aging facility and much more to operate it. This situation can only become more pressing as alternatives to incarceration continue to be used for minimum inmates, resulting in an "in custody" population that presents higher levels of risk.

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## Hamilton County Justice Center (HCJC)

## General Information

*Location and Property Description***Figure 8.6** Hamilton County Justice Center Location

The Hamilton County Justice Center is located in the center of downtown Cincinnati at 1000 Sycamore. It occupies the irregularly shaped block bounded by Sycamore, East Central Parkway, Eggleston Avenue, and East Ninth Street. The site is 3.513 acres and provides 166,951 finished square feet. According to the Hamilton County Auditor, the market value of the land is estimated at \$9,183,900 and the improvements at \$61,023,200, resulting in a total market value of \$70,207,100. Most likely the improved value is the cost of project construction. The facility is located directly across from the Hamilton County Courthouse and is directly linked to the Court through the old Hamilton County Jail.

*Facility Description*

HCJC was occupied in 1985 with an initial capacity of 848 inmates. The facility is essentially comprised of two multistory structures (the north and south buildings) which are

linked by a pedestrian bridge. As noted earlier in this document, this facility was at capacity very soon after occupancy and double celling occurred in two stages. Because of crowding within this facility, the Sheriff's Office sought and obtained a cap established by the Federal District Court which set capacity limits at 1,240 where it has remained since 1994.

The facility provides podular housing units which essentially mirror each other in the north and south buildings. Each floor of inmate housing is divided into two housing groups. Units A-D comprise one unit, resulting in a capacity of 112

**Figure 8.7** HCJC South Building

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inmates (with double ceiling). Units E-H comprise a second unit, resulting in a capacity of up to 112 inmates (with double ceiling). Cells are grouped into units of 8, 8, 16, and 24 with separate dayrooms. Each group of units shares a common control room. This facility is similar to most first generation podular remote designs. In this approach to facility design and inmate management, staff are located in a series of control rooms which have the ability to observe inmates in one or more housing units. The primary philosophy of operations in this facility is a mixed strategy for delivery of services, which will be discussed in greater detail in each of the relevant areas. This also was typical of facilities constructed at this time.

### Inspection Reports

The Ohio Bureau of Adult Detention (BAD) is responsible for inspection of jail facilities in the State. Inspections occur annually and typically focus on a selected group of standards which change annually. This section provides a summary of findings of BAD inspections.

1. 2005 Inspection
  - a. BAD - The facility was in compliance with 61 of the 63 standards which were reviewed this year.
    - i. The facility was non-compliant with 1-8-04 A(2a) and 1-8-04 (4)(a). Both of these standards relate to capacity.
    - ii. BAD indicated that *“action must be taken to limit the prisoner capacities in this jail to within the Bureau’s recommended housing capacity (848). The areas in the jail that are double bunked do not meet the minimum 100 square feet double bunk requirement. These cells should have one of the bunks removed and at that time these cells will be in compliance with single cells standard.”*
    - iii. BAD indicated that *“action must be taken to limit the prisoner population in the jail within the Bureau’s recommended housing capacity to allow the appropriate amount of square footage per prisoner in the dayroom space.”*
  - b. Environmental Sanitation Report for Institutions - Report noted one minor food handling violation, but no violations of temperature control. Further inspections noted the need to replace/repair tile in showers in various housing units.
  - c. City of Cincinnati, Division of Fire Inspection Report - noted no violations.
2. 2004 Inspection
  - a. BAD - the facility was in compliance with the 27 standards selected for inspection this year.
  - b. No environmental or fire inspections were available for this year at the time of BAD’s inspection, was duly noted by BAD. A subsequent fire inspection revealed no violations.

**Figure 8.8** North Building with Court Connector



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3. 2003 Inspection
  - a. Bureau of Adult Detention - the facility was in compliance with the 29 standards selected for inspection this year.
  - b. Environmental Sanitation Report recommended the following:
    - i. Cleaning and sanitizing of showers which were reported to be moldy
  - c. The City of Cincinnati Fire Inspection found no violations.

**Functional Analysis**

On June 16, 2005, the consultant conducted a detailed walk-through of HCJC. This section of this document identifies issues that were noted during that walk-through and are the consultant's observations.

1. In-facility Service Delivery Strategy, Circulation and Movement
  - a. This facility uses a mixed approach to the delivery of services.
  - b. As the primary booking and court holding facility, there is a significant amount of movement within the facility from booking to arraignment courts (which are also provided within the building) as well as to the adjacent courthouse.
  - c. Movement for inmates other than inmate workers is escorted, and large groups of inmates move from intake housing to booking.
  - d. This facility does provide wide primary circulation corridors which are designed to facilitate inmate movement and which are also relatively easy to observe on closed circuit television (CCTV). Within housing and program components areas, corridors are somewhat narrower and there are more corners.
  - e. One of this facility's greatest strengths is its secure connection to the Courts. Holding areas of the old Jail are currently used for post-arraignment court holding. However, the capacity of this area is inadequate for the number of inmates who routinely have to go to court.
2. Inter-facility Movement
  - a. HCJC serves as a transportation hub for inmates who are moving to and from Queensgate, Reading Road and Turning Point.
  - b. HCJC is the primary location of support services (food service and laundry), resulting in a significant amount of movement of materials between facilities.
3. Security and Control
  - a. The security and control systems in the facility are contemporary and were upgraded in 2003.
    - i. Security cameras appear to be of good quality with a mixture of color and black and white. There are more than 80 cameras in the facility.
    - ii. The control system relies on programmable logic controllers and appears to be relatively rapid in its response.
    - iii. It is possible to record (video only) from any camera.
  - b. Some systems which support these security devices are less robust.
    - i. Duress alarms are non-functional.

