

**IN THE COURT OF APPEALS  
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO  
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO**

DONALD YOUNG,	:	APPEAL NO. C-090771
	:	TRIAL NO. SP-0900060
Petitioner-Appellant,	:	
	:	<i>JUDGMENT ENTRY.</i>
vs.	:	
STATE OF OHIO,	:	
	:	
Respondent-Appellee.	:	

We consider this appeal on the accelerated calendar, and this judgment entry is not an opinion of the court.<sup>1</sup>

In 2004, petitioner-appellant Donald Young was convicted of sexual imposition. The trial court did not hold a sexual-offender classification hearing or enter an order classifying Young as a sexual offender. Therefore, Young was a sexually oriented offender by operation of law under former R.C. Chapter 2950 (“Megan’s Law”).<sup>2</sup> Young was required to annually register as a sexual offender for ten years.

Young received a notice from the Ohio Attorney General stating that he had been reclassified under Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 (“Senate Bill 10”) as a Tier I sex offender and that he was required to annually register with the local sheriff for 15 years. Young filed an R.C. 2950.031(E) petition to contest his reclassification, challenging the

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<sup>1</sup> See S.Ct.R.Rep.Op. 3(A), App.R. 11.1(E), and Loc.R. 12.

<sup>2</sup> See *State v. Hayden*, 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, 773 N.E.2d 502; *In re Abney*, 1st Dist. No. C-080053, 2008-Ohio-4379; *In re Hawkins*, 1st Dist. No. C-080052, 2008-Ohio-4381; *State v. Cooper*, 1st Dist. No. C-030921, 2004-Ohio-6428.

constitutionality of Senate Bill 10. After a hearing, the trial court overruled Young's constitutional challenges to Senate Bill 10 and denied his R.C. 2950.031(E) petition.

Young's first assignment of error, which alleges that the retroactive application of Senate Bill 10's tier-classification and registration requirements violates the constitutional ban on ex post facto laws, is overruled.

"The Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to criminal statutes."<sup>3</sup> We held in *Sewell v. State*<sup>4</sup> that the tier-classification and registration provisions of Senate Bill 10 are remedial and not punitive, and that they do not have the effect of converting a remedial statute into a punitive one. Because Senate Bill 10's classification and registration provisions are civil and remedial, not criminal, they do not violate the constitutional ban on ex post facto laws.

Young's second and fourth assignments of error are overruled because the retroactive application of Senate Bill 10's tier-classification and registration requirements does not violate the prohibition on retroactive laws contained in Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution or the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Ohio Constitution.<sup>5</sup> Young's arguments under the United States Constitution are also overruled on *Sewell's* reasoning.

Young's third assignment of error alleges that Senate Bill 10's requirement that the attorney general reclassify him as a Tier I sex offender violates the separation-of-powers doctrine inherent in Ohio's Constitution. We addressed and rejected that argument in *Sewell v. State*,<sup>6</sup> holding that the retroactive application of Senate Bill 10's

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<sup>3</sup> See *State v. Cook*, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 1998-Ohio-291, 700 N.E.2d 570, citing *California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales* (1995), 514 U.S. 499, 504, 115 S.Ct. 1597, and *Collins v. Youngblood* (1990), 497 U.S. 37, 43, 110 S.Ct. 2715.

<sup>4</sup> 181 Ohio App.3d 280, 2009-Ohio-872, 908 N.E.2d 995.

<sup>5</sup> Id.

<sup>6</sup> Id.

tier-classification and registration requirements did not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. In *Green v. State*,<sup>7</sup> we revisited the separation-of-powers issue in light of the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in *State v. Bodyke*.<sup>8</sup> We held in *Green* that the supreme court's decision in *Bodyke* did not apply to cases in which there is no prior court order classifying the offender under a sex-offender category.<sup>9</sup> In cases where there has been no prior judicial adjudication of the offender under a sex-offender category, our holding in *Sewell* is still applicable.<sup>10</sup>

The record does not contain a final court order classifying Young under Megan's Law. Therefore, the *Bodyke* decision does not apply to him, and pursuant to our holdings in *Sewell* and *Green*, his reclassification by the attorney general under Senate Bill 10 does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.<sup>11</sup> The third assignment of error is overruled.

Young's fifth assignment of error is overruled. Young has no standing to challenge Senate Bill 10's residency restriction because he has not shown that he lives in or owns property within the restricted area or that he has been forced to move outside the restricted area.<sup>12</sup> We note that the Ohio Supreme Court held in *Hyle v. Porter*<sup>13</sup> that because the residency restriction in former R.C. 2950.031 was not expressly made retrospective, it could not be applied to an offender who had bought his home and committed his offense before the effective date of the statute.

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<sup>7</sup> *Green v. State*, 1st Dist. No. C-090650, 2010-Ohio-4371.

<sup>8</sup> \_\_\_ Ohio St.3d \_\_\_, 2010-Ohio-2424, \_\_\_ N.E.2d \_\_\_.

<sup>9</sup> See *Green v. State*, supra, ¶9, at fn. 7.

<sup>10</sup> See *id.*

<sup>11</sup> See *id.* at ¶10.

<sup>12</sup> See *State v. Randlett*, 4th Dist. No. 08CA3046, 2009-Ohio-112, reversed in part and remanded on other grounds, *In re Sexual Offender Reclassification Cases*, \_\_\_ Ohio St.3d \_\_\_, 2010-Ohio-3753, \_\_\_ N.E.2d \_\_\_; *State v. Swank*, 11th Dist. No. 2008-L-019, 2008-Ohio-6059; *State v. Duncan*, 3rd Dist. No. 7-08-03, 2008-Ohio-5830.

<sup>13</sup> 117 Ohio St.3d 165, 2008-Ohio-542, 882 N.E.2d 899.

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Young's sixth assignment of error, alleging that the retroactive application of Senate Bill 10's registration requirements constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, is overruled because the statutes are civil and remedial, not punitive.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, the registration requirements cannot be viewed as punishment.<sup>15</sup>

Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Further, a certified copy of this judgment entry shall constitute the mandate, which shall be sent to the trial court under App.R. 27. Costs shall be taxed under App.R. 24.

**SUNDERMANN, P.J., HENDON and MALLORY, JJ.**

*To the Clerk:*

Enter upon the Journal of the Court on September 22, 2010

per order of the Court \_\_\_\_\_  
Presiding Judge

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<sup>14</sup> See *Sewell v. State*, supra, at fn. 4.

<sup>15</sup> See id.; *State v. Williams*, 12th Dist. No. CA2008-02-029, 2008-Ohio-6195; *State v. Byers*, 7th Dist. No. 07 CO 39, 2008-Ohio-5051.