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- ii. The watchtour system reportedly never functioned as intended.
  - c. There are two central controls, one in each building. Neither appears to have a security vestibule and it appears that door position switches are either non-functional or being over-ridden on a regular basis.
  - d. In addition to these controls, each housing group has a separate control; this would result in sixteen additional control rooms (2 per floor in each tower). In addition, there are two visiting control rooms, one intake control room, and one kitchen control room, resulting in a total of twenty-two control rooms. The prevalence of controls has become somewhat questionable in contemporary correctional design because of the relative inflexibility of these posts. Unless it is possible to close a control room down and return operations to central control, then these are posts which must always be staffed.
- 4. Intake and Release - This is one of the areas which seems most problematic at HCJC.
  - a. The vehicle sallyport appears to have been designed for a much smaller number of in-coming arrests and much less inter-facility transportation. In addition to being uncovered with rather low walls, resulting in a number of escape vulnerabilities, given its shape, the vehicle sallyport is very narrow and was not designed to accommodate busses which are routinely used to move prisoners. 9-10 small vehicles can park in the sallyport. Buses block vehicles routinely.
  - b. This is one area which has been modified significantly to accommodate the increased numbers of in-coming prisoners and the increased role of the Department of Pretrial Services in screening for the Courts; the original booking area was designed for forty-five prisoners. While the renovation was successful in adding space, it has further complicated an ineffective and circuitous circulation pattern within booking and is still inadequately sized for the volume of prisoners who must pass through this area for intake, transportation, and release.
    - i. In booking, there is a need to separate circulation paths for in-coming inmates, inmates going to and from courts, inmates being released to the community and inmates being transported to other locations. This is critical - particularly when handling large groups of inmates - to avoid the potential of releasing the wrong inmate. Although the Sheriff's Office takes all reasonable precautions to appropriately identify inmates within this area, these groups of inmates share the same spaces and could potentially be mixed.
    - ii. Booking is a very sequential process in which movement should be linear with no retracing of steps to complete the process. Booking in this facility frequently involves doubling back to complete the process and is very inefficient.
  - c. The same holding areas are used for different functions during the day and evening hours. While this is efficient from a space perspective, it sets in motion a number of staffing dilemmas in booking associated with managing inmates in this area.
  - d. One of the strongest components of this facility is the extensive intake process which includes evaluation by pre-trial release personnel at the time of booking. This is an excellent approach which addresses specific needs of both the courts and the jail. Classification and health screening occur immediately following intake processing before inmates are placed in housing.
- 5. Courts -
  - a. The inclusion of arraignment courts is a significant asset since movement to court can occur without vehicle transportation. However, there are a number of issues associated with access to the arraignment courtroom from the holding areas, since

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inmates essentially move across the jail perimeter for this hearing and back pending release. A stronger control of this perimeter would be desirable, and video-arraignment might be worth considering in the future.

- b. The court connector between this facility and the former Jail in the Courthouse also provides a secure, if somewhat circuitous, connection between HCJC and the courts. However, the holding space available at the Courthouse is limited. There are five single holding cells and several group holding cells. Typical movement to the court on a daily basis is more than 200 inmates. Inmates are moved to court holding based on morning or afternoon court appearances.
- c. A small room is available on the second floor for video-arraignment of a limited number of inmates.

6. Housing

**Table 8.3** HCJC Housing Capacity

- a. As noted earlier, this facility is podular in design and the predominant inmate management style is remote supervision through a series of control rooms. Although housing areas are supervised by controls, staff actively supervise inmates by moving throughout the units.

North Tower						South Tower					
Unit	Capacity	Cells	Unit	Capacity	Cells	Unit	Capacity	Cells	Unit	Capacity	Cells
N51	112	56	N52	88	56	S51	104	56	S52	104	56
N41	112	56	N42	112	56	S41	112	56	S42	112	56
N31	112	56	N32	96	56	S31	112	56	S32	112	56
N21	46	46	N22	44	18	S21	88	56	S22	48	48
Subtotal	382	214		340	186		416	224		376	216
North Totals						South Totals					
Bed Capacity						722					
Cells						400					
<b>HCJC Totals</b>											
Bed Capacity											1,514
Court Ordered Capacity											1,240
Cells											840
Design Capacity											848
Female Bed Capacity											215
Female Cell Capacity											119
Original capacity included multiple occupancy for 8 additional people in medical											

- b. Table 8.3 provides an overview of capacity, which clearly shows the extent of double celling which has occurred in this facility. BAD's recommended capacity would return the facility to single occupancy.

- c. It is worth noting that the American Corrections Association (ACA) Standards for Adult Local Detention Facilities requires that one-third of housing be designed for single occupancy; it is clear that Hamilton County can not meet this standard. This same standard also requires that inmates who present a high degree of risk be housed in single occupancy. HCJC's problem lies in the fact that it does not have adequate housing for its medical and mental health population. When current national research suggests that in excess of 15% of inmates have a significant mental health disorder, and there is less than 10% of all capacity is in special housing, it tends to support the belief that there are significant deficiencies in specialized housing in HCJC.

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- i. In fact, the unit in which mental health inmates (suicide watch) are held is no different from other housing units in door type and organization. Typically this unit would provide a much higher degree of observation than others. In fact, cell fronts have no additional glazing and door vision panels are classroom sized.
    - ii. The complexity of medical housing needs have increased. Not only are negative pressure rooms required, but many of those with specialty medical needs now need access to special devices, such as sleep apnea machines.
  - d. HCJC is a primary housing location for female inmates; the other location in which women are held is at Reading Road. System-wide, 315 beds (14%) are available to women and nearly half of these (99 beds at Reading Road and 7 beds in medical) are specialized beds. General population capacity for women then is considerable less (about 7% of system capacity). At the time that HCJC was constructed, 10% of beds for women would have been a typical "rule of thumb." Unfortunately, a variety of factors have led to significant increases in the female offender population throughout the US. Today, it is not unusual to see a female population between 15% and 20% of ADP. In addition, because this is a smaller number than the male population, there is greater statistical variability, resulting much more variable counts for females. As a result, there are frequent capacity issues for this population.
7. Health Care - HCJC is the location in which inmates who have the most significant medical and mental health needs are held. As a result, there are a number of issues associated with this function. There is a great deal of inmate movement to this area, both from inside HCJC and from the remote facilities.
  - a. It is reasonable to assume that facility planners could not reasonably anticipate the types of medical challenges that health care staff in this institution face. The emergence of MRSA, HIV, Hepatitis C and more virulent forms of TB have challenged all health care providers in institutions. As a result, this facility is experiencing the issues previously noted under housing comments.
  - b. The approach to delivery of services is mixed. While medications are distributed to each unit, sick call occurs in the clinic area. There are two small holding areas adjacent to the clinic, which are not adequate to hold the number of inmates who need to be seen in clinic.
  - c. There are four exam rooms in the clinic area. Since this clinic also services inmates from the remote facilities, these rooms will be in high demand.
8. Inmate Programs
  - a. The primary strategy for delivery of inmate services is centralized. Inmates move to classrooms and other multi-use areas in which services and programs can be delivered. This results in a significant amount of inmate movement.
  - b. The facility includes two computer classrooms with approximately 20-25 stations each. This is consistent with contemporary approaches to inmate programs and services, providing access to computer based programming.
  - c. There is a chapel available for religious services.
  - d. Today, the most significant difference in this area is likely to be the degree to which these types of programs and activities are decentralized and delivered to inmates in or immediately adjacent to their housing areas. There are two significant advantages to this approach: the degree to which inmate movement (which is labor intensive) is minimized and the greater potential for access to these services.

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
9. Exercise
- a. Ohio Standards require that inmates are offered opportunities for exercise for a minimum of one hour, five days a week. In reality, more is often better, since it provides an opportunity for inmates to release energy in a positive way.
  - b. HCJC provides for centralized exercise areas. An indoor gym is available on the fourth floor and outdoor exercise is available on the roof. All inmates must move to this area. Because this function is centralized, it is likely that larger groups go to exercise together. The larger the group in the area, the higher the staffing requirement and the greater potential for an incident. This approach to exercise has not worked well for correctional facilities; contemporary designs have found alternative approaches to providing this function which are much less labor intensive.
  - c. In contemporary design, most facilities try to decentralize these areas so that they are immediately adjacent to housing areas. This results in a higher degree of access and less inmate movement.
10. Visiting
- a. The facility provides for decentralized non-contact visiting. Visitors move through a separate circulation system to their side of the visiting cubicle. The security perimeter essentially runs through the glazing in each visiting booth and communication occurs via telephone. Inmates can move to their side of the visiting booth from the second level of their housing units.
  - b. This approach minimizes movement and reduces the potential for the introduction of contraband.
11. Food Service - This is the primary food service location for all facilities.
- a. There are two methods of preparation: pre-plated trays, which are distributed throughout HCJC and which are transported to Turning Point and Reading Road, and bulk preparation for Queensgate. Most food service operations would prefer to do only one method of preparation.
  - b. The kitchen has been able to meet the challenges of preparing and staging this number of meals, which strongly suggests that it was designed for something more than the 848 initial capacity. However, if the population continues to grow, additional staging and storage space may be required. The kitchen has a relatively small dry storage area for the population fed; the fact that food service has contracted with a correctional food service vendor with access to off-site facilities and bulk purchasing contracts has been an advantage.
  - c. The layout of the kitchen presents a number of inmate supervision challenges, due to its shape and the inability to easily observe the working areas.
  - d. The loading dock has become an issue for several reasons.
    - i. Although it is an enclosed dock, there are only two slots, one of which is large enough to easily accommodate a tractor trailer. However, this is the location through which inmate work crews move into the facility and through which food is transported to other locations. As a result, there are times when there is a greater demand for dock space.
    - ii. The receiving area is relatively small which results in the need to move deliveries quickly to the location where they will be stored.
12. Laundry - This is the primary laundry facility for the system.

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- a. Laundry equipment is commercial grade and appears to be in relatively good condition. There are three washers and three dryers.
- b. Laundry operates on two shifts and requires 8 detail workers.
- c. Laundry's stock is located across the hall, which requires inmate workers who stock to leave the laundry.
- 13. Maintenance - It was not possible to observe maintenance areas. However, it appears that there is a very active maintenance program in this facility. Equipment appears to be of good quality and in working order, which is remarkable given the number of inmates services in this facility.
- 14. Staff and Administrative Functions
  - a. This facility does provide some amenities for staff, primarily locker rooms and a staff dining area.
  - b. However, it is clear that there are more staff working in the facility than it was designed to accommodate. This is true not only for correctional staff, but for civilian staff, including medical, classification, and pretrial release.

Reading Road Correctional Facility

Figure 8.9 Reading Road Facility



General Information

Location and Property Description

The Reading Road Facility is located at 1613-1617 Reading Road about a mile from HCJC. The facility was constructed in 1930 as a commercial building and was an automobile dealership or garage at one time. The ramps which were used for that purpose are still in the facility. The building has been owned by Talbert House, a non-profit corporation, since 1994 and has been removed

Figure 8.10 Reading Road Facility



## Section 8. Facility Evaluation

from the tax rolls. This three story structure sits on .87 acres of land and includes a small parking area, able to accommodate less than 15 vehicles. Land is currently valued at \$107,200 and improvements at \$1,307,400 for a total property value of \$1,414,600. This is an area which was clearly once commercial in nature and today should probably be considered transitional. The site slopes steeply up behind this facility, and it appears that the area across Hamilton Avenue, behind the facility is residential in nature.

This is a masonry structure with few evidences of correctional grade equipment and construction. It must be considered a minimum security facility. The Reading Road facility accommodates up to 150 inmates on three floors, 100 of whom are female offenders. BAD recommends a capacity of 150, which is consistent with current use. The primary focus of this facility is extended drug and alcohol treatment. The first floor of this facility houses up to 49 females who are being assessed for substance abuse treatment needs. The primary focus for this floor is educational in nature. However, because of crowding in the female offender areas of HCJC, the Sheriff's Office frequently moves female intakes to this area where they are held over night until a bed becomes available for them at HCJC. Talbert House, the Sheriff's Office and a consortium of other groups who are specifically interested in the needs of female offenders have develop a model for an "off the streets" program, similar to the SAGE program in San Francisco which targets women who have been involved in prostitution. The second floor accommodates 50 female inmates in extended treatment, and the third floor accommodates up to 50 male inmates in extended treatment. Inmates in the extended drug treatment program may be charged with offenses other than substance abuse offenses. At the completion of treatment, most inmates have their sentence mitigated.


Each of the floors in this facility are identical, with the exception of an area which has been modified on the first floor to provide for office and security functions. Each floor is operated independently of the others, which provides gender specific program opportunities at this location. What is remarkable about this facility is not the structure at all, but its program, which will be described in more detail later in this section.

### Inspection Reports

This section provides a summary of findings of BAD inspections.

1. 2005 Inspection

Figure 8.11 Reading Road Floor Plan



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**Section 8. Facility Evaluation**

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- a. BAD - The facility was in compliance with all 63 standards which were reviewed this year.
  - b. Environmental Sanitation Report for Institutions - This inspection noted the need to replace a variety of pillows and mattresses
  - c. City of Cincinnati, Division of Fire noted no violations.
2. 2004 Inspection
    - a. BAD - the facility was in compliance with the 27 standards selected for inspection this year.
    - b. No environmental or fire inspections were available for this year.
  3. 2003 Inspection
    - a. BAD - the facility was in compliance with the 29 standards selected for inspection this year.
    - b. Environmental Sanitation Report found no violations
    - c. The City of Cincinnati Fire Inspection found no violations.

**Functional Analysis**

1. In-facility Service Delivery Strategy, Circulation and Movement - All programming and activity occurs on the floor, and inmates have relatively high freedom of movement on the floor. Correctional staff are assigned to each floor who supervise inmates along with treatment counselors. All services, except for recreation, are decentralized to the floor.
2. Inter-facility Movement - As noted earlier in this section, this facility is close to HCJC. However, all transportation will occur in a vehicle. The parking area for this facility is small enough that the transportation vans routinely used can easily block vehicle access. In addition, Reading Road is a heavily traveled thoroughfare; entering and exiting the facility can be difficult.
3. Security and Control
  - a. Security control technology and space were added when the facility was renovated for treatment uses.
  - b. Control technology provides for the ability to monitor specific areas of the facility, door controls (perimeter doors only), and intercoms.
  - c. Movement on and off the floor is controlled by staff in key operated elevators.
4. Intake and Release - All intake and release functions occur at HCJC.
5. Housing - All housing is dormitory style.
  - a. Each floor has two units, able to accommodate 26 and 24 inmates. Each unit is further subdivided into smaller sleeping rooms.
  - b. All inmates on a floor share common day and activity spaces.
  - c. Toilets and showers are provided for each floor. Each shower room provides 5 shower, 5 toilets, and 2 sinks.
6. Health Care - This is a satellite health care facility. Health care staff come to this location from HCJC in the morning for triage and to deliver medications. Most health care treatment requires transportation to HCJC.
7. Inmate Programs - Talbert House is a progressive, multi-service community non-profit corporation, which developed from a single halfway house program. Talbert House serves a broad population and develops and delivers quality mental health, community corrections, welfare-to-work and substance abuse services in both correctional and non-correctional settings.

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**Section 8. Facility Evaluation**

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- a. Talbert House provides two different programs at this facility. Females who are housed on the first floor participate in an assessment and educational program. As noted earlier, this floor may shift in purpose to house a dual diagnosis program that targets women who have been involved in prostitution.
  - b. Women who are housed on the second floor and men who are housed on the third floor participate in a longer term treatment program (90 - 120 days). This program is cognitive-behavioral in nature. Inmates participate in a variety of group and individual treatment activities during the day; evenings provide for visiting and mandatory participation in daily 12 step groups.
  - c. Because Talbert House provides a variety of services outside of the facility, there are strong linkages to aftercare.
  - d. Inmates at this facility are sentenced misdemeanants; felons receive comparable services at River City (a community corrections facility). There are relatively few program restrictions, however, inmates who are fire setters, escape risks or assaultive are not placed here.
  - e. As this program is involved in a continuous process of quality improvement, there has been a clear interest in developing and integrating more gender specific programming.
8. Exercise - Each floor has an activity area which includes cardio-vascular fitness equipment. An outdoor exercise area is available behind the facility.
  9. Visiting - Six non-contact booths are available on the first floor. Visiting times are designated by floors and inmates move to the visiting area. There is relatively little space in which visitors can wait.
  10. Food Service - Meals are pre-plated and delivered on insulated trays. Inmates eat in their day areas.
  11. Laundry - Inmates are responsible for some of their own laundry, but HCJC is responsible for bedding and blankets.
  12. Maintenance - Maintenance areas were not observed.
  13. Staff and Administrative Functions - Counseling staff have offices on each of the floors in which they provide individual treatment. Administrative and support staff have office space assigned on the first floor.

**Physical Building Analysis***Structural Load Characteristics*

As stated previously, this multi-story concrete/masonry building was constructed around 1930. For many years, the building was reportedly utilized as a parking garage and car dealership. The structure is situated in front of sloping terrain and as such, the rear wall of the building functions as a retaining wall. The soils are retained to a height just below the roof level.

The facility structure is predominantly cast-in-place concrete columns and beams with a cast-in-place floor slab. The floor slab appears to have been poured integrally with the supporting concrete beams. Other than cosmetic issues, no distress was observed on the interior structural support systems.

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**Section 8. Facility Evaluation**

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The exterior of the facility is comprised of multi-wythe masonry construction. This exterior shell of masonry may or may not be tied to the cast-in-place concrete support structure. The masonry exterior system appears to be servicing the facility adequately. As with previous discussion on other County facilities, sealing of the masonry should be part of a maintenance program.

If modifications are made to this facility, it will be necessary to evaluate current code requirements. Since the structure is known to fall within the influence of the New Madrid fault, the present structure will need to be evaluated for resistance to seismic design criteria. This criteria was not considered in the original design, and evaluation will most likely demonstrate the structure's inability to resist such applied loads without extensive structural retrofit of the lateral bracing systems.

*Facade Thermal Characteristics*

Although constructed of masonry and most likely uninsulated originally, it appears the facility has been renovated to include interior build-out that has enhanced the thermal performance of the building. Additional thermal enhancements could be made throughout the facility with the installation of insulated windows.

*Facade Moisture Characteristics*

Unlike the Queensgate facility, moisture related damage to the facade appears to be minimal.

*Plumbing Systems*

The plumbing systems are observed to be standard grade porcelain with non-detention grade hardware. Piping is routed in the open space and not concealed. Showers and restrooms have been upgraded. Shower units are not detention grade fixtures.

Plumbing should be completely replaced. Reconstruction should also include chase walls and cabinets that are designed for a correctional application. Plumbing could then be concealed with only operating parts such as push buttons exposed for use in operating lavatories, toilets, and showers. The installation of concealed construction will result in a minor reduction of available floor space. Chases will need to be constructed in a manner that facilitates maintenance.

*Fire Protection Sprinkler System*

The fire protection system, like many other systems, is constructed and routed throughout the facility in an open, unprotected manner. The distribution piping is routed overhead without detention grade sprinkler heads.

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**Section 8. Facility Evaluation**

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The fire protection system should be upgraded by removing non-detention grade sprinkler heads and replacing them with detention grade sprinkler heads. Exposed overhead branch piping will likely need to remain exposed. Fire protection piping that is presently mounted too low should be raised to prevent it from being reached easily.

*Electrical Systems*

The electrical service appears to be adequate for the facility. Unprotected outlets are observed in inmate spaces and are exposed. Conduit is surface mounted and not tight to the walls and ceilings. Light fixtures are non-security grade fixtures. Chain hung light fixtures with wire covers to protect the lamps are observed throughout the facility. Lamps for the lights are also an older style and less efficient than today's designs.

The electrical installation should be upgraded to include improvements consistent with a corrections application. Overhead conduit should be mounted as high as possible and securely fastened to the structure with tamper resistant hardware. Light fixtures should be replaced with detention grade fixtures that are installed with security hardware.

*Security Systems*

The following is a list of observations as they pertain to security concerns for a correctional facility. All of the building systems were adapted for use as a correctional facility and each system presents concerns as follows.

1. HVAC
  - a. Ductwork is routed within reach of inmates and is accessible for hiding contraband.
  - b. Intake grilles are mounted on plywood sheets in the windows and make the building envelope vulnerable.
  - c. Radiators are enveloped by guards that protect against burns without properly limiting accessibility for hiding contraband.
2. Plumbing
  - a. Piping is routed in open spaces and vulnerable to being tampered with.
  - b. Fixtures are not of a detention grade and are vulnerable to attack.
3. Electrical
  - a. Light fixtures are not of a detention grade with tamper resistant lenses.
  - b. Light fixtures are hung in a manner conducive to hiding contraband.
  - c. Electrical outlets are readily accessible for tampering.
  - d. Conduit is mounted in a manner that is susceptible to tampering.
4. Fire Protection

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**Section 8. Facility Evaluation**

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- a. Fire protection sprinkler heads are non-detention grade and susceptible to tampering.
5. Building Envelope
- a. The building construction could be breached rather easily and consideration should be given to perimeter upgrades that enhance security.
  - b. An inmate could gain access to the roof. Doors leading to the roof are not monitored and provide no warning that the perimeter is potentially being breached. Once on the roof, an inmate could easily leave by jumping onto the slope retained by the back of the building.

The security system is inadequate at this location. The use of direct supervision has succeeded in operating the facility with minimal incident, however, many blind spots exist that provide opportunity for incidents. Doors and frames should be replaced with detention grade construction that automates access and provides a means of checking the status of the doors. When replacing doors and frames, door position switches should be installed to provide a means of monitoring door position and record its use. Consideration should be given to the installation of cameras throughout the facility. Cameras should be installed as needed to eliminate blind spots. New control panels should be installed to integrate all controls for better means of indirect supervision. Real time recording capabilities should be included to record incidents in the facility. Critical locations should also include audio as well as visual recording. Access points should be provided with an intercom system that is interconnected with a camera when activated in order to provide automated visual observation of individual and group movement throughout the facility. Upgrading the control system will necessitate a larger control room in order to house the expanded system.

*Mechanical System Evaluation*

The HVAC system appears to be adequate for this facility. The facility is serviced by roof top units that appear to be in good operating condition. Other than security concerns expressed previously, no comment is offered with the regard to mechanical system improvements.



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1. Other priorities have overtaken law enforcement and there may be less of an emphasis on DUI.
2. Driving while intoxicated is less socially acceptable in 2005 than it was in 1985.
3. The fact that this is a very low security facility, with minimal correctional supervision, may limit who can be housed here.

Turning Point is a pleasing brick structure with four levels. Inmates are housed on the first through third floors in small dormitory style rooms. Program space includes a variety of group rooms and a large multi-use room which are located throughout the facility. This facility has three separate furnaces (one for each expansion) and is likely to have many of the energy efficiency issues typical in buildings of this age. There is a volleyball area outside that serves as an exercise area. There is a privacy fence separating the grounds from the adjacent houses, but this is essentially a non-secure facility.

### Inspection Reports


This section provides a summary of findings of BAD inspections.

1. 2005 Inspection
  - a. BAD - The facility was in compliance with all 63 standards which were reviewed this year.
  - b. Environmental Sanitation Report for Institutions -
  - c. City of Cincinnati, Division of Fire noted no violations, but commented that fire extinguishers were to be recharged the month of the inspection.
2. 2004 Inspection
  - a. BAD - the facility was in compliance with the 27 standards selected for inspection this year.
  - b. No environmental or fire inspections were available for this year.
3. 2003 Inspection
  - a. BAD - the facility was in compliance with the 29 standards selected for inspection this year.
  - b. Environmental Sanitation Report recommended the following:
    - i. Repair of broken plaster
  - c. The City of Cincinnati Fire Inspection found no violations.

### Functional Analysis

1. In-facility Service Delivery Strategy, Circulation and Movement - Inmates in this facility are unescorted. A single corrections officer is assigned to supervise the facility.

**Figure 8.14** Turning Point Floor Plan



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**Section 8. Facility Evaluation**

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2. Inter-facility Movement - Because this is a short-term facility, inmates are not likely to leave this facility. Services and supplies are delivered to Turning Point.
3. Security and Control - There were no security or control systems noted, other than good practice regarding manually locked doors.
4. Intake and Release - All inmates are booked at HCJC and brought to this facility.
5. Housing
  - a. All housing is dormitory style in small rooms of 2-4 occupants.
  - b. Equipment is residential in nature.
6. Health Care - A nurse comes to Turning Point twice daily from HCJC to deliver medications and provide triage services. If additional care is needed, the inmate would be transported to HCJC.
7. Inmate Programs
  - a. Like Reading Road, this facility's programs are operated by Talbert House. The focus in this facility is various types of driving intervention programs, with the duration dependent on the number of driving violations.
  - b. This facility also has a strong program day in which daily activities provide individual and group activities from approximately 9 AM until 4 PM. Evenings include both opportunities for visiting and self-help groups such as AA.
8. Exercise - In addition to exercise equipment in the facility, an outdoor volleyball court provides for active exercise. Because this population is relatively short-term, this approach to exercise seems appropriate.
9. Visiting - Visiting in this facility allows contact. Visiting occurs in the central dining area. Again, given the nature of this population, contact visiting is an acceptable option.
10. Food Service - Food is trayed and delivered to this location from HCJC. Meals are eaten in a central dining area, which is also used for larger group activities. This is another facility which uses HCJC resources.
11. Laundry - Residential grade washers and dryers are available in the basement of the facility.
12. Maintenance - Like the others noted, this facility is clean and well-maintained. However, this is clearly an older facility and shows all of the symptoms of what was essentially a residence being used for congregate living.
13. Staff and Administrative Functions - There are small offices provided for staff.

**Physical Building Analysis***Structural Load Characteristics*

The facility was constructed in 1930 as a residence and construction reflects this. No distress was observed during our walk-through. Typical to older residential design, corridors are narrow, stairs are narrow and tend to be steeper than today's designs. Although not a structural issue, the existing floor plan does not function well in terms of the functional relationship of the spaces.

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**Section 8. Facility Evaluation**

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*Accessibility Characteristics*

The existing floor plan, stairs (both interior and exterior), and narrow design present a considerable challenge in accommodating persons with a disability.

*Facade Thermal and Moisture Characteristics*

The building envelope appears to be functioning satisfactorily. As with all buildings constructed in this time frame, the extent of insulation in the walls would be expected to be minimal or non-existent.

*Plumbing Systems*

The plumbing systems are observed to be standard grade porcelain with non-detention grade hardware. Piping is routed in the open space and not concealed. Showers and restrooms have been upgraded. Shower units are not detention grade fixtures.

Although the level of security for this building is not the same as the previous buildings, consideration should be given to upgrades that enhance the installation to reflect detention concerns.

*Fire Protection Sprinkler System*

The fire protection system is constructed and routed throughout the facility in an open, unprotected manner and in many instances is located within corridors. This could potentially impede travel through the corridor during emergency egress scenarios and expose the County to liability. Consideration should be given to removing riser piping from the corridors. The distribution piping is routed overhead without detention grade sprinkler heads.

*Electrical Systems*

The electrical service appears to be adequate for the facility. Light fixtures are non-security grade fixtures. Chain hung light fixtures with wire covers to protect the lamps are observed throughout the facility. Lamps for the lights are also an older style and less efficient than today's designs.

The electrical installation should be upgraded to include improvements consistent with a corrections application. Overhead conduit should be mounted as high as possible and securely fastened to the structure with tamper resistant hardware. Light fixtures should be replaced with detention grade fixtures that are installed with security hardware.

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**Section 8. Facility Evaluation**

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*Security Systems*

As mentioned previously, security is provided by the use locks that are manually operated by a single corrections officer located at this facility. At a minimum, consideration should be given to automating the exterior door access. This would provide the officer with a means of indirectly supervising more of the facility without being drawn away from internal activities. A limited controls system could be installed that would include an intercom, camera, and monitor.

*Mechanical System Evaluation*

The HVAC system appears to be adequate for this facility. The facility is serviced by residential units located in spaces retrofitted to serve as mechanical rooms. These systems appear to have been well maintained and are servicing the facility adequately.

**Conclusions**

1. With the notable exception of the Hamilton County Justice Center (HCJC), all of the facilities in use range in age from 70 - 100 years old. In addition, none of these facilities, with the exception of HCJC, were originally designed as correctional facilities. All have been retrofitted with varying success for their current purposes. Of the four facilities, Queensgate appears to the consultant to be the least successful - particularly when viewed in conjunction with the housing of medium security inmates in this location. With the exception of HCJC, none can be considered appropriate, based on the structure, layout, equipment and finishes, for correctional purposes beyond the lowest security levels. Given utilization rates in the various facilities, it appears that the jail population now has a lower proportion of minimum security inmates than it did in the past, resulting in the need for higher security beds than these facilities provide.
2. All of these facilities are relatively close to HCJC, and all rely strongly on the delivery of services from HCJC for daily operations. While this is clearly understandable from a financial and functional perspective, the movement of inmates, food, laundry and other materials clearly complicates daily operations at HCJC and provides ample opportunities for security violations. In the opinion of the consultant, Queensgate is particularly problematic because of its size. It is one thing to transport meals to Turning Point at up to 60 beds, and quite another to transport meals to Queensgate at up to 822.
3. With the exception of HCJC, these facilities are clearly at or beyond their useful life cycle. Examination of past practices suggests that both the County and the City have had a history of using facilities, such as the Workhouse and the old Jail, for very long periods of time. In the long-term, the extended use of facilities beyond their normal life-cycle was at least partially responsible for past litigation regarding conditions of confinement. Hamilton County has also, in the past, double and triple celled its primary correctional facility until ordered by the Federal District Court to reduce population. In the consultant's opinion, it is reasonable to assume that the County once again has increased vulnerability for confinement conditions, given the age of its facilities, and the degree to which the system has become reliant on multiple occupancy for medium and maximum security inmates.

## Section 8. Facility Evaluation

4. HCJC is clearly the best of these four facilities from a physical plant perspective. Yet, there are a number of significant issues here as well. There are areas within this facility that no longer meet the needs of the current population and are likely to become even more problematic in the future.
- a. Crowding in housing results in a significant number of inmates being placed in double occupancy. As the jail capacity was increased in the 1990's, the proportion of single cells decreased. When double celling occurred, even fewer single cells were available. However, the proportion of inmates who stay in custody on a long-term basis and are held at HCJC is a population in which more single occupancy is needed. BAD has been quite clear on its position that the capacity of this facility should be returned to the original 848, which provided much greater single occupancy.
  - b. The booking and intake areas have reached a point at which they no longer accommodate all of the functions which must occur here, given the number of inmates being processed.
  - c. The volume of inmates being booked, moving to arraignment court, being transported to other locations, and being released is large enough that it has become essential to separate the areas used by these populations and their circulation paths to avoid the potential for errors associated with release functions.
  - d. The consistent need to move inmates to exercise, health care, education and other program services is a staff-intensive approach to service delivery. Although this facility is likely to house most pretrial detainees whose service needs are not likely to extend to educational program, pretrial inmates will use all of the other services. Particularly problematic are approaches to meet the needs of inmates with medical and mental health needs.
  - e. There clearly is not enough space for female offenders. Females are the most likely inmates for early release, since they generally present a lower level of risk to the community, if not to themselves. Females have been early released since at least 1993, and it is clear that female ADP has become capacity driven.
  - f. It is also clear that a number of the support areas of the facility are operating at capacity. This is particularly true of food service and the loading dock. It will be essential to evaluate the ability of this area to support any additional inmate capacity.
  - g. Since the 1980's when this facility was planned, the activities required to provide mandated services in correctional facilities have expanded. This, in turn, has resulted in increases in personnel. The facility does not have adequate work areas for the number of staff currently employed.
  - h. The prevalence of secure control rooms in this facility raises the question of potential efficiencies that could be obtained if:
    - i. A single central control could be created to manage the perimeter and access across zones.
    - ii. The number of housing controls could be reduced with an alternative means of inmate behavior management and supervision used during at least during portions of the day.
  - i. An examination of the degree to which core functions of this facility, including mechanical and maintenance spaces, are adequate for increased population levels will be required in any expansion effort.
  - j. The value of this facility is its connection to the courts, which provides for a secure connection into the courthouse. If this connection were to be lost, the County would face significantly higher costs for transportation of inmates to and from courts.

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**Section 8. Facility Evaluation**

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5. Because of the large number of inmates held at the Queensgate facility, its continued use is particularly problematic.
  - a. The Queensgate facility was originally converted from a warehouse to correctional use from 1990 - 1992. The facility was renovated quickly because of jail population pressures in the County; it was renovated as economically as possible because its original intended lifespan was three years. The facility has now been operating continuously since 1992, and since that period the County has paid in excess of \$27 million dollars to lease the facility, in addition to the costs of operating it, paying property taxes, and maintaining any damage attributable to inmate or staff damage.
    - i. The materials selected were not correctional grade.
    - ii. Many design elements did not meet the correctional standards of the day, and the Bureau of Adult Detention granted variances because of the anticipated short life of the facility.
  - b. Queensgate was originally designed and approved for minimum security inmates; now 50% of its population are medium and maximum classifications.
    - i. The security system is inadequate for the level of inmates now held; the magnetic locking system used is not in current use in full-service jails and has severe limitations particularly in the event of a mass evacuation.
    - ii. Other security systems such as intercoms and cameras are almost totally lacking.
  - c. Maintenance considerations at this facility are significant and not without cost impacts:
    - i. The facility was not designed to withstand potential earthquakes.
    - ii. The uninsulated exterior walls have developed moisture problems which required extensive maintenance.
    - iii. The plumbing systems are not correctional grade, and water pressure on the upper two floors is inadequate.
    - iv. The heating system is at or near the end of its life-cycle.
    - v. HVAC, electrical, plumbing and fire protection systems are all within easy reach of inmates.
    - vi. The lack of insulation results in the continuous use of air conditioning to attempt to balance temperature levels.
  - d. The population held at Queensgate is among the most appropriate for program interventions. However, program space is so limited that basic services, such as recreation and education, which are required by standards are not available to the population. There are only two classrooms, which can accommodate a maximum of 32 inmates.
  - e. The facility has operated with minimal incidents to this point because of the successful management of direct supervision strategies. The Corrections Division has promoted an orderly style of operations in which staff are in control, and they have maintained the facility in a way that is remarkable for its age and current use. Nevertheless, there are indications that the number of incidents which have occurred here have increased as the minimum security proportion of the population decreased. As the facility continues to age and the security level of inmates housed there increases, the chances for successful outcomes diminishes very quickly.